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Grinevskiy Discusses Progress at Vienna Talks

LD3004140690 Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 30 Apr 90

[Text] Last weekend another round of talks devoted to European isues ended in Vienna. There are two sets of talks—one devoted to conventional forces in Europe, and the other to searching for ways of promoting security, confidence, and disarmament on the continent. Our Vienna correspondent has spoken to the head of the Soviet delegation, Oleg Grinevskiy:

[Begin Grinevskiy recording in Russian with superimposed English translation] This past round, Oleg Grinevskiy says, saw an intensive search for a compromise on all points of the future treaties. Many agreements were reached. The sides have made good progress in terms of disarmament. A treaty on conventional forces in Europe is shaping up and big advances have been made on information exchange and control. For the first time the sides went into the technicalities of arms and equipment elimination. On the last day the Soviet team offered a draft protocol setting procedures to make the arms reduced unfit for combat use, scrap them or convert them to non-military uses.

However, Oleg Grinevskiy went on, there's no ground for euphoria as to the progress at the talks. Moreover, there's ground for concern given the long way ahead. The pace of the talks has visibly slowed down. On some issues the sides have been treading water. What's the matter?

The Warsaw Treaty and NATO leaders have been unanimous on the need for accelerating the negotiations and have rendered political support to the negotiations. The foreign ministers of many countries have been to Vienna to join the discussion. But when the sides get down to brass tacks the initiatives of the leaders seem to be neutralized by Western experts.

For instance, the foreign ministers of the two alliances agreed on the reduction of Soviet and American troops in Europe at their Ottawa meeting more than two months ago, but work on an appropriate treaty is yet to start in Vienna. The Soviet team has repeatedly suggested that such work begin, but NATO has been temporizing. It is doing the same on the issue of tanks.

Nevertheless I believe an agreement on conventional forces in Europe may be signed before the end of the year; a treaty on confidence-building measures can be ready by the start of the next European summit meeting. [end recording]

That was a statement made by Oleg Grinevskiy, head of the Soviet delegation at the Vienna talks.

West's Stance on Tank Cuts Decried

LD3004204890 Bratislava Domestic Service in Slovak 1630 GMT 30 Apr 90

[Text] Problems concerning tanks are among the important questions of the Vienna talks. Our special correspondent Michal Berko asked Oleg Grinevskiy, head of the Soviet delegation, about his view on this issue:

[Begin Grinevskiy recording in Russian fading into Slovak translation] Among the Warsaw Pact member states, it was the Soviet Union that expressed its wish and preparedness to destroy 40,000 tanks. I think that the political significance of this step, especially in the present situation in Europe, is clear. The West should keep in step with us. It should make use of the current situation to speed up the signing of an agreement, as it was from the west that we heard about the tanks threat from the side of the Soviet Union. It is not so. Instead of signing the agreement, they began squabbling about some tens or perhaps a hundred tanks, which Western experts are trying to exlude from the agreement. [end recording]

TASS Views Vienna Conventional Arms Talks

LD2604153790 Moscow TASS in English 1528 GMT 26 Apr 90

[By Vladimir Chernyshev, TASS analyst on military affairs]

[Text] Moscow April 26 TASS—Another round of the talks on conventional armed forces in Europe which are conducted by 23 Warsaw Treaty and NATO states, ended in Vienna today.]

The sides concentrated on a search for solutions, compromises and agreements on all issues which will make up a futher agreement. They have made considerable headway, and the outline of the future document is becoming more visible.

The partners have done much work on exchanging information and control, which was largely promoted by a draft protocol on inspections submitted by a delegation of the German Democratic Republic on behalf of the Warsaw Treaty states.

Thd draft takes into account the West's position.

The distinguishing feature of this round is that the sides discussed for the first time the destruction of weapons and military hardware limited by a treaty.

Nevertheless, despite positive results achieved at the talks, the two sides' positions are not drawing closer quickly enough to ensure the signing of a treaty this year.

It is justifiable to reproach Western partners for their lukewarm interest in achieving progress. They refuse to consider compromises on categories of weapons subject to reduction, including combat aviation.

The East tried various avenues to achieve a compromise: It agreed to establish appropriate levels on he classes of warplanes that originally had been considered outside the limitations altogether.

This category will be expanded under a future treaty.

However, the sides cannot overcome substantial differences due to the inflexible position of NATO countries. This concerns, above all, the number of planes to be cut.

The West suggests a ceiling of 500 planes for air-defense interceptors, the East—1,500. The sides also differ on whether land-based marine aviation should also go under the axe.

The impression is that the West, using differences in the present structures of East-West aviation and a geographic factor, hopes to gain favorable conditions.

The partners have not settled other important questions, including the definition of tanks and infantry armored carriers as well as ceilings for artillery.

After settling these issues, the sides would make headway in settling the levels and sub-levels for these categories of weapons, which, in turn, would enable the negotiators to agree on the question of zones and zonal limitations.

Much difficult work remains to be done. If participants in the talks become inspired to make headway in drafting a treaty, they will be able to achieve the aim set by the East and West at the top level: to sign the first treaty on the reduction of conventional weapons and troops in Europe by the end of this year.

Prospects, Future of START Examined

PM2704160290 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 16, 17-23 Apr 90 pp 10-11

[Andrey Kortunov and Sergey Fedorenko article: "After the Treaty. What's in Store? Reflections After the Shevardnadze-Baker Meeting in Washington."]

[Text] Disarmament was the main item on the diverse agenda discussed by Ministers Shevardnadze and Baker. That fact can be evaluated in different ways: On the one hand it is evidence of the Soviet and American leaders' attempts to dismantle the main confrontational mechanism in postwar politics as soon as possible. On the other hand it can be regarded as a sign that the inherent conservatism of the two sides obliges them to discuss disarmament to the detriment of other issues no less important for the future of Soviet-American relations.

Anyway, the Washington meeting confirmed once again that disarmament remains the main concern of the superpowers. In its turn, the disarmament topic is dominated by the talks on reduction of strategic offensive armaments. Since the early seventies these talks have been the axis of the bilateral relations. Other aspects of Moscow-Washington relations were directly or indirectly linked with these talks. The state of affairs in the strategic sphere was a barometer of the general political atmosphere in the world.

In this respect, Shevardnadze's visit to Washington is an important step forward in the development of Soviet-American interaction. A new impetus was given to the Geneva talks. A number of concrete problems were solved in principle. Few people doubt today that this year will witness the signing of START—a conclusion of many years' of bilateral political, diplomatic and military efforts.

The Treaty and Its Critics

As the signing of the treaty draws closer, this document's shortcomings are appearing simultaneously with its indisputable merits. With a certain degree of assurance one can, already today, forecast who will criticize START during its ratification in the U.S. Congress and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

Advocates of radical cuts in the strategic arsenals and a rapid transition to a world without nuclear arms will obviously be critical of the scale of the real reductions stipulated in the treaty. In fact, the strategic forces of the two sides will not be halved. The United States will scrap about 20 percent of its carriers-launchers while the Soviet Union—about 35 percent. As for the warheads, their reduction will be minimal due to the formula for counting strategic bombers ("one launcher—one warhead"). It will be undoubtedly said that the treaty is designed to regulate the development of the signatories' strategic forces rather than to halt this development, to strengthen mutual deterrence rather than to eliminate it.

Economists will certainly prove that all the hopes that the treaty could help save a substantial amount of money are groundless. Not only because the destruction of missiles will prove to be expensive, but mostly because the treaty will force the Soviet Union to reshape its strategic triad by building new strategic bombers, land-based monoblock missiles and also by stepping up modernization of sea-borne nuclear weapons.

Negotiators themselves will probably regret that the new treaty won't be more comprehensive than SALT-2. During negotiations, the initial package of accords did not adequately address such problems as strategic defence and sea-launched cruise missiles. The attempts to curb the qualitative aspect of the arms race yielded no significant results either.

Those who always look for the evil will of the United States lurking behind all the problems and difficulties of Soviet policies will try to dispell the opinion, quite widespread in the Soviet press and political rhetoric, that during the negotiations the sides were making equal concessions and arrived at a balance of interests. For the sake of fairness, one must admit that the treaty will affect Soviet strategic programmes more than U.S. ones. It is the Soviet Union which is learning the American "strategic culture," not vice versa.

Does this mean that the treaty is inconsistent with Soviet interests? Not at all. Such an assessment would not do justice to the Soviet political leadership who displayed much courage and pesistence when resisting obsolete approaches and stereotypes. It would also be an injustice to our diplomats who are conducting difficult and meticulous work in Moscow and Geneva.

We are better off with the treaty than without it. The treaty will increase the predictability of military developments and provide each side with more information about the opponent's plans, it will activate new verification mechanisms. The new strategic treaty will have a favourable effect on the political climate of Soviet-American relations. Taking into account the vulnerability and perfectly natural shortcomings of the new treaty, however, it is already necessary to offer constructive criticism to both sides and to start a joint search for principles to guide further talks on reduction of strategic armaments. If we regard the treaty as another stage, another link in the chain of past and future disarmament accords, then many questions will not have to be asked.

After START-2

We believe that the treaty could be ratified both in the U.S. Congress and in the Supreme Soviet more easily and sooner, if prior to the ratification hearings, the sides agreed on the principles of further talks on reductions of strategic arms and provided at least a general outline of future accords (similar to the Vladivostok Agreement of 1974) providing for gradual elimination of START's unavoidable shortcomings. If such principles were agreed upon, the sides could reject their attempts to reach the ceiling specified by the treaty at all costs, and be more restrained in their military development. Such a "declaration on intentions" could also influence the position of other nuclear powers who are in no hurry to join the process of nuclear disarmament claiming that the Soviet Union and the United States are not displaying preparedness for really radical cuts.

One must keep in mind that new talks will have to be conducted under conditions when growing economic and internal political pressure for radical cuts in the nuclear arsenals will be combined with a growing number of purely technological problems and the complexity of the "nuclear equation" which will increase as the Soviet Union and the United States gradually reduce their strategic forces to the level of third nuclear powers. Acceleration of the scientific and technological progress could tempt one of the sides to try and achieve qualitative preponderance in the strategic sphere through a powerful technological leap while the growing public discontent with the very idea of nuclear deterrence will question the fundamental principles of the Soviet and U.S. nuclear strategies.

As for the principles of future accords, these are practically agreed on already, although in a very general form. These principles are based on the idea of a purposeful retructuring, which stabilizes the strategic nuclear arsenals of both sides when further deep cuts will not be viewed as a self-contained goal but as a logical continuation of the above-mentioned restructuring.

All of this suggests that mobile systems will be preferred to stationary ones, monoblock missiles to missiles with MIRV, "slow response" means (bombers and cruise missiles) to "quick response" ones (ballistic missiles). The sides acknowledge in principle the necessity to limit the qualitative arms race and to develop confidence-building measures in the strategic sphere.

In our opinion the concrete objectives of future talks on reduction of strategic offensive arms (START-2) could be as follows:

- setting a ceiling of 6,000 units for the total number of nuclear warheads and nuclear charges on all types of carriers without limiting the number of such carriers;

- setting a ceiling of 3,000 units for ground-based an submarine-launched strategic ballistic missiles without counting single-warhead ballistic missiles;

- returning to the principles of counting warheads specified in SALT-2 and the "factual loading" principle with respect to warheads and free falling bombs deployed on strategic bombers;

- banning of tests and deployment of antisatellite systems and their components capable of disrupting the functioning of early warning, command and communication systems of the opposing side;

- possible joint reconsideration or aboliting of the 1974 protocol annexed to the 1972 ABM Treaty provided the preceding point is agreed on;

- setting a limit of 1,000 units on each side for air defence interceptors capable of carrying out strategic missions;

- setting a limit of 50 to 100 units for attack submarines (with possible construction of sancturary zones for strategic submarines where the use of anti-submarine warfare means would be banned);

- broadening of information exchange on the state and prospects of development of the sides' strategic arsenals, middle- and long-term programmes of testing and deployment of weapons systems;

- concluding an agreement on radical reduction (and possibly complete elimination) of tactical nuclear systems.

Cold Line

Naturally all of the above objectives must not necessarily be achieved at once. In this sense we agree with the experts who believe that START-2 will not be a "package" treaty like SALT-2 or START-1 but rather a negotiating process during which the sides will be able to solve concrete problems as soon as relevant accords are completed. Such a process is obviously less spectacular than a comprehensive accord, but it raises hopes that negotiations will be more consequential and less politically-motivated. It is important to solve even complex and painful problems with no delays unlike in the past.

The transition to a new form of the Soviet-American strategic interaction will require serious efforts going far beyond the framework of START. The ultimate goal of such efforts, in our opinion, must be to create an effective mechanism of control over technology in the strategic sphere which could reveal destabilizing tendencies at the early stage and neutralize them.

It appears logical to set up "a cold line" between the Soviet Union and the United States—a constantly working forum of military, technological and diplomatic experts for discussing long-term prospects of development of strategic stability. This forum, we believe, should function outside the START negotiations since its task will be not in "trading" one system for another but in coordinating the development of the sides' strategic forces. Since the participants of the "cold line" would discuss only proposed systems, they would be able to avoid the influence of time-serving political considerations which to some extent have deformed the process of the START negotiations.

'4 + 2' Experts Discuss German Unification

LD3004171990 Moscow TASS in English 1646 GMT 30 Apr 90

[Text] Berlin April 30 TASS—Experts from the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, France, East and West Germany met here today to discuss international implications of the unification of both Germanys.

The meeting, being held as part of the "Four Plus Two" talks, will prepare the first round of talks between the foreign ministers of the six countries, opening in Bonn late next week.

The Soviet delegation is headed by Aleksandr Bondarenko, head of the Foreign Ministry's Third European Department, the U.S. delegation—by Counsellor to the Department of State Robert Zoellick, the British Delegation—by the Foreign Office's political director John Weston, the French delegation—by Director of the Foreign Ministry's Political Department Bertrand Dufourcq, the East German delegation—by State Secretary Hans-Juergen Mieselwitz, and the West German delegation—by Political Department Head Dieter Kastrup.

GDR-FRG Defense Talks in Cologne Viewed

LD2704135690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 27 Apr 90

[Text] The first official talks on the state treaty between the FRG and the GDR are being held in Berlin today. It is expected that they will concern economic, currency, and social union between the two German states.

Another aspect of the unification of the two German states—this aspect concerns the military sphere—is the subject of our correspondent's report. The first meeting of Stoltenberg, FRG defense minister, and Eppelmann, GDR minister for defense and disarmament, is being held in Cologne today. Well, in general, regular meetings and talks between representatives of the governments of the FRG and the GDR within the framework of the unification of the German states have become quite a regular matter now. But this meeting has particular features, and our correspondent in Bonn Aleksandr Pozharskiy will tell us about them.

[Pozharskiy] Particular features certainly do exist with regard to the meeting between the defense ministers of the FRG and the GDR. In the first place, the GDR remains a member of the Warsaw Pact, with all the obligations stemming from this treaty. Eppelmann, GDR defense minister, speaking in the Peoples Chamber, literally just before his visit to the FRG noted that the agreement remains in force for the GDR, and its violation could cause concern among its allies. In the same speech, Eppelmann stated that the already planned expenditure on military equipment needs would be reduced in the GDR by 25 percent.

By the way, speaking of his visit to Cologne, he noted that he would first of all ask his Bonn colleague why the FRG's military budget this year is a record for the whole postwar period. One result of the political transformations is the fact Eppelmann now heads the Ministry of Defense and Disarmament. At the same time, no one intends to rename the FRG's military department the Ministry of Defense and Disarmament.

Moreover, the pressure which Bonn is experiencing from NATO and the United States, as a partner, with regard to strengthening its military potential is not only not being reduced but is even taking on several new aspects. Immediately after his meeting with Eppelmann, Stoltenberg is going to Washington, where he will have several days of talks, including some within the framework of preparing for the session of the Nuclear Planning Group at the beginning of May in Canada. One of the new aspects which it is planned to discuss at this meeting is the proposal to eliminate all short-range nuclear missiles in Europe. But the United States considers this proposal a major concession by NATO and as compensation plans to station in Europe air-based nuclear missiles. These, after being carried by aircraft, can quite easily reach Moscow. It is planned to station these missiles primarily in the FRG.

Naturally, such actions by NATO, and of course by the FRG as the main executor of the NATO strategy, will hardly promote the stabilization of the military political situation in Europe as a whole.

EC Alone Cannot Decide German Question

PM3004142190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 1

[S. Guk and A. Krivopalov report: "Western Facade of the European Home"]

[Excerpt] Two main subjects occupied the participants in the EC summit which has just ended in the Irish city of Dublin. There were no differences on the first subject—the forthcoming unification of the German states. FRG Chancellor H. Kohl, who has won his partners' blessing, talked about "super results," a "historic hour," and the "German dream come true." The West German "locomotive" will power the GDR unhindered into the community and do so before the start of formal unification.

Admittedly, the final "green light" to unification can only be given by the summit meeting of the 35 Helsinki process countries. Prior to this the details of the "German question" will be examined by Soviet, U.S., British, and French experts together with GDR and FRG representatives—after all, it is a question not of purely German affairs, but of the security structures for a future Europe. However, it seems that H. Kohl is convinced that the problem has already been solved. [passage omitted]

German Parliaments Hold First Joint Session

LD3004192890 Moscow TASS in English 1845 GMT 30 Apr 90

[Text] Berlin April 30 TASS—Human rights shall never again be violated in our country, the work of freely elected deputies shall never be hampered, and violence shall never again be used against other nations," says the statement adopted by the presidiums of the East German Volkskammer and West German Bundestag in closing of their first joint session held alternatively in East and West Berlin.

The statement by the two presidiums' session, chaired by Presidents Sabine Bergmann-Pohl and Rita Suessmuth, noted that war shall never again originate in German territory and all neighbouring countries shall be confident in their borders.

They favoured the urgent drawing up, on the basis of the West German Bundestag resolution of March 8, 1990 and the Wolkskammer statement of April 12, 1990, of guarantees, identical in their content, of the Polish Western borders.

The parliamentarians expressed confidence that German unification would be achieved within the framework of the unification process on the European scale. They reaffirmed the readiness of the two parliaments, elected by representatives of a sovereign nation and endowed with special responsibility for progress, to work towards German unification.

The two parliaments will cooperate intensively in the matter on all their levels.

The two presidiums expressed hope that deputies of the two parliaments would meet to commemorate June 17, 1953 together.

Warsaw Pact Sci-Tech Council Meets 23-26 Apr

PM2704201390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Apr 90 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "Session Held"]

[Text] A routine session of the Warsaw Pact states' Joint Armed Forces Military Scientific-Technical Council was held in Moscow 23-26 April 1990. The council examined questions of the Joint Armed Forces' technical equipment and the improvement of the allied armies' military-technical cooperation in present-day conditions.

In the opinion of its participants, the Military Scientific-Technical Council session took place in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and was characterized by a constructive approach toward the elaboration of joint measures.

Army General P.G. Lushev, commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact states' Joint Armed Forces and USSR first deputy defense minister, took part in the session.

The members of the Military Scientific-Technical Council were received by Army General D.T. Yazov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR defense minister.

Shevardnadze Interviewed on European Problems

LD2804121490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2030 GMT 27 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 28 Apr (TASS)—The replies given by Eduard Shevardnadze, USSR foreign minister, to questions from the Irish newspaper IRISH TIMES concerning a number of European problems, which are published in its today's edition, follow below.

[IRISH TIMES] What guarantees will be sought by the Soviet Union to ensure that the unity of Germany does not present a threat to the security of other countries?

[Shevardnadze] The movement toward the unification of Germany is undoubtedly a historic event. In fulfilling the legitimate and deeply felt hopes of the German people, it not only coincides with the closing of the postwar era in the life of Europe, but also to a considerable degree determines the content of this process.

In spite of all its shortcomings, the military-political structure of Europe which arose as a result of World War II ensured stability in the world and on the continent for almost half a century. The new structure of Europe which is being formed should, as a minimum, possess the same qualities. This is an all- European task. All interested states should effectively join in resolving it, although, of course, the four powers—including the USSR—are invested with particular responsibility here.

The main thing, evidently is for a military-political status to be found for a united Germany which would not radically disturb the balance. In our opinion, this is fully achievable if Germany becomes a militarily nonaligned state whose armed forces would possess a potential sufficient only for defense.

The other guarantee whose significance is difficult to overestimate is for the movement toward a united Germany to be combined with efforts to create all-European security structures.

[IRISH TIMES] How does the Soviet Union see the role of Germany's national integrity in the politico-military structure on the European continent?

[Shevardnadze] It would not be without problems for a united Germany now to be included in the military-political structures which have come about on the European continent. These structures were shaped not for a united Germany but for two German states belonging, moreover, to different alliances.

The prospect of German unity is an important incentive for a radical reform of the present structures of European security and for, in essence, creating them anew. This, like any serious work, requires time and a transitional period. In any event, it would be a mistake during the construction of German unity to destroy the existing security systems without creating new ones to replace them.

[IRISH TIMES] Could the Soviet Union, in any circumstances, see a united Germany as a member of NATO?

[Shevardnadze] A united Germany's membership in NATO is unacceptable for us, since it would mean a radical distruption of the present balance of forces in Europe. Understanding must be displayed by the West of the impossibility for us to accept such a version. Together we must seek different solutions which would not lead to a reduction in anyone's security. Such solutions are achievable if one stands on reality and mutual respect for both sides' interests.

In seeking such solutions, I think one should not limit oneself to conventional recipes. For example, the idea has been expressed of a dual membership of a united Germany in NATO and the Warsaw Pact. I would like to recall it once again, even though some people in the West have tried to say "no" straight off. The unconventional nature of this version is by no means evidence that it is unrealistic. In any event, it is necessary to thoroughly investigate the arguments of those who believe that the idea of "dual membership" would not only resolve one of the most complicated questions arising in connection with the unification of Germany, but would also be a practical step toward creating all-European security structures. The territory of Germany would become a "testing ground" for constructive cooperation between the blocs and would become a place for their gradual diffusion. In general, there is something to think about here. Germany itself would not lose at all from such a solution.

[IRISH TIMES] How do you assess the role of the European Communities within the framework of the CSCE in the new conditions?

[Shevardnadze] The "Twelve" have always played a notable role in determining the basic directions of development of the Helsinki process and have frequently assisted in finding mutually acceptable solutions and reasonable comprises. We hope that the EC member countries in the present rapidly developing situation in Europe will use their political weight and influence in order, together with the other participants in the all-European process, to provide guarantees that it will proceed in conditions of stability. We particularly value the support by the EC for our initiative to convene in 1990 a summit conference of CSCE member states. We are prepared for the most active cooperation with the "Twelve" in the practical preparation for and conducting of this conference and in giving a qualitatively new impulse to the development of the CSCE process as a whole.

[IRISH TIMES] How does the Soviet Union see the work of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in the new conditions?

[Shevardnadze] It is already evident today that in order to maintain stability on the European continent, ongoing development of the all-European process is becoming not only desirable but essential.

The question of the future of the CSCE process will undoubtedly be one of the central themes of the European summit meeting. An authoritative exchange of opinions about the paths of European construction would promote the elaboration of coordinated conceptual approaches and the formation of a future European commonwealth, taking into account Mikhail Gorbachev's idea of the "common European home," Francois Mitterrand's proposals about a "European confederation," Mark Eyskens' thoughts about a "confederative commonwealth of Europe," and the ideas expressed by other countries. Many good ideas have been put forward on the shaping of all-European structures. Apart from the well-known Soviet proposals about setting up an all-European council made up of heads of state, a committee of foreign ministers of the CSCE countries, and a military risk prevention center, there are also proposals from the FRG, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. In short, there is something to think about and discuss proceeding from the interests of today's and tomorrow's Europe.

[IRISH TIMES] How do the "two-plus-four" talks affect the development of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe?

[Shevardnadze] There is a most direct connection here. The movement toward a united Germany should not slow down the building of the common European home, and it is quite impermissible for it to disturb the balance and stability in Europe and to call in question the positive results achieved within the framework of the CSCE. On the contrary, the drawing together and unification of the two German states is called upon to become a component part of the broad efforts to arrange a new way of existence for the Europeans which will be based upon peace and cooperation. Proceeding from this understanding, the Soviet side is in favor of discussing, within the framework of the "Six," synchronizing the construction of German unity with the CSCE process. We share the approach of those states which believe that the results of the work of the "Six" should be discussed at a summit conference of CSCE participant countries and, possibly, approved by it.

[IRISH TIMES] Will the Soviet Union, as a participant in the talks of the "two-plus-four" countries, insist on resolving questions concerning the interests of other European countries, including the decision about a peace settlement in Europe.

[Shevardnadze] The Soviet Union, as a participant in the talks of the "Six," is guided not only by its own national interests, but also by the broad interests of European security. It would be irresponsible to act in any other way. Today security cannot be built one against the other; it is possible only on the basis of taking account of the interests of all European states. During the work, specific questions are sure to arise concerning the interests of countries not included in the "Six." In our view it would be possible to ensure that they are brought into the discussions within the "Six" at the appropriate stages. The construction of German unity raises onto the practical plane the question of elaborating an international legal settlement in order to finally conclude the last war. The most correct form for such a settlement would be a peace treaty or a document equivalent to this in which a solution would be given to questions connected with military-political status, the question of borders, and so on. We are in favor of such a document being drawn up within the framework of the "Six" with the active participation of the two German states.

[IRISH TIMES] How do you see the role within the all-European process of such militarily neutral countries as Austria, Ireland, and Sweden? [Shevardnadze] We feel that the role of each country, even taken separately, is important in the CSCE process, for the process is envisaged as not being bloc-oriented, and decisions are by concensus. Consequently, the voice of each country is of importance in the process. The three countries which you mentioned, alongside the other neutral and nonaligned countries, take an active part in all-European cooperation and have made, each in their own way, a considerable contribution to its development. Now, when confrontation between countries belonging to the blocs is disappearing into the past, the role of conciliator previously played by the neutral countries is, naturally, somewhat reduced, but is far from disappearing. This was shown, in particular, by the Bonn conference on economic cooperation in Europe, where the draft final document was presented by the "N plus N" [neutral and nonaligned] group. Today, when the question of the necessity of creating new security structures has arisen in Europe in all its acuteness, each participant country can and must make its contribution to this work. This is a matter not just for the bloc countries. Security is indivisible, and the countries of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, just as all other states of the continent—including the militarily neutral Austria, Ireland, and Sweden—have an interest in strengtheninmg it.

[IRISH TIMES] How do you see relations developing between the USSR and the member countries of the European Communities within the framework of political and economic cooperation in the changing Europe?

[Shevardnadze] The current changes in Europe are a good precondition for political and economic cooperation between the USSR and the EC to reach a qualitatively new level.

In the conditions of the drawing closer together of the East and West of the European continent which has begun, we belive it possible and realistic to set the task of orientating our political dialogue with the EC to a gradual transition from a simple exchange of opinions and comparison of positions to practical interaction and partnership in strengthening the positive changes in Europe and throughout the world. I think that the USSR and the "Twelve" could become the coauthors of many specific ideas and steps to shape the European Community of the 21st century.

An example of the fundamentally new approach to economic cooperation between East and West Europe, and a sort of glimpse into the future, is the USSR-EC agreement on trade and commercial and economic cooperation. It is a practical contribution by both sides to laying the foundation of the "common European home." Evidently, the time has come to give joint thought to creating some sort of permanent all-European structures of economic cooperation which would make it possible to link together the economy of the East and the West of the continent, with the prospect of moving onto a common European economic space from the Atlantic to the Urals.

[IRISH TIMES] Criticism has been voiced both in Moscow and in Dublin about the unutilized opportunities of Soviet-Irish relations. What can be done about this, and are there any plans for a meeting at foreign minister level to sign, for example, an agreement on cultural cooperation, an accord on which was reached almost two years ago?

[Shevardnadze] It must be confessed that for a long time relations with Ireland were given, as it were, residual attention in our country. To tell the truth, we did not particularly sense from the Irish side any aim of raising relations with the USSR, either. In spite of all this, there are hardly grounds to speak about any coolness or alienation in bilateral relations. Since they were made official in 1973, no acute or unpleasant problems have arisen between Dublin and Moscow. On the contrary, our countries have always respected each other. There is another circumstance which I consider important. There has always been much similarity and even coincidence in our countries' approaches to the central problems of European and regional policy. We have a high assessment of Ireland's contribution to the all-European process, the settlement of regional conflicts, and the peacemaking activity of the United Nations.

The new political era in world affairs which began with perestroyka also opens up new possibilities in the development of Soviet-Irish relations on an equal and mutually advantageous basis. Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Ireland and his conversations with Charles Haughey at Shannon on 2 April 1989 is assessed by both sides as a most important point of reference, characterizing the transition of the whole complex of bilateral relations into a phase of dynamic and constructive cooperation. One can say with satisfaction that the results of the visit are being quite successfully implemented as far as concerns the deepening of political dialogue between the two countries and the expansion of economic and cultural ties and parliamentary exchanges. Quite a lot has already been done in these areas, although it is understood that this is only a start.

Visits by Prime Minister Charles Haughey and Foreign Minister Gerard Collins have already been included in the plans of Soviet-Irish contacts at summit and high level by mutual agreement. The desire to carry out these visits is mutual and preparations for them are under way. This is all the more important now, when Ireland holds the chairmanship in the EC and Dublin during the current half-year is the capital of integrating West Europe. However, unfortunately, circumstances are, as the saying goes, stronger than we are. The extremely full schedule of measures requiring the direct attention of the Soviet leadership does not permit us at present to set precise dates. To fill out the picture, I would like to note that, as well as visits, we maintain contacts with the Irish leadership. I have had and I continue to have opportunities to conduct a dialogue with the Irish foreign minister within the framework of the UN General Assembly and of those forums—including all-European ones—in which international practice is now rich.

Perestroyka Discussed on 'Studio Nine'

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["Studio Nine" program, presented by Valentin Sergeyevich Zorin, with Spiros Kyprianou, former president of Cyprus; Joseph Luns, former secretary of state and former U.S. ambasador to the USSR; and Politologist Andrey Serafimovich Grachev, deputy head of the CPSU Central Committee International Department—Kyprianu, Luns and Hartman all speak in English with superimposed Russian translation]

[Text] [Zorin] Hello comrades! I would like to begin our conversation today with a letter which is, to a certain extent, typical of "Studio Nine's" latest mail, in any case, typical if not in form then in the content of the question it contains. The author of the letter, candidate of technical sciences (Nikolay Ivanovich Kachalov), from Novosibirsk, writes as follows: You talk a very great deal about the world's attitude to our perestroyka, but unfortunately the greater part of the information proceeds along a road that has been well-worn over the decades. We are told about the compliments we have been paid, and about opinions on perestroyka and its leaders which flatter our ears and please our vanity. I think that such a program as "Studio Nine" would do well if it were to devote to the subject of perestroyka and the outside world a serious, analytical conversation, designed for thinking people who, as a rule, carefully follow the conversations in "Studio Nine."

Well, the problem raised by the author of the letter is indeed one of the most topical today, and I think we will be doing the right thing if we actually devote to it our conversation today. In order that it should turn out really analytical, taking into account the various points of view existing in the world on this problem, we have invited to "Studio Nine" today people whose views are listened to throughout the world. The NOVOSTI PRESS AGENCY recently organized an international conference: The Role of the Mass Media in the Restructuring of International Relations. The conference was very representative, and with the help of our colleagues from NOVOSTI, we have invited to this table Spiros Kyprianou, whose activity enjoys recognition throughout the world—in the seventies and eighties he was president of the Republic of Cyprus—Joseph Luns, former secretary general of NATO from 1971-84 a man well known in world politics, although I'll tell you honestly that if a few years ago I had been told that Mr. Luns, regarding whom we used not to spare the harshest epithets, would someday end up at the "Studio Nine" table, I would have taken this as a joke; well; nevertheless, he is here today, and it will be all the more interesting for us to listen to you, Mr. Luns—and former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Arthur Hartman, who we in the Soviet Union know and remember well as an outstanding U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1981-86. Mr. Ambassador, it is again a pleasure for me to welcome you here in Moscow. Also at our table is eminent Soviet politologist Andrey Serafimovich Grachev, deputy head of the CPSU Central Committee International Department. As you can see, today we have fully guaranteed what it is fashionable to call pluralism here, and so it only remains for us to begin work.

So, perestroyka and the outside world: I would like to begin our conversation with a question to you, Mr. Kyprianou. Do you agree that the process of perestroyka underway in the Soviet Union is seriously changing the contemporary world? If not, why? If so, then in what way?

[Kyprianou] Certainly, the perestroyka underway in the Soviet Union is changing the economic and political structure of the Soviet Union in many respects, and I think this is obvious to anyone who has spent even just a few days in Moscow. With your permission, I would like to say a few words about these changes before making remarks on the external aspect of perestroyka. There are people who doubt the success of perestroyka. I am one of those who are confident of its victory, and that is not a compliment.

I believe that the Soviet Government is displaying the necessary resolution. This became particularly obvious when we met with President Gorbachev. I think people in the Soviet Union will gradually understand the entire necessity of perestroyka, and I hope we all will participate in that construction, in successful construction, and in those transformations. I think that history is being written today in the Soviet Union, and world history is largely being determined by precisely what is happening inside the Soviet Union. Of course, there are difficulties, but I believe that they will be overcome. These are inevitable difficulties; perestroyka, glasnost, and the new thinking undoubtedly are having a definite and direct effect on the situation in the international arena. For example, they undoubtedly are influencing the Soviet Union's relations with the countries of East Europe. Here the changes are entirely obvious, and are a direct consequence of the policy of perestroyka in the Soviet Union. Moreover, there are other signs of the influence of perestroyka on relations, for instance, between the Soviet Union and the United States, between the two superpowers, relations that have changed beyond recognition, and have changed as a result of the policy of perestroyka. This is manifest, first and foremost, in the progress of the disarmament process we are observing today. One can say that one consequence of perestroyka is that the cold war has receded into the past and that today we live in an entirely new situation in the world. At the same time, many problems remain, of course, to this day, but I am sure that the new climate being created in the international arena will enable the cold war finally to recede into the past and to yield its place to closer cooperation among nations, and this applies primarily to Europe. Therefore, I think perestroyka is happening not only in the Soviet Union, but in a very short time it has had a great influence, without any force and without any extraordinary situations, on the positive changes in the world.

[Zorin] Mr. Ambasassdor, you have a basis on which to make comparisons. Therefore it would be interesting for me to know your opinion.

[Hartman] I agree with most of what Mr. Kyprianou said, but I think—and this is important—that every person who is watching the situation in the Soviet Union from the sidelines perhaps will spot more easily how these events are developing within a general historical context. Mr. Gorbachev is trying to change something in his country, and these transformations are to affect tradition that have existed for centuries. He himself has admitted that he is fighting with very fact that many of those traditions and customs are fixed in people's minds. The entire democratic process, which is beginning today, is a very healthy process because it means that people are assuming responsibility for the formation of their own future, for the future of their country. I think that we, as detached observers, can evaulate this as a very postiive and a very creative period in Soviet, and I would say, Russian history. I think we all share the hope that this will take place gradually, certainly not all at once, because it is simply impossible to expect sudden results. The revolution currently happening in practice, in politics and in the minds of people, will require a certain amount of time. I think we can only convey you the very best of wishes.

[Zorin] Mr. Hartman said a lot of time would be needed. In this regard, I would like to say the following, Mr. Luns: We understand that we will need a lot of time in our country, but we feel that some things have changed in the Soviet Union over these years. However, is the West changing in response to this, from your point of view? Can Soviet policy, if one can put it like this, carry the West along? Or is this, from our point of view, a political romance and a lack of political realism? From the point of view of your experience, how would you reply to this question?

[Luns] I think that if one can speak of anything at all, we certainly are witnessing how the whole West is watching the enormous understanding and hope, with enthusiasm, what is going on in the Soviet Union. As far as NATO is concerned, I think this alliance will continue to exist because we think it very important for preserving the mutual links between the countries of Europe and the United States. At the same time, the entire focus of attention is shifting from military to political cooperation, and in my time, when I was head of NATO, I became convinced that the initiator of all arms control proposals was NATO. Very often, the initiator was the United States, sometimes other countries. I believe we are witnessing the fact that our policy has changed. I do not think we have to try and persuade you of the popularity of Mr. Gorbachev in the West.

[Zorin] Well, I would put it like this: Mr. Luns has replied to this question quite diplomatically, do you not think so, Andrey Serafimovich?

[Grachev] Well, of course, as a representative of the East, let us put it like that. From the political point of view, it is difficult for me to assess, for the West, the degree to which the West is changing under the influence of the ideas and policies of perestroyka. It seems to me that certainly the distinction can lie only in the degree of the epithets. The whole world recognises that it has already changed under the influence of perestroyka.

Moreover, I would divide this into short-term and long-term changes. Some of them, that is, in their way, the promises which perestroyka gave, it seems to me, it has already kept. First of all, it saved the world form fear, and in the final analysis, this was the main feature of the situation in which the world existed throughout the post-war period. Second, and perhaps, it is precisely this factor that provides the possibility of foreseeing and already perceiving very serious economic consequences. I think that we will agree that, for the first time in our lives, and perhaps we had not even hoped that this would happen in our lifetime, it is possible realistically to foresee an end to the arms race, a burden that takes its toll not only on our economy, but I am convinced, also on the Western economy. Finally, there is one very important consequence, in my view, although I would put it in the category of the more long-term ones. It seems to me that perestroyka allows mankind, or gives it a chance, to feel a single whole, and accordingly, to see its further history not as a continuation of the history of some sort of internal conflict with itself, or of one part against another, but as of something single and whole which can concentrate on the resolution of the common problems that are in reality facing mankind.

I think this is one of the important consequences of perestroyka, but if we are to speak of the reaction of the West to our policies, primarily to the foreign policy of perestroyka, which we call the new political thinking, then it still seems to me that the West, for the moment, to a substantial degree, prefers to remain in the spectators' stand, although we can see that the real consequences of perestroyka are having an effect on the practical position and on the real situation in the whole world, in all countries. This, albeit benevolent observation on the part of the West, it seems to me, bears out that there is still in the West a certain distance, a certain mistrust of the long-term consequences, of the vitality and viability of perestroyka.

[Text]Of course, we can spend a long time discussing whose peace-loving initiatives in the post-war period—NATO'S or the Warsaw Pact's—had greater chances of being implemented, but I think we will be forced to agree with you, Mr. Luns, that it has been possible to implement these peace initiatives from both sides only since the Soviet Union embarked on the road of perestroyka in its foreign policy, too, and sometimes even used unilateral steps to unlock the vicious circle of mutual accusations and suspicions, and even counter proposals, which we submitted to each other, sometimes without great hope that they would be accepted by the other side.

[Zorin] I do not suppose the U.S. respresentative regards himself as a man on the rostrum, for spectators, either, does he?

[Hartman] No, of course not, I think it is very important not to talk to each other in slogans. One of the difficulties I encounter when I talk to people about perestroyka is that they want that concept to cover all the positive and good things that are happening. I think it is much easier to understand each other if we talk about specific matters.

As far as disarmament is concerned, we are conducting very important negotiations on reducing strategic confrontation to a much lower level which, however, guarantees stability and security for each side. This is very important. We do not want to end up in a situation in which any side feels in danger. Expressing my government's opinion, I can say that none of us considers these levels satisfactory. We must continue this process further and reduce these levels further, to the lowest number of nuclear weapons. We are conducting equally serious negotiations on conventional weapons, and I think we have almost reached very important agreements on this matter. Again, our expectations might be slightly too high. We have a level of, probably, up to 195,000. I am sure that it can be reduced much more. We also must talk about what creates stability in Europe and what forces us to think that we are in danger. We need to discuss this with each other.

As for the common European home, I am not sure that we understand what it is. We have a structure, which was established after the Helsinki conference, in which 35 countries participated. This is the structure on which we can base our cooperation. However, if we are dealing with economic cooperation, for example, I do not believe this is a very good structure for its development. I would also like for this cooperation to include Japan, which is very rich and could help us very well in the development of cooperation with the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and is now carrying out very serious and very large-scale economic projects.

[Luns] I would like to add that even before the negotiations on starting arms reduction, the Western countries already had begun reducing their military budgets and the level of their armaments, in Belgium and several other countries. As far as economic cooperation is concerned, the Common Market now is engaged in coming to an agreement with the Soviet Union and in establishing relations with such countries as Poland, where there are very serious economic difficulties. I am certain that we will be fairly actively involved in this.

[Kyprianou] I would like to dispute Mr. Hartman's words about the common European home. I think that we, as a small country that seeks to be included in the common European economic structure, are striving for everyone to see all the benefits of such cooperation.

Yes, I agree with Mr. Hartman when he says that we must set specific goals, but when we say common European home, we mean a community of Europe, in one sense or another. There are no reasons, say, for us to avoid or somehow to impede cooperation between Europe and Japan, or for instance, cooperation with the United States. We who live in Europe would feel much safer in the context of an united Europe. I simply wished to note this aspect.

[Hartman] I, too, would like to comment on that. Of course, we do not live in Europe, America is not part of Europe. Therefore, Mr. Luns has more reason to comment on this process, but I also have followed events in Europe very attentively since 1950, when I worked with Jean Monnet who was the initiator ot those changes in Europe. The aim of the EEC is not only economic, which will gain not only economic benefits from its unity, but which also is acquiring very great political weight on the international scene. In recent times, we have been hearing about more and more countries who aspire to join that structure, but they cannot renounce their specific feature, who aspire to be members of the European entity. Take Hungary, for instance, which wants to join the European Community. I think this is unrealistic. The East European countries can conduct economic cooperation with the countries of the West, but they still do not fully understand all the basic goals pursued by France, the Netherlands or Belgium, which are prepared to become part of some kind of supernational European entity. True, Mrs. Thatcher does not like to talk of such a prospect.

[Luns] I would like to correct Mr. Hartman somewhat. The greatest disappointment in my political life was the collapse of the EEC's attempts to form a kind of political, pan-European, supernational entity. Very many people thought that way, and the founding fathers of the community thought that way, but I know something about the story of that process. It is most important to note that the planned entity will be economic. Yes, it is very advantageous and it is very efficient, but I do not think that even in 1992 we will see any political changes. France, incidentally, never aspired to that. France never was prepared to adopt the status of part of some kind of supernational entity. This is with reference to your commentary regarding a common European market and a political commonwealth or community of nations. If Great Britain, for instance, were member of such a community, it would run into very serious problems concerning both its political and economic status. Nothing positive will come out of such an experiment. Take Ireland, Portugal and Greece, or any other small member of the European Community, I do not think any of them can influence the political destiny of the community decisively.

[Zorin] I ask you, Andrey Serafimovich, to intervene in the argument of our Western colleagues.

[Grachev] I take pleasure in doing so, and I am glad to state that on this occasion I am closer to the thesis of Mr. Luns than that of Ambassador Hartman. In any case, I think his remarks offer me a chance to return and to define a little more clearly my statements concerning the common European home because, as I see it, this concept advanced by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev assumes precisely that most important degree of a blend of originality, individuality, and sovereignty for each of the European countries—and not just the European countries, but also the countries generally participating in the common European process, meaning the United States and Canada, too—with the new degree of integration and cooperation, and perhaps on different levels because different countries of the European Continent today have reached different levels in their mutual relations. There is one level of integration achieved by the Common Market countries, which envisage some kind of new frontier for themselves in 1992, but there also are pan-European integration processes, which were released and liberated, so to speak, by the events not only of the five years of perestroyka, but particularly by the events of last year and which allow one to speak about Europe not only as a continent that was able to maintain peace throughout the postwar period thanks to the Helsinki process, but also as a continent that today has an opportunity to look beyond the horizon of the current stage of the Helsinki process. This, effectively, is the purpose of the concept of the common European home, a concept that has been received variously, being mostly favorably received in the various European capitals, and which such concepts as that of Francois Mitterand concerning pan-European confederation, among a large number of other proposals, have started to supplement and to develop in some ways.

[Zorin] I would like to express one thought. I fear that none of you will agree with it, but nevertheless I want to say that the argument that arose at this table seems to me to be an aspiration to leapfrog a stage. The common European home is, of course, an urgent task, a task on which evidently, as today's conversation shows, there is no single position among us, but are you and I ready—and let us try to answer this question for ourselves—to take the bull by the horns in this concept, given the situation. Throughout all the postwar years—and I fear not merely until the mid-eighties, but in places perhaps today, too—all political development took place under a leitmotif of confrontation, and took place due to the existence, both in our camp and in yours, of an enemy image. We opposed each other, built plans against each other, Mr. Luns, and built intrigues against each other. Here suddenly, seemingly without any transition, we are at this table discussing the details of a common European home, but after all, in effect we have turned out to be in a new situation whereby to some extent the conventional stereotype thinking has collapsed, one that incidentally gave us what was perhaps a false sense but a sense of stability nonetheless. An enterely new situation is arising in which there is no enemy; there is a partner, maybe, a partner one does not totally trust; but a partner and not an enemy. I want each of those present to answer the question: Are we ready for this today? Is our political thinking keeping up with this rapid course of events in the world? We will begin with you, Mr. Hartman.

[Hartman] I think we are even ahead of that process. Some things have happened which we hoped for immediately after World War II. We did not think the Berlin Wall would be erected or that barriers would be erected between us, and at long last all that has collapsed, and I am most grateful to Mr. Gorbachev for this happening. This has made possible what is happening today. Poland has signed an agreement with the International Development Bank. We are supporting it today in many respects. Hungary aspires to the same, and a process of cooperation is taking place within Europe. We welcome it in every sense, just as we welcome the attempts of the Soviet Union to establish the same relations with the West. This is a very healthy tendency. Yes, we are prepared for it.

[Zorin] Mr. President?

[Kyprianou] I think the world undoubtedly is ready for this. Perhaps we still need time to achieve progress on some issues, but this progress will be achieved. No one would have believed two or three months ago that the changes going on now were possible. Perhaps we still have some kind of romantic hopes for the future in our nature, but gradually we will become witness to the fact that this is not something romantic, but a perfectly realistic prospect. I agree with Mr. Hartman that the new thinking that has encompassed the whole world undoubtedly exists. I think that every person—and this again is one of the results of perestroyka—I stress, every person would welcome closer ties in the international arena in all respects, ties between international organizations and ties between various countries. This is a change in the international climate about which we did not even think just a short time ago, but it has happened. Therefore, in some respects—forgive me for not answering your question very precisely; I'll return to it, but I would like to comment on the idea of the common

European home—it seems romantic today. Yes, perhaps it is, but I think that from the economic point of view we are beginning to build it. Politically, undoubtedly, we cannot yet observe the same progress as in the economic field, but I think that if we have set ourselves this goal, in the conditions in which those blocs are being eroded away, I do not see why Europe cannot seek to find the correct answer to the question of what the common European home means. It is a federation, or a confederation, taking into account everything that Mr. Hartman has said about the sovereignty and status of each side. I think that in some sense the world definitely is ready today for diverse cooperation in various forms. Of course, we need some time to complete this process.

I would like to add just one sentence: Cyprus is one of the very small countries that have found themselves in a situation in which the Nonaligned Movement, of which we are a part, has lost its force. Today everything is happening between the two blocs. On the other hand, however, such an assessment would be imprecise because the nonaligned countries can help the process of progress in Europe and prevent the appearance of new military blocs. I would like to note the role of the nonaligned countries, about which we have not yet spoken; we have been speaking about the countries of the West and the East. Yes, there also are prospects for the nonaligned countries; they could help in the development of this cooperation.

[Zorin] Thank you.

[Luns] I would like to add something: I think that when we talk about the common European home and a common future for Europe, we should not forget that very important changes are going on in Europe itself. I mean, in this case, the problem of the future unified Germany. Let us be frank. From my point of view, none of the countries that are Germany's neighbors will regard what is going on there now with very great joy. I realize that the leaders of West Germany will not start a policy of aggression soon. Of course, they will not start one, but we are not thinking about that, of course. However, what will happen over several decades, when new generations of Germans will grow up who did not know the war and will be living in a very large country in Europe, a very, very strong country? It is already almost the first country in the world today, from the point of view of economic power, and I would like to note that this, of course, prompts very definite anxiety and uncertainty. Take France, with a population of 53 million people, one of Germany's neighbors. Germany has a much larger population and much greater economic strength. This is a factor that cannot be dismissed. I am sure that each of us shares that anxiety.

[Zorin] I want to give due credit to Mr. Luns' political courage because in the last two discussions here in "Studio Nine," representatives of both the FRG and Britain, and other Western representatives did not bring themselves to recognise what Mr. Luns now has said out loud, which I will not pretend does not worry many Soviet viewers, to judge from our letters.

[Luns] There is a difference between what they say and what they think.

[Zorin] In connection with what we are talking about, I want to ask you, Andrey Serafimovich, to express your point of view on the following subject: There is indeed a lot of talk and anxiety now in connection with what is happening in the GDR and the FRG, and in East Europe in general. We have mentioned both Hungary and Poland at this table today. This is, in general, a topical issue. In the letters coming to us at "Studio Nine" we often encounter this question, put directly, and so to speak, undiplomatically: Will the Soviet Union be deprived of its security strip as a result of the changes in East Europe? And do the changes that are taking place mean a particular kind of review of the results of World War II?

[Grachev] This is a real question. I know that many people are asking it of themselves. It is natural because it borders on the question we have been discussing: Can our awareness keep pace with the changes going on in the world around us, the world in which we live?

Let me return to your question. First, to be honest, I have an extreme dislike of the actual concept, the actual term security strip. It brings to mind something like a kind of dug border strip, you understand. I believe, overall, that an honest, principled, and open policy cannot regard any country, including and especially its neighbors, evidently, as just an instrument of its own policy, and as what I would call some kind of auxiliary factor serving its own security. Each of those countries has the right to its own independence, its own policy, and its own sovereignty. In that sense, to speak of some sort of security zone to which the Soviet Union should lay claim by some right, as the largest power in terms of territory, I do not think that we ourselves consider that we have such a right. Besides, I feel, in general, that the very notion of a so-called security zone is, to a significant degree, inherited from obsolete geopolitical concepts. I feel that both we, and not only we but also our partners, including, say, the United States, continued, following the world war that took place and was won by them, to live to some extent by a certain inertia. We in the nightmare of 22 June 1941, believing that we could get rid of that nightmare only by somehow pushing back the line of potential contact with the potential opponent, while the United States evidently existed in the nightmare of Pearl Harbor, and after being deprived of that base, they embarked on the course of creating a kind of security zone or security strip, which surrounded not them, but us, in the form of a large number of bases—in other words a sort of Pearl Harbor multiplied by a large number of bases sited along our perimeter, but....

[Zorin interrupting] I would like to make one amendment. Unfortunately, you are putting all of this in the past tense, but they not only used to surround but even now surround, Andrey Serafimovich.

[Grachev] Certainly. Well, I am speaking about all this in the past tense simply because it seems to me that they belong to the past, in terms of efficacy, in terms of productivity, in terms of real participation in possible military-political, strategic, and other concepts. In the nuclear and missile age, in the current era of lasers and cruise missiles which, as the military says, can fly through an open window, to continue building military-strategic concepts borrowed from, relying on the experience of World War II, is not only unproductive but also ruinous. And it seems to me that, from this point of view, we must also look at the changes that have occurred in the recent period in East Europe. It is not a matter of a weakening of the security of the Soviet Union in those cases when its forces stationed on the territory of neighboring countries return to Soviet territory by mutual accord. In the final analysis, forces stationed on foreign territory, and moreover, on territory in conditions where they are, say, surrounded by a far from friendly atmosphere, and the very factor of a presence on foreign territory can actually be a condition for the creation of such an unfriendly atmosphere, this is a factor that lessens security, in the final analysis that heightens the vulnerablility of one side or another. I think that the United States came across this when they encountered a certain situation in, say, Iran. At the present time, you speak of the bases that continue to exist, analagous or similar problems exist in certain areas in the Philippines. It seems to me that the very concept of belts and zones, and security interests, which, by some incomprehensible right, seem to belong to the great powers and permit them, in some sense, to limit just such interests and just such rights of other powers, also belongs to the past.

[Zorin] since we have to—I'm sorry, Mr. Hartman, you wanted to add something, please.

[Hartman] Yes, I wanted to stress once again the need to speak specifically. The reason for the growth in tension lay, to a considerable extent, in the enormous quantity of weapons stockpiled by both sides. Enormous programs for the modernization of weapons were elaborated in your country in the seventies and the eighties, and we followed you. The situation should, I believe, change to a substantial degree as soon as an agreement is concluded on cutting the weapons of the superpowers. The matter of military bases can be resolved by democratic means. For example, do the Philippinos want to preserve bases on their territory? If not, we'll leave. We have no reason at all to maintain our presence there if they don't need such an American presence. The same goes for Japan. The Japanese themselves determined the bounds, the limits of the armed forces which they intend to have. And exactly as in the previous case, a lowering in the level of armaments of the superpowers will lead to a change in the attitudes and views on this matter in this country, too. And I am not at all sure that the Japanese will want us to leave this region. I don't think that the countries of ASEAN will want this. They may be apprehensive of the growing conomic might of Japan, and will see the United States not so much as a military power as simply a counterweight power to Japan. Returning to the question of a unified Germany, it seems to me that conversations about the possible neutrality of Germany which are currently under way are, from the point of view of both sides, the West and you, the worst way out of the situation. The existence of a unified Germany, a strong economic power in the middle of Europe floating about with neutral status, would become a destabilizing factor. I hope that your leaders will pay great attention to the proposals that Germany be tied, primarily, to the Common Market. This is the strongest tie that is at all possible. I think that, if countries need a single currency with other countries, then political integration is also necessary. I would agree with you if I had no doubt that this could be achieved. I also think that there is benefit in maintaining an American presence in Europe in some form. It would be a kind of counterweight to a great economic power. I cannot see this as yet, but we simply need to be in Europe. I recall that your leaders welcomed such a proposal.

[Grachev] Valentin Sergeyevich, I would like to say a few words on the matter of Germany, of course, although I know that practically the whole of your previous program was devoted to this matter, but by all accounts this is quite an inexhaustible subject today. I would like to submit just one consideration. It seems to me that all of us, Europeans and non-Europeans, in this case the United States, have an interest in a future unified Germany not becoming a return to the past, Germany's past, Europe's past, the world's past. We all want, apparently, for it to become an element of the future, of a future unified Europe, this is natural, that in a unified Europe there will be a unified Germany, and to a considerable extent, of a future, safer world. So why do we, in arguing about this future and in beginning its construction—and it turns out that in this sense, a unified Germany could overtake and is already in some sense overtaking the process of unifying Europe—drive this future construction from a future Europe into a structure of the past, like NATO? After all, we are talking about a bloc that was generated by known conditions, by that same cold war that we now regret, with known aims, with a known orientation, and thrust against the east of this continent. Nothing is preventing a unified Germany belonging and having, of course, the closest mutual ties with the Common Market and the future structure that awaits it, but to drive it into the structures of the past without transforming these structures in parallel—I have in mind the bloc structures, be it NATO, be it the Warsaw Pact—without transforming them from military structures, from structures which help towards the construction of a new and unified Europe, would not, I think, be sensible.

[Zorin] I fear that we won't manage to resolve this problem in the time that remains to us at this table, and so I would like to put the last question. If we are talking about perestroyka, which we are discussing today, then, in the foreign policy aspect, one of its undisputed, very important results can be considered—and I believe that we'll all agree on this—the end of the cold war, whether it has already ended or whether it is ending, it is a fact. I would like, for a start, to ask you, Mr. Luns—I hope that you won't take offense if I say that for many years, your name was closely linked with this cold war, it was linked with the official position that you held—and so, I would like to ask you to reply, frankly, to this question, which, by the way, is not so simple as might appear at first sight: In every war there is usually a winner and a loser, so in this war, the cold war, which lasted from the end of the forties to the middle of the eighties, from your point of view, who is the winner and who is the loser?

[Luns] Let me say that it is impossible to speak about this, using the concept of winners or losers. It is impossible to ignore the fact that over all these years, West Europe—and of course, East Europe, too, which was governed by Moscow—that West Europe maintained its independence, achieved enormous success in economic development, and all the time was ready and was preparing for rapprochement with the Soviet Union. NATO was also prepared for that. As for me, one can call me a knight of the cold war only due to my work, but this does not apply to me personally.

[Zorin] And you, Mr. Ambassador?

[Hartman] I think that one should not make judgments about this from a viewpoint of victory or defeat. I am very glad about what has happened. I see how people have gained a choice. They themselves choose what they want to do. Our system is based on choice. I think that this is progress in a direction that we like.

[Zorin] And you, Mr. President?

[Kyprianou] I would like to comment on the word "choice." Our choice is to be a totally independent state without occupation troops on our territory. I mentioned at the start of our conversation the problems that remain unresolved to this day. I also meant the problems of my country that have not been resolved to this day, despite the fact that 16 years have passed. I think that the time has come to resolve these problems, too. In this sense, the countries of Europe, and—in view of the current historic moment—the superpowers, can really come to grips with these problems in the course of the dialogue that they are conducting, and they can find a solution in the spirit of the United Nations. This applies not only to the problem of Cyprus. I consider that the problem of the Middle East and the situation in Lebanon should be resolved in this way, too. Regional issues must be resolved today. The climate is right for their resolution, and one must convince of this those countries that still remain the main impediment to the solution of those problems. Therefore, the question of choice is a very important and broad concept, which must work in every specific case.

[Zorin] Andrey Serafimovich, over to you to complete our conversation.

[Grachev] I think that, if we recall that the leaders of the Soviet Union and of the United States of America jointly came to the conclusion in Geneva in 1985 that there can be no winners in nuclear warfare and that there can only be losers, this is in a way, the result of the objective situation that they thereby recognized, namely the fact that in the cold war there were no, and evidently there could be no winners. There were only losers. I would consider that the cold war was—nobody knows whether it was an inevitable stage, for maybe it was possible to avoid—in any case, a definite stage and a definite phase in the self-realization of humanity. Humanity was forced to undergo that stage which, in my view, was highly costly, only in order to realize that humanity should not seek enemies among itself and that it should, wherever possible, concentrate its efforts and unite them so as to tackle those genuine problems and troubles that humanity really runs into today.

[Zorin] Well, rounding up our program, I think that we have every right to draw the conclusion that one of the most important results of perestroyka and of its influence on the external world—a long-term result, a result which will be talked about many years later—is that our perestroyka has served as an impetus to end the cold war. And this circumstance alone is sufficient to make this event a historic one. It only remains for me to thank our eminent guests for participating in our conversation. I wish to thank my colleagues at the NOVOSTI press agency who helped us and shared their guests with our program "Studio Nine," to thank the viewers for watching. Until the next meeting here in our "Studio Nine." Thank you.

Developments in Mongolian-Chinese Relations Noted

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[Text] Mongolia hopes to expand good-neighborly relations with China. A statement to this effect was recently made by Ochirbat, chairman of the Mongolian People's Great Hural Presidium. Station observer Alekseyev says: Extraordinarily important and heartening changes have occurred in Mongolian-Chinese relations. Relations between the two countries in effect were frozen from the mid-sixties, as a result of longstanding tensions. Only in the eighties did the two nations begin gradually to eliminate barriers, such as alienation and lack of mutual trust. The process continued unabatedly. Here, I would like to offer an important (?viewpoint). A Mongolian-Chinese pact on demarcating national borders and resolving border issues was signed in 1988, making border issues the foundations of peaceful and good-neighborly relations between the two countries. Mongolian and Chinese foreign ministers exchanged formal visits in 1989. Both Mongolia and China believed that the exchange of visits signified a complete normalization of state relations between the two countries, as well as a normalization of party-to-party ties. Speaking in Ulaanbaatar on 1 September 1989, Foreign Minister Qian Qichen said that China was greatly satisfied with the restoration of good-neighborly relations with the Mongolian People's Republic [MPR].

Recently, there have been new developments in Mongolian-Chinese relations. At the end of last month, Mongolia and China signed a protocol on expanding reciprocal and good-neighborly relations. The first meeting of the Mongolian-Chinese Government Mixed Committee on Scientific, Technological, Economic, and Trade Cooperation was held in Ulaanbaatar. The two sides studied the possibility of establishing joint enterprises and reached an accord on expanding border trade. In the military sphere, the two countries have always sought to strengthen good-neighborly relations. Ulaanbaatar hailed China's reduction of its troops by one million as a significant event. Likewise, China spoke highly of similar actions taken by the MPR. I would like to remind you that along with the significant reductions of their respective armed forces, Mongolia and the Soviet Union reached an agreement on withdrawing the Soviet troops stationed temporarily in Mongolia's territory. Three-fourths of such troops will leave Mongolia this year, and the remainder will depart by the end of 1992. As reported by Mongolian newspapers on many occasions, Mongolia and China are working hard to expand good-neighborly relations, and in doing so, they are contributing to promoting stability in the Asia-Pacific region. This is my formal conclusion.

'Observers Roundtable' Comment on China, Lithuania

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["International Observers Roundtable" program with presenter Nikolay Agayants and All-Union Radio political commentators Boris Andrianov and Gennadiy Vedenyapin]

[Excerpts] [Agayants] Hello, esteemed comrade listeners. We are beginning our regular meeting "International Observers at the Roundtable." This is its presenter Nikolay Agayants at the microphone, and beside me I have my colleagues Boris Andrianov and Gennadiy Vedenyapin, All-Union Radio political commentators.

Last week Li Peng, member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and premier of the PRC State Council, paid an official visit to our country at the invitation of the Soviet Government. This visit by the head of the Chinese Government was a further important milestone along the road of developing relations between the two countries following the historic meeting between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and Chinese leaders which, let me remind you, took place last May in Beijing; a meeting which marked the normalization of relations between the Soviet Union and the PRC.

[Vedenyapin] Normalization of relations with China amounts to a turning point—a turn toward good sense—and to acknowledgement of the realities of the contemporary world. I would reckon I am not wrong if I say that the state of relations between the USSR and the PRC is something about which not only the Soviet people are concerned. For the fact is that it is something which—I am sure you will agree—exerts considerable influence on the international climate throughout the world. It is therefore no accident that the results of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's visit to the PRC in May 1989, and of the meetings and talks it included between the top leaders of the two parties and states following a break of 30 years, were seen in the world as one of the major landmarks of recent times in international political life. In China itself, Li Peng remarked a week ago that the Soviet-Chinese summit meeting is seen as an important event along the way. Since that meeting, he said, bilateral relations in political, economic, scientific, cultural, and other spheres have undergone further dynamic development.

[Andrianov] That is beyond dispute, beyond any doubt. Where our relations with China are concerned the past year has been richer in events than recent decades. Between the two countries and peoples an atmosphere of goodwill and trust is becoming ever more firmly established, and the sphere of mutual ties is becoming ever broader. Much that is real has already been done in this respect. So, for instance, although the economic situation between the two countries is not straightforward, trade turnover between them last year reached a record level of around R2.4 billion. There is discernible progress in the development of direct economic links and also of trade in the border region, the volume of which rose by a factor of 2.8 last year as compared with 1988. As you know, we have a shortage of manpower in the eastern areas of the country, and so there are now over 20,000 Chinese workers employed on a contractual basis in the Soviet Union.

[Agayants] One could cite quite a few more similar examples, Boris Vasilyevich, and I would suggest it was not for nothing that Li Peng stressed at a meeting in Beijing with Soviet journalists that, as far as the overall state of Soviet-Chinese relations is concerned, it needs to be noted that they are developing in the right direction. Yet at the same time the Chinese premier noted that our relations could be advancing more rapidly.

[Vedenyapin] There is no dispute about that, Nikolay Ivanovich; the view is quite justified. And incidentally, it is a view whch is shared by the Soviet leadership. This was declared by our head of government, Comrade Ryzhkov, in the speech he made at the dinner given in honor of the eminent Chinese visitor. So you will see that there are no differences of interpretation on this subjejct. As for why mention was made of the possibility of advancing our relations more rapidly, I think there is an explanation for this. It is sufficient to recall that at their meetings in Beijing Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and the leaders of the PRC outlined the general prospects for

Soviet-Chinese relations, thereby opening up a fundamentally new stage in the development of those relations. The specific fleshing-out of those outlines is taking place through a working dialogue dealing with broadening of mutually-beneficial economic cooperation and with other problems. But until recently there was an impression that this day-to-day working dialogue betweeen the USSR and the PRC on the matters mentioned previously—and on on other matters too—was unfortunately not keeping up with the requirements of the times either in its content or in its intensity, that it was not keeping up with the headlong development of political life. What was the matter here? It is quite possible that the inertia of the past, not yet fully overcome, was making itself felt here. And it seems to me that this probably also reflects how enormously occupied each country is with its own complex affairs, of how burdened each is with its own difficulties and problems.

[Andrianov] You know, Gennadiy Aleksandrovich, I cannot wholly agree with that interpretation. Why? Because the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations is far from being a mere act of protocol, as some people may see it. It is a process, and one which is far from simple at that, because the process is improving relations between two countries is a lengthy procedure. As I see it, it would be inexcusably naive to assume that even given the political will on both sides it is possible at one go to forget and put behind one all the quesions that have piled up. It is rather a question of, once having put aside entrenched dogmas and stereotypes, moving steadily forward toward strengthening mutual understanding and trust and a constructive development of links, while at the same time resolving also those far from easy problems bequeathed to us. I therefore see Li Peng's visit as one of this year's most important political events.

[Vedenyapin] Well, it is almost unnecessary to say that the strengthening of a good-neighborly relations between the Soviet Union and the PRC is wholly consonant with the trend toward an improvement in the international climate which is coming more and more to determine the world situation today. And it is obviously no accident that the resumption of Soviet-Chinese dialogue has attracted close attention from the media and political circles in various countries. There have been many reactions to Li Peng's visit but I shall confine myself to just one of them, taken from the French bourgeois paper L'ECHO, which published an editorial comment headed "Chinese-Soviet Realism." The Chinese premier's visit to Moscow and the concrete results achieved in the course of it, writes L'ECHO, quite obviously correspond to normalization in Chinese-Soviet relations, which have now been completely freed of any kind of ideological coloring. Both China and the Soviet Union, by having clearly defined the framework for the meeting, deserve equal merit for its success, which was expressed in agreements on reducing the military presence in areas adjoining the two countries' border and also on trade, economic, and scientific-technical cooperation. That, as I said, is the view of a paper hardly sympathetic to either Beijing or Moscow.

[Andrianov] The whole series of new agreements signed between the two countries during Li Peng's visit will considerably strengthen the juridical basis of Soviet-Chinese relations. I shall not dwell on all these documents. Let me just mention the long-term program for economic and scientific-technical cooperation. It is very important indeed, for it is this program which will determine the activities between us right up to the year 2000 and which will provide a basis for intensive mutually-beneficial relations in various economic spheres.

[Vedenyapin] In my view the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations has undoubtedly created beneficial conditions—as Li Peng's visit demonstrated—for moving ahead to mutual reductions in armed forces and to confidence-building, above all in those areas adjoining the world's longest land border—that between the USSR and the PRC. Progress in this area would make it possible once and for all to rid the public consciousness of the idea of each other as a potential military adversary, and additionally to release for civilian purposes huge resources so necessary at the present key stage of development in both countries.

[Agayants] The importance of the talks on this question, Gennadiy Aleksandrovich, and of the agreement which has now been signed on guiding principles for mutual reductions of armed forces and military confidence-building in the Soviet-Chinese border area goes far beyond the bounds of bilateral relations. This experience and example could prove very valuable from the point of view of setting up a pan-Asian process for talks on regional security problems. For this reason the continuing normalization of relations between the Soviet Union and the PRC forms an organic part of the present positive trend in world developments, representing a contribution in substance to improving the situation in Asia and in the world as a whole. [passage omitted on Andrianov noting that talks between the two Germanys began last week amd mentions the areas covered. Vedenyapin says they have given themselves 8-10 weeks to reach monetary and social union. He adds that FRG financial and business circles' reactions to the proposals have moved from positive to critical. Agayants adds that the values of FRG stocks and the Deutschmark have fallen. Andrianov quotes a warning from an FRG banker of possible rises in interest rates. Vedenyapin says people in the FRG are worried and Agayants quotes results of a poll showing that only 19 percent approve of a 1:1 exchange rate. Andrianov says the GDR Government also has its worries, especially over property claims by West Germans, and he quotes a statement by De Maiziere calling for sharing and solidarity. Agayants adds that De Maiziere has spoken of his desire for friendly cooperation with the USSR and of the need to heed the USSR's security interests. Vedenyapin says people in Europe want German unification to be part of an all-European process. Agayants says the influence of states today is determined by economic and technological might, and mentions West European concern that a united Germany might dominate the EC. Andrianov takes up the point, saying West Europe would like to weave the unification process into the all-European Helsinki process, and that too much haste could leave Germany isolated while a stage-by-stage approach would win universal approval. Vedenyapin winds up by mentioning that questions such as the capital city and membership of NATO remain unanswered; in short, there are more questions than answers]

[Agayants] It is exactly one month before the regular Soviet-U.S. summit meeting between Presidents Bush and Gorbachev begins or, to be more precise, should begin. [passage omitted nothing much preparation for this summit is going on, including visit to USSR by Secretary Baker in May]

It is not suprising that there is huge interest in this event, and it is heated up by certain difficulties in the relations between our countries, which on the one hand is linked to the very critical stage which our perestroyka is going through now and which is clearly being used by certain forces in the United States, and on the other hand, the situation around Lithuania, which has been created after the Sajudis's proclamation of independence. Personally, I believe that some people in Washington have played the Lithuanian card and would like to push the head of the White House to steps which could greatly complicate the relations between our countries and interfere with the continuation of the fruitful Soviet-U.S. dialogue. But if we are to discard the euphoria at the cloudlessness of these relations, then the obvious should be recognized: We will set going—and it is going, even if there are failures and disillusion at times—the difficult process, the process of normalizing the communications beween two superpowers.

[Vedenyapin] Quite right, Nikolay Ivanovich. And it would be an inadmissable luxury and thoughtlessness to negate what has already been achieved in joint searches for an optimal balance of our interests. However, why only ours? For the positive development of the Soviet-U.S. dialogue and the important documents adopted during the talks have a huge influence, as the experience of recent years shows, on improving the political climate on the whole of our planet. For this reason the summit in Washington at the end of May and beginning of June is being waited for. It is not only the inhabitants of the United States and the USSR who link their hopes and expectations with it, but people of good will in other countries also do.

[Agayants] And although some American politicians are trying at the moment to make it look as if the Lithuanian crisis has put all Soviet-U.S. relations as a whole under threat, this, in the first place, does not correspond to the views of the administration and, second, it does not correspond at all to the mood of the majority of U.S. citizens. [passage omited: Aagyants supports his statement by referring to CNN and TIME magazine opinion poll, in which 65 percent of respondents are in favor of maintaining and developing relations with the USSR, regardless of events in Lithuania. Vedenyapin then mentions ABC and WALL STREET JOURNAL opinion poll which shows the same, and that sanctions should not be introduced against the USSR. Andrianov quotes "one of the most influential observers in the United States", John Oakes in the NEW YORK TIMES, who writes that Bush should warn Lithuania against forcing Gorbachev into using military intervention. If the Lithuanians continue to press their case this could be disastrous for Lithuania and Gorbachev, and dangerous for the United States]

[Vedenyapin] I will note that the appraisals of certain American politicians have a double approach, a double standard, if you like. One thing, so to speak, for us, another thing for everyone else. The aggression against Grenada and Panama, the economic blockade organized by Washington against regimes which do not suit Uncle Sam is one thing, they say. Measures against the Lithuanians, rushing they don't know where, is in the the opinion of such politicians something completely different. The effort to teach everyone the rules of living together and morality by some Washington strategists naturally complicates the process of holding a constructive dialogue. But nevertheless it is necessary to hold it, although it needs, of course, gigantic endurance and self-control.

[Agayants] All that is true. And it seems to me that the White House is beginning to understand this. In any event, last week on Tuesday when President Bush met leaders of the U.S. Congress and discussed the situation around Lithuania with them, he did not give in to the indeterminate pressure from those who wanted to hurt the administration more painfully, accusing it of indecisiveness and weakness, nor did he given in to his own emotions. After the meeting Bush stated precisely and clearly that at the present time he will not introduce any sanctions against the Soviet Union in reply to the Kremlin's actions as regards Lithuania, because their introduction could have the reverse effect. [passage omitted: Agayants quotes Bush who said he did not want sanctions as it could turn back the clock on recent progress in freedom throughout the world. Andrianov notes that the Western media had speculated before that this meeting would be a turning point in the West's actions as regards the Lithuania situation. ABC said Bush came to the meeting ready to introduce sanctions if the congressmen had wanted them]

[Vedenyapin] As it turns out now, the consultations which the U.S. president and his councillors held recently with leaders of the allied countries of the North Atlantic bloc, just as with the leaders of some East European states, had an unambigous result. Neither the allies nor the East Europeans are at all inclined to support strict sanctions against our country. All of these factors, plus the opinion polls already mentioned, in all probability influenced George Bush's position who, as the ABC television network expressed it: decided not to take a decision. [passage omitted: Vedenyapin quotes Bush as saying he does not want people to look back in

20 or 40 years and view this as the time when everything went off the rails and progress stopped. Andrianov quotes a NEW YORK TIMES editorial approving of Bush's lack of action, although Lithuanians may not appreciate this]

[Vedenyapin] Incidentally, many Americans support Moscow's policy as regards Lithuania. There have been references in the press to the fact that, in his time, President Lincoln even began a civil war with the South to preserve the integrity of the American union. So the most decisive actions by the head of the Soviet state in this question are not only not condemned by many U.S. citizens, but are perceived with understanding. In the words of the observor Patrick Buchanan, they prefer Gorbachev to Lithuania.

[Agayants] The need to continue the Soviet-U.S. dialogue, including at the highest level, is today extraordinarily greeat. Disarmament problems and problems connected to the changes taking place in Europe, regional conflicts, and the development of trade and economic links between our states need the greatest possible mutual understanding. This is obvious. It is also clear that the development of relations, especially between such different countries as the United States and the USSR, which until very recently opposed each other in the world as irreconcilable opponents, cannot only go up. In general, over the entire history of mutual relations between the United States and the USSR, sinusoidal development is characteristic of them, that is, there are moments of upward flight and moments of sharp falls. But now, with all the objective and subjective difficulties, with all the unexpected turnings, nevertheless there is hope that they will remain on a level worthy of our peoples. And since nothing good comes to us by itself without effort, does not fall on us like manna from heaven, it is necessary to take care of and develop what has already been achieved. It is necessary to make efforts so that the mutually advantageous Moscow-Washington dialogue continue. I personally am convinced that this is how it will be.

The time for our program has come to an end. We, its participants, thank you, dear comrade listeners, for your attention. All the best and a happy spring holiday. A happy Mayday.

United States & Canada

Lithuania's Prunskiene Negotiating Canadian Trade

LD0105103490 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0900 GMT 1 May 90

[Text] Kazimiera Prunskiene, prime minister of the republic of Lithuania, is on a visit in Canada. She is leading negotiations with Canadian businessmen and other influential Canadian officials. Negotiations are about direct economic and trade links between Canada and Lithuania as well as the credit of $18 million to Lithuania.

After Canada K. Prunskiene will visit the United States.

U.S. Congressmen Cited on Lithuania Situation

LD3004105390 Moscow TASS in English 0949 GMT 30 Apr 90

[Text] New York April 30 TASS—An influential U.S. lawmaker supported the White House's policy on Lithuania.

"The general thrust is correct," Representative Les Aspin, House Armed Services Committee chairman, said in ABC News television programme "This Week With David Brinkley" on Sunday.

"Basically, the interest that the United States has and that the world has are greater in this case than just the temporary tactical concerns over Lithuanian independence," Aspin said.

Another U.S. lawmaker, David Boren (Democrat—Oklahoma) Senate Intelligence Committee chairman, speaking on the Meet the Press Programme of the NBC News Network, supported President George Bush's refusal to give in to pressure and block a trade accord with the Soviet Union.

In both cases the president took the right decision, he said.

U.S. Resolution on El Salvador 'Riveting'

LD2804181590 Moscow TASS in English 1632 GMT 28 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 28 TASS—By TASS diplomatic correspondent:

The U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee's resolution to halve military aid to El Salvador has riveted the attention of political observers in Moscow.

The Soviet Union has always positively assessed the American public's campaigns for a political settlement of armed conflicts and for the improvement of the international situation as a whole.

The Foreign Affairs Committee's resolution demonstrates the American lawmakers' desire to persuade the State Department to alter the U.S. Central American policy and make it correspond to new realities in the region.

It is believed here that the committee resolution shows that the legislators understand the futility of old policies in the new regional situation.

The resolution is viewed here as challenging official Washington to abandon power methods of handling Salvadorean problems and to search for a political solution to the civilian conflict in that country.

The hope is expressed in the Moscow diplomatic circles that this trend will become stronger.

Reasons for Canceling Psychiatrists' Trip Derided

PM3004144690 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Interview with Yu. Reshetov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Administration for International Humanitarian Cooperation and Human Rights, by our correspondent M. Yusin; date, place of interview not stated; first paragraph is IZVESTIYA introduction: "Soviet Psychiatrists' U.S. Visit Canceled at the Last Minute"]

[Text] It has become known that the American side has postponed, basically, indefinitely the visit to the United States by a delegation of Soviet psychiatrists which was to have begun 28 April. Our correspondent asked Yu. Reshetov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Administration for International Humanitarian Cooperation and Human Rights, who was directly involved in preparations for the canceled visit, to explain the reasons for this decision.

[Reshetov] First, a bit of prehistory. Last year a group of American psychiatrists came to our country. It was an unprecedented visit. Only a few years ago it was impossible to imagine Western specialists visiting any psychiatric clinic they liked, meeting with any patient who interested them, and being allowed unhindered even into hospitals in zones that are closed to foreigners. In short, we did everything to make the visit as useful as possible, so that after the visit distrust and reticence between Soviet and American psychiatrists would be minimized.

Even then it was stipulated that a return trip by our psychiatrists to America would take place in 1990. But as the date of the visit approached, the Americans behavior became increasingly strange. First they postponed the invitation for a long time. Then a question of principle—from the American viewpoint—arose: Can the forthcoming trip be described as a return visit? Psychiatrists across the ocean were opposed to this, putting forward roughly this argument: Our visit to the USSR in 1989 was a kind of inspection, a verification, to see how things stand in ill-famed Soviet psychiatry. But there is nothing for the Russians to inspect in America, it is not for them to assess the state of our psychiatry.

That, in my view, is one factor explaining the cancelation of the visit. Most likely people in America were afraid that the Soviet delegation's trip could uncover the darker side of U.S. psychiatry. And, judging by recent American press publications, that darker side does exist. But unlike Soviet psychiatrists, who have learned openly to talk about painful areas and not to keep quiet about past sins, their colleagues across the ocean are very sensitive about any undesirable leak of information.

I must stress another aspect, too. The Soviet delegation had no intention of placing the emphasis on the inspection aspect of the visit, which so worries the Americans. Our main aim was to exchange professional experience with colleagues, study their scientific achievements, and share our own. But the Americans looked at things differently....

Two days before the start of the trip, when the 28 delegation members were already sitting on their suitcases, you could say, the American side announced its decision to postpone the visit "to a later date." That is, in effect, indefinitely. The following argument was cited to justify this step: The delegation includes "people who in the past actively participated in abuses of psychiatry for political purposes." This unsubstantiated accusation sounds all the more strange in that only three weeks ago we submitted a list of the delegation to the Americans, and they had no objections.

Another argument cited by the trip's organizers looks frankly risible. They assert that an atmosphere has now developed in the United States that is unfavorable to a visit by Soviet psychiatrists, since the American public are indignant about.... "anti-Semitic remarks" by members of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Writers' Union on a recent trip to the United States! It is quite obvious that the Americans were simply looking for a reason to cancel the visit. And the one they found was, to put it mildly, rather unfortunate.

As a result enormous preparatory work is wasted. A blow has been struck against Soviet-American humanitarian and scientific cooperation. This turn of events can only please the "psychiatric hawks" who, unfortunately, exist in both our countries. They advocate an end to contacts in the sphere of psychiatry and a return to confrontation. Now these people can feel they have won.

In conclusion I would like to note that the U.S. Administration had nothing to do with the decision to cancel the visit. Nor is this step connected in any way with the situation in Lithuania.

Greater U.S. Military Cutbacks Urged

LD2904023190 Moscow in English to North America 2200 GMT 28 Apr 90

[Vladislav Kozyakov commentary—announcer-read]

[Text] The U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney has suggested in Congress that the program for building B-2 Stealth bombers and also tactical and transport planes be slashed. Vladislay Kozyakov of our staff has contributed this commentary:

At first sight the proposed cuts look impressive. Instead of the original 132 B-2 bombers the Pentagon is going to acquire 75. That would greatly ease the taxpayer's burden since each B-2 is estimated at $530,000,000. [figure as heard] The benefits of the cuts would be felt alredy next year because only two bombers will be built instead of five.

And yet this attitude is not fully consonant with the imperative of our time. The reason is that the program for building the high-tech B-2 Stealth strategic bomber emerged in a situation dramatically different from the current one. That plane, undetectable by radar, is a first strike weapon. It won't be an exaggeration to say that it is a product of the policy of military confrontation with the Soviet Union.

Why should the Americans waste billions of dollars on such weapons now that the Soviet Union and the United States no longer look at each other as enemies? What is the reason for doing that at a time when there is a good opportunity for reaching agreement with the Soviet Union to cut or eliminate altogether any kind of weapon on a mutual basis and couple that agreement with reliable verification measures? Why should the B-2 bombers be given the go-ahead? The Soviet Union hasn't been building aircraft of that type—why should America need them?

It is not only Soviet people who have been asking these questions—Americans, including members of Congress, have been asking them, too.

The statements made by the defense secretary look rather promising. There is clearly going to be a smaller navy, clearly going to be a smaller marine corps, smaller army, smaller air force. He added that: Obviously we are looking at a force that is significantly smaller than it is today.

However, the reaction from members of Congress was mixed. Some believe that the administration's specific proposals for cutting military spending and programs don't go as far as the new international situation allows for.

In the view of the House Armed Services Committee chairman, Les Aspin, Cheney's proposal still is based on an unrealistically pessimistic view of the Soviet threat. Indeed, as far as the evaluation of Soviet policies and changes in Europe are concerned, the U.S. Defense Secretary obviously disagrees with the prevailing opinion in Washington. Speaking in Los Angeles this week, he even called for using the developments involving the Soviet Republic of Lithuania to delay all arms cuts by two years.

The tone of Richard Cheney's statement about Soviet policies, full of mistrust and suspicion, does not fit in with the new relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. All this has clearly had its imprint on the proposals for cuts in military programs the Pentagon has put forward in Congress, and their scale rather limited.

China

Jiang Zemin Meets PRAVDA's Ovchinnikov

OW0105044890 Moscow in Mandarin to Southeast Asia 1100 GMT 30 Apr 90

[From the "World Today" program]

[Text] Dear listeners, Jiang Zemin, general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, received, at Zhongnanhai, and spoke to Ovchinnikov, a political commentator of PRAVDA, who headed the visiting delegation of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society.

Jiang Zemin said: The year I assumed the post as general secretary of the CPC Central Committee was fraught with difficulties for China as it was for the Soviet Union. However, when it comes to the fate of socialism, we should not ignore the fact that it takes a long while for a social system to replace another system. My people stick to the historic choices which they themselves made in 1917 and 1979. Those who try to make socialism disappear from the earth have rejoiced prematurely. He laughs best who laughs last. As long as the people of our two countries hold up high the banner of socialism, it is invincible. It is very likely that the historic meeting between Mikhail S. Gorbachev and Deng Xiaoping in May last year will prove to be able to close up the past and open up the future. Premier Li Peng has just concluded a successful visit to the Soviet Union. Progress has been made in the cooperation and exchange between our two countries in politics, economy, science, technology, etc. It has been proven in the past year that the two major socialist countries—China and the Soviet Union—should establish and develop friendly and good-neighborly relations on a long term and steady basis, which not only is in the fundamental interests of the Chinese and Soviet people but also is in the interests of the people of the Asia-Pacific region and the rest of the world.

Jiang Zemin pointed out: It is necessary to observe strictly the five principles of peaceful coexistence in the relations between our two countries. We still differ with each other in our positions and views on certain issues, which is quite natural because the actual situations in our two countries are different.

The General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee Jiang Zemin continued: In the past year, the CPSU and the CPC have established ties and contacts with each other based on the principles of independence, mutual respect, and noninterference in each other's internal affairs. Even though they still cannot see eye to eye with each other on many issues, the CPSU and the CPC have identical or similar views on issues concerning how each party should fulfill its historical mission. At present, as our two countries are undergoing reforms, we encounter many similar problems.

At the end of his speech, the General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee Jiang Zemin extended his greetings to the Soviet people on 1 May International Labor Day and wished them greater success in their effort to build socialism under the leadership of the CPSU.

Yefimov Talks With Li Ruihan in PRC

LD2504095690 Moscow TASS in English 0943 GMT 25 Apr 90

[Text] Beijing April 25 TASS—By TASS correspondent Vladimir Kashirov:

Normalisation of Sino-Soviet relations following Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to China last May is in the interests of the two socialist countries. The development of friendship and cooperation between China and the Soviet Union is also in the interests of all nations, Li Ruihuan, member of the Chinese Communist Party Politburo Standing Committee, said during talks with Nikolay Yefimov, chairman of the Soviet committee on the press, today.

The meeting with the Soviet delegation takes place as Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng visits the Soviet Union, Li Ruihuan said. He said he was certain that Soviet perestroyka will be a success in all spheres.

Li supported the comprehensive development of Sino-Soviet relations, saying that China and the Soviet Union have and will have points of mutual advantage and differences.

"This is natural, but we should pay more attention to what unites us and cast aside our differences. Our countries have much space for cooperation. It is necessary to forge broad contacts in order to promote understanding between our countries and peoples," Li said.

During talks held in a warm and friendly atmosphere, N. Yefimov called for the establishment of direct links between the Soviet and Chinese publishers and pointed to growing Soviet interest in Chinese economic and political literature and belles letters.

Moscow Notes Progress in Relations With PRC

OW2504094290 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0100 GMT 24 Apr 90

[From the "Current Events and Commentaries" program]

[Text] The first round of Soviet-Chinese talks was held in the Kremlin Palace on Monday. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and Li Peng, premier of the PRC State Council, respectively led their delegations to the talks. Li Peng arrived in Moscow on the same day for a formal visit.

People are showing great interest in the Soviet-Chinese talks. This interest might be explained, to a great extent, by the fact that it is the first time in 26 years a leader of the Chinese Government is visiting the Soviet Union. However, the major point—what we are trying to say here—is that it is the continuation of important dialogue at the highest level started by Gorbachev's visit to Beijing a year ago. This historical event normalized relations between the Soviet Union and China.

Upon his arrival in Moscow, Li Peng pointed out: Both sides developed new contacts in all fields of endeavor the past year. The purpose of our visit this time is to continue to give impetus to this process. The leader of the Chinese Government expressed his belief that improving relations between the two countries is conducive to promoting peace and detente in Asia as well as in the whole world.

In proposing a toast at a banquet he hosted for the honored Chinese guests, Ryzhkov said: It is with a friendly feeling that the Soviet people follow with interest how China's workers carry out the current reform policy of the state and the rather difficult task of modernizing the economy while giving full play to socialist potentials. On Soviet-Chinese relations, the leader of the Soviet Government pointed out: The relations are based on mutual respect, complete equality, and noninterference in each other's internal affairs. Cooperation between the peoples of the two great countries is not in any sense for the purpose of opposing any third country. A new atmosphere of friendship and trust is being fostered and growing stronger day by day between the Soviet Union and China. Ryzhkov said that a program to promote long-term development of economic, scientific, and technological cooperation between the Soviet Union and China, which will be signed in Moscow within the next few days, will be conducive to expanding Soviet-Chinese relations more quickly.

The chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers pointed out: The Soviet Union and China take a similar stand on the issue of not using nuclear weapons. They both call for destruction of all nuclear weapons, withdrawal of foreign troops in territories of other countries, not using force in international affairs, eliminating military bases established beyond national boundaries, and easing and settling regional conflicts through political dialogue.

During their first meeting, the two government leaders expressed satisfaction with the progress made at the talks started last year on mutual reduction of armed forces deployed along the Soviet-Chinese border and boosting confidence in the military sphere.

Engineering Contacts With China Broaden

LD2404173990 Moscow TASS in English 1244 GMT 24 Apr 90

[By TASS Correspondent Leonid Streletsky]

[Text] Donetsk April 24 TASS—Personnel at an engineering plant in Slavyansk, the Donets Coal Basin, Ukraine, have become a reputed economic partner of China.

The shipment of the first consignment of mechanisms for the Anshan steel mill began today at this plant, which is the Soviet Union's leading enterprise for the manufacture of coke by-product equipment.

"An agreement on economic and technical cooperation in the construction and modernisation of industrial facilities was concluded last year at the Soviet-Chinese summit, helping to make relations with China more active," Gennadiy Rogov, general director of the Soviet plant, told TASS.

"Immediately after that, we delivered an installation for the dry quenching of coke to the Shanghai coke-oven gas plant. The installation, priced at R1 million, makes it possible not only to utilise waste heat and repeatedly use it but also to improve markedly the ecological situation in the industrially developed region of China. The contract with Anshan workers is still larger in scope, it will be fully implemented towards the end of the year."

Rogov voiced confidence that the current visit by Chinese Premier Li Peng to the Soviet Union would lend still greater dynamism to mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries.

The Donets Coal Basin has products for trade with China. Goods to China are also sent by engineering workers in Donetsk, Gorlovka, Yasinovataya, Kramatorsk and Mariupol.

Many plants in this industrial centre have now established direct contacts with Chinese specialists with a view to founding joint ventures.

Northeast Asia

Realistic Approach to Korean Question Urged

SK0105022090 Moscow International Service in Korean 0900 GMT 28 Apr 90

[Text] One of the issues discussed when Comrade Li Peng, premier of the PRC State Council, was visiting the Soviet Union was the question of the Korean peninsula. This is because both the Soviet Union and China are directly linked with Korea geographically and politically.

Our station commentator (Sergey Vladov) says as follows:

Today, when the positive tenor is becoming even more stable in the world and in Asia, the Korean peninsula seems to be away from this course.

Tension and mistrust continue to prevail on the Korean peninsula, and the two sides of North and South Korea have not arranged (?practical) dialogue.

All these things make the Soviet Union and China—the neighbors of North and South Korea—uneasy.

Of course, peaceful dialogue between North and South Korea is a most important means to settle the question of the Korean peninsula.

During the course of the Moscow talks, Moscow and Beijing fully supported peaceful dialogue between North and South Korea.

The constructive proposals which North and South Korea put forth for military abatement (wanhwa) and for establishing economic and (?human) exchanges between Pyongyang and Seoul have been made well known in the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union and China consistently support North Korea's proposal for making the situation on the Korean peninsula peaceful.

In addition, on many occasions, Moscow and Beijing expressed their affirmative stand toward the constructive elements of the plans which South Korea had put forth to normalize the situation in Korea.

Today, one of the major issues placed on the timetable is the withdrawal of the U.S. forces from South Korea.

Pyongyang has put forth many proposals regarding this matter. Pyongyang proposed holding tripartite talks between the DPRK, the United States, and South Korea, and holding bilateral talks between the DPRK and the United States.

The bilateral talks are being held in secrecy. However, no remarkable progress has been made.

The DPRK proposed to begin with the most complicated, and largest questions such as reducing the armed forces of North and South Korea, withdrawing the U.S. troops and nuclear weapons from South Korea, adopting a declaration of nonaggression between Pyongyang and Seoul, and turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone. All these proposals are essentially the same.

However, if one is a realist, he must admit that an immediate settlement of such issues is impossible after the bitter confrontation has continued for many decades.

Accordingly, next comes the natural question of whether it wouldn't be better to begin with small steps, to proceed from small matters to big matters, and to proceed from simple things to complicated things.

For example, a question arises on whether it wouldn't be better to begin with such issues as taking a confidence-building step on the Korean peninsula, controlling military exercises, making the DMZ truly demilitarized, and mutually reducing military personnel in the DMZ.

In other words, here we note the proposals put forth by North and South Korea. The question now is to begin practical discussions of these proposals. Talks must not be postponed but be held at once.

Moscow and Beijing are developing relations with South Korea in various fields. The relations have become conspicuously active lately.

In 1988, the Soviet Union increased its trade with Seoul to $200 million. It increased this to as much as $600 million in 1989.

China's trade with South Korea over the past two years exceeded $3 billion respectively.

At the same time, it is noteworthy that the Soviet Union has practically established consular relations with Seoul, and is developing political contact as well with delegates of the South Korean Government.

Needless to say, the Soviet Union's and China's expansion of contacts with South Korea fundamentally affects the overall situation on the Korean peninsula. This is a fact and cannot be denied.

The fact that attention was directed to the Korean question during talks between Soviet leaders and the premier of the State Council of China once again displays the genuine aspiration of the Soviet Union and China to find a way to ease tensions in Korea and fully contribute to peaceful dialogue between North and South Korea.

Without peaceful dialogue between North and South Korea, it is impossible to achieve true peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia as a whole.

Soviet Press Coverage of DPRK Greatly Reduced

SK2904232990 Moscow International Service in Korean 0900 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Text] Dear Listeners, we will now briefly introduce to you some data on the DPRK carried by Soviet publications. The (?April) issue of the magazine (ASIA AND AFRICA) carried an article by economist (Georgiy Towarayo) entitled "An Experience Worth Considering."

(Georgiy Tomarayo) writes as follows.

One who is accustomed to the construction of facilities taking a long time in the Soviet Union cannot help being surprised at the speed of construction in the DPRK—particularly the construction of the facilities considered important from the production, social, and political standpoint. Those who are responsible for construction in the DPRK aim at completing the facilities within a very short period of time by concentrating strength and funds on the most important construction projects. What caused construction to become the (?strongest) and most active aspect of economic activities? The overall (?developmental) activities presuppose that the construction complexes are put at the front of overall economic development. Also, the economy of the DPRK is based on the principle of self-reliance. A significant portion of the state budget is set aside for construction.

The budget executed for construction was (?41.7) percent in (?1986) and (?47.9) percent in 1988, namely over 10 billion won, of the total state budget. The system of organizing work at construction site is very unique. Those working at construction sites include the soldiers from the Korean People's Army and young construction unit members. According to the construction workers, they refuse to use their holidays and leave. Other workers, and, in particular, the (?officials) of the state organizations are all made to participate in construction work every week. (?Those who are engaged in construction) are bracing themselves in connection with the tradition of completing the facilities with the state holiday, party holiday, and the birthdays of the party and state leaders approaching. The Soviet construction workers have long been interested in the experience of their Korean colleagues. The Korean side will be able to participate in the construction of industrial and civilian facilities in the Soviet territories, particularly in Siberia and the far eastern areas. The mutually beneficial meeting (?in this area) will facilitate the solution of the construction problems in the far eastern areas of our country. This agreement can become a new source of outside income for the DPRK.

The weekly publication [name indistinct], citing a NODONG SINMUN article, reports to the readers on the booklet containing the works of Kim Chong-il, son of and heir to Kim Il-song, president of the DPRK, published in Pyongyang. This book is said to contain songs and poems praising Kim Il-song and novels and short stories on Kim Chong-il. NODONG SINMUN notes that this book will contribute to intensifying the work of fostering loyalty and respect among the party members and other (?politicians) to prepare themselves to be more reliable revolutionaries.

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, telling the readers about the event nearly 45 years ago upon the request of a reader, writes as follows.

The Soviet army suffered casualties of 8,219 soldiers killed in action and 22,064 soldiers wounded in the battle to bring freedom to Korea. The casualties suffered by the Kanto Army were much higher than this. Some (?170) Soviet soldiers participated in the combat operation of the Soviet army on the Korean peninsula.

Strangely, the number of articles on the DPRK has dropped drastically. A TASS article carried by PRAVDA may explain the cause of this phenomenon. The article says: The Soviet reporters are in a very odd situation in the DPRK. The Soviet reporters' requests for meetings with official figures have not been filled for over 2 months now. Unless they have permission for the meetings, they cannot meet them. What has caused this? (Pak Chong-hyon), chief of a section of the Information Bureau of the DPRK Foreign Ministry, offered the following explanation to the TASS reporter: Write articles supporting our revolution, then your requests will be filled. TASS reporter (Aleksandr Levin) notes that the (?news) and information on the DPRK carried by the Soviet central newspapers and magazines are making the Korean authorities uneasy. (Alexsandr Levin) also reports that the Korean side has requested the Soviet Embassy to take measures on a number of occasions.

Reporter Sketches Scenes of Seoul, South Korea

SK3004042490 Moscow International Service in Korean 0900 GMT 25 Apr 90

[Text] Soviet paper MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA carried an article by its correspondents who visited Seoul, capital of the ROK, some time ago. We will now carry the gist of the article.

We were aboard the first flight of Aeroflot which was flying along the route from Moscow to Seoul. In the skies over the Ural Mountains, one of our company unfolded a map of the Aeroflot international service route and jokingly said "we are flying to a nonexistent country."

The joke was not very far from the truth. For many years, we have not recognized the country which does really exist in the southern part of the Korean peninsula.

We still continue to maintain the same line as in the past. However, the opening of direct air service, along with expanding ties in other fields between our two countries, seems now to be bringing such an unclear position to the finalty of logic.

All of the South Koreans we met asked exactly the same question; when would official relations be established between the Soviet Union and the ROK?

We, needless to say, have no right to answer the question.

Nonetheless, while staying in Seoul, we tried to find answers to other questions regarding the miracle through which the country, which was backward until recently, has been turned into a little dragon country.

A little dragon—this is a description for the ROK, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong which have won economic prosperity in a short period of time.

From the peak of Namsan Hill, we look down at Seoul, which accommodates 10-million population, as if it were our palm. We see the zigzagging roads leading to the foot of the hill.

The most proper word with which to characterize today's Seoul may be "leap." People say that the city already foresees the 21st century in its urban planning and in its technological development.

To define the city's philosophy of life and the ROK's general philosophy of life, we may cite the remarks by Cho Chung-kun, chairman of Korean Air.

While speaking about the opening of the air service between our two countries, Chairman Cho Chung-kun says: You will see no gold statues of political leaders in our streets. We diligently struggle only to make our country even better.

Staying in Seoul, we realized what he said was not just words. Every moment and every hour of the South Koreans are teeming with industrious and credible labor. Precisely this seems to be a main key to the leap which amazes many people today.

It is hard to believe that the bedrock of Seoul was established way back in 1394. It is not easy to find the traditional buildings of the past in the streets.

Seoul citizens desire to live in individual residential houses, if they can afford it materially. However, today, the city is a mammoth city full of skyscrapers of clearly American-style architecture. This is particularly conspicuous at the center of the capital.

In the famous shopping area Itaewon, three shopkeepers reportedly serve each customer. There, we were surrounded by those who were persistently trying to lead us to their shops.

In this shopping area, one can buy whatever he wants and it takes only several hours to purchase even high quality made-to-measure white shirts. Alterations are absolutely no problem.

The Itaewon was another find to us. There was a genuine interest in our country. Street vendors showed us many Soviet souvenirs such as Soviet (?badges) and mementos. A lovely miss—a shopkeeper who introduced her surname as Son—spoke some Russian words. So we were extremely delighted. She told us that she had learned the Russian words from the Russian language textbook recently published for the first time by the Purunsan Publication House in Seoul.

We could become accustomed to abounding goods and sparkling show windows, which were beyond our imagination. But it was never easy for us to get accustomed to the people's attitude of unfeigned respect toward customers we experienced everywhere in Seoul; shops, restaurants, and hotels, even if we considered the Korean people's traditional etiquette. Greeting with a deep bow evinced a sort of self-esteem, along with respect toward customers.

Seoul has many small and big things which represent its unique characteristics. One of them is the well known Namdaemun Market. The market—an endless labyrinth—spans over several sections and bustles day and night. What is amazing, however, is that no one pushes anyone, no one is hysteric, and no one looks at other people with angry eyes, despite extreme overcrowding. There, we see no single policeman. We realize that there must be some secret sense of motion which enables the perfectly orderly function of the market, though it is crowded like an ant hill.

Once, we visited the Namdaemun Market at night. However, no one ever paid attention to us, though we were touring the nearly deserted market at night. We felt completely safe. We felt much safer than in the (Zhusiskiy) market in Moscow in broad daylight.

This is by no means an exaggeration. According to a briefing given to us, the crime rate is very low in Seoul.

However, there is no need to harbor an illusion. At dusk, we occasionally see some acceptably drunken young men. But they are still very polite and never pose any threat to the passersby.

The South Korean people's life seems to be a reflection of a secret culture.

One of the most critical problems in Seoul is the traffic problem. The population of the South Korea's capital is just about the same as that of Moscow. However, it reportedly has ten times more cars.

Car-created confusion is a (?chronic) problem of the city. In rush hour, it takes 56 minutes to travel 20 kilometers by car in Seoul. In New York, it takes 29 minutes.

Accordingly, today, it is no wonder that the Seoul citizens' most widespread topic of conversation is not politics, nor inflation, nor sex but the street crowdedness, environmental pollution, and high rate of traffic accidents, as noted by the magazine (?BUSINESS KOREA).

The number of cars is ceaselessly increasing. According to information from the ministry of trade and industry, most of the Koreans will have private cars by the end of 1992.

If we are asked what amazed us most in Seoul, we try to recall the impression we had some time ago and try to tell some most amazing thing. However, what amazed us most was not those wonderful modern buildings, nor the proudly-preserved Olympic facilities, nor the (?commodities) displayed at the Lotte Supermarket but rather, a small miraculous event.

We saw the flowers hung at the street-light poles. They were the artificial flowers decorating the electric poles along a street in Seoul. Those artificial flowers were hung within the reach of a hand. But not even a leaf nor a petal was damaged. They were all left untouched and maintained intact.

What we say is not to give our readers an impression that the capital of South Korea is a paradise. This is not the case.

Problems facing the city and its citizens are not few. We only say that the problems are those which can not be readily noticeable.

Kim Sun-chin, an employee of a sightseeing company who was guiding us during our tour of Seoul, told us: The most serious problem is the gap between the poor and the rich. Efforts are being made to narrow the gap. But the gap is still wide. It is true that the standard of the material life has been enhanced, and the average monthly income is now $700 to $900. However, there are still many of those who earn much less than this. In our country, there are also homeless people. The unemployment rate is not very high. But it is still one of the problems. The toppling of past traditions is our concern as well. This problem is related to (?young citizens). They only desire to live an easy and trouble-free life. Our particular concern is the environmental problem. I think other major urban areas also face the same problem.

The curtain of night suddenly spreads over Seoul. But the city at the foot of the Namsan Hill never stops its vigorous dash.

Radio Reports on Mongolian Party Congress

OW2804000590 Moscow in Mandarin to Southeast Asia 1100 GMT 16 Apr 90

[From the "World Today" program]

[Text] Dear listeners: The Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party [MPRP] held an extraordinary session in Ulaanbaatar last week. A reporter of this station has the following dispatch from the Mongolian capital:

The Mongolian party congress ended after electing a new party leadership last Friday. For the first time, none of the party Presidium members, who previously sat on the party central Politburo, was appointed to state or government leadership posts. The omission stressed the need to separate party and government functions. The party congress openly called for radically reforming the republic's social and political structures. At the same time, the meeting cautioned that it would be a gross mistake if such radical reforms were seen as oriented toward capitalism. The party congress, speaking in its political report, said that the planned radical reforms constituted an entirely different matter. It noted that the reforms were intended radically to renew the socialist system that had already taken root on Mongolian soil, as well as to give the system humanistic substance.

Ochirbat, chairman of the MPRP Central Committee, said that during this great revolutionary period, the party should devote all its energies to satisfying people's pressing needs. An extremely lively debate was held at the meeting. Many critical opinions about the MPRP's previous work were presented. The Mongolian Communists finally declared their intention to revolutionize their party. Most importantly, the documents adopted by the MPRP's extraordinary congress made a comprehensive assessment of the paths taken by the state and the party in the past, as well as the current situation. They also spelled out measures for averting a crisis.

Political Forces in Mongolia Begin Talks

LD2804232290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1835 GMT 28 Apr 90

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, (TASS)—Talks began today at the government building between the leaders of the new movements and representatives of Mongolia's official authorities. They began after a meeting of many people in the square in front of the "Yalalt" ["victory"] Cinema, organized by the Mongolian Democratic Union (MDU), the Mongolian Democratic Party (MDP), and the Mongolian Students' Union (MSU).

Under a reciprocal accord, the sides discussed the first three points on a petition from the MDU—DP containing demands to form a provisional people's hural and emergency people's council, to remove the apparat of the MPRP Central Committee from the government building, and to leave the premises to the new parties and movements.

Discussions on the first point of the coalition's demands led to an agreement to examine the matter of setting up a smaller hural and a permanently operating supreme legisslative body on condition that the procedure by which it was formed is acceptable to both sides. There are plans to form the smaller hural from the Great People's Hural and to grant it the right to elect a president. The coalition believes direct elections of every level of authority, up to and including a president, are essential.

Representatives of the Council of Ministers and the MPRP Central Committee have stated their readiness to grant equal conditions for their activities to all parties. At the same time, a representative of the MPRP Central Committee said that the leadership of the ruling party "could remain in the government bulding".

The sides expressed their readiness to embark, as of Monday, upon the formation of an MPR People's Great Hural Presidium Consultative Council, and to continue discussions of specific alternatives for forming the smaller people's hural and emergency people's council.

Political Situation Viewed

LD0105014190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 2200 GMT 30 Apr 90

[By correspondent Vladimir Korolev]

[Text] On the eve of May, naturally, one wants to talk not of confrontation but of the unification of all forces of Mongolian society, striving for the renewal of the country. Newspapers, radio, and television devote a great deal of material to this. But there are also other sentiments which cause concern. In particular, UNEN publishes a statement of social organizations, of servicemen of the capital's garrison, of numerous citizens, condemning the extremist outbursts of the Mongolian Democratic Union (MDU) as disturbing the peace and people's normal life. The MDU and the Mongolian Democratic Party (MDP) which emerged from it are carrying out their mass actions in violation of the law, presently in force in the Republic, on the procedure for holding rallies, demonstrations, and ceremonies.

Thus, at the end of last week, the MDU and the MDP organized a demonstration on Sukhe-Batar square. Its organizers, having delivered all sorts of ultimatums to the country's leadership, even attempted to blockade the government house. A day later, a similar unofficial rally was held in the Mongolian capital on Victory Square. The government report on this says that recently the MDU and the MDP want to use in their political interests people's aspiration for democracy. That blatant action is nothing other than the action of a group of extremists trying to attain power, the report notes.

At the same time, the government expresses readiness to work both with the MDU and the MDP, and other new organizations and formations. The Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party [MPRP] is also striving for the consolidation of all political forces in the country. The report that roundtable talks are now underway in government house bears witness to this. Participants include representatives of the MPRP and of other parties. They are discussing the situation in the country, questions of electoral legislation connected with the formation of the supreme bodies of state power, and other problems of urgence for Mongolia.

TASS Cites UNEN on Tsedenbal 'Degree'

LD2904084290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0430 GMT 29 Apr 90

[Text] It was reported today that a dialogue has begun in Mongolia between the leaders of the new movements and representatives of the official authorities. Agreement was reached to embark on Monday on forming a consultative council under the presidium of the People's Great Hural, and also to continue discussion of specific options for forming a people's minor hural, with the right to elect the president and an extraordinary people's council.

The process of democratization in Mongolia is proceeding as rapidly as in Eastern Europe. The transformations are encompassing more and more different aspects of life. The latest confirmation of this is a publication in UNEN: The authors of the article analyze the scientific activity, or more accurately the pseudoscientific activity of former leader Tsedenbal. He is accused of implanting in the public consciousness tenets that contradict Marxist-Leninist theory and defend even such Stalinist phenomena as the cult of personality. In 1972, the degree of doctor of sciences was conferred on Tsedenbal, not in the Academy of Sciences, however, but in the politburo of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee. The newspaper concludes that Tsedenbal is unworthy of this title, and demands that he be stripped of his academic degree.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Vietnam Follows Lenin, Rejects 'Dogma'

PM2704105790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[Article by Nguyen Thanh Binh, member of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee, under the rubric "Lenin, Socialism, and Renewal in Vietnam": "Vital Core"]

[Text] Hanoi, April—The 120th anniversary of Vladimir Ilich Lenin's birth is one of the most noteworthy dates this year in the life of the Vietnamese and Soviet peoples and all progressive mankind.

Continuing the cause of Marx and Engels, Lenin upheld and creatively developed Marxism and successfully directed the first proletarian revolution, which eliminated man's exploitation of man, established a working people's state on one-sixth of the earth's surface, and opened up a new era—the era of the transition from capitalism to socialism. The World War II victory against fascism, in which the Soviet Union was the deciding force, and subsequent victories won by a number of national liberation and social revolutions changed the situation in the world. This must be seen as a continuation of the October Revolution in Russia.

Nguyen ay Quoc—our future president, Ho Chi Minh—was the first Vietnamese to turn to Lenin's ideas. Ho Chi Minh wrote that Leninism is not only a compass for Vietnamese revolutionaries and the entire Vietnamese people. It is the sun lighting our way to the final victory. Grasping the essence of Lenin's teaching, Ho Chi Minh saw that the way to national liberation was linked with socialism. The correctness of this choice has been proven by the results of our people's protracted struggle, full of sacrifices and difficulties.

The Communist Party of Vietnam [CPV] firmly believes that Marxism-Leninism serves as the theoretical foundation and ideological foundation for guiding the Vietnamese people's revolutionary cause. When we say that we are doggedly implementing Marxism-Leninism, this does not mean that we are acting in a dogmatic and stereotyped fashion. V.I. Lenin never considered Marxism to be a readymade prescription to which no changes must be made but, on the contrary, called for it to be developed Lenin was profoundly aware that Marxism is not a dogma but a guide to action, not a panacea for all ills, not a readymade answer to all questions that life puts forward, but a dialectical method of thinking and acting in line with objective laws. It was Lenin who put forward the well-known idea of the need for concrete analysis of every concrete situation. That is the essence and the core of Marxism. It is only from this scientific, objective viewpoint that we can make a correct assessment of Lenin's theoretical legacy on socialism and employ his ideas in renewal.

Anti-Marxist currents are now increasingly attacking Lenin, in the belief that Lenin turned Marx' scientific socialism into a mixture of utopia and pragmatism and overestimated the role of force, dictatorship, and ideology and the role of subjective factors as a whole. That is a gross distortion and does not correspond with historical realities. Lenin's critics have confused Lenin's scientific theory on socialism with the distorted form of socialism that arose in a number of countries owing to their failure to fully understand Lenin and their wrong perception of him.

It was the mistakes made in socialist building that brought about the restructuring, renewal, and reforms in socialist countries that are necessary to overcome the distortions and return to the Marxist principles of scientific socialism. Despite the mistakes, socialism achieved indisputable successes following its emergence and development. On the other hand, socialism was retarded on its long road owing to the view of Marxism-Leninism as a totally immutable truth and to the disregard of specific historical conditions and comprehensive analysis of ever-changing life. Lenin said that Marxists must pay attention to real life and true reality, and not unthinkingly cling to the theories of yesteryear. Especially since theoreticians merely determine, and sometimes only outline basic, general principles. It is only by remembering this that we can correctly assess Lenin's legacy, combat the distortions, and outline the means of renewal and the means of escaping from dogmatism.

It was on this dialectical method of thinking that Lenin relied in April 1917 when he contemplated the forms of the transition to socialism. After conducting an in-depth analysis of the failures and determining the point of departure for the economy and social life in Russia of the time, Lenin elaborated New Economic Policy [NEP], which made it possible to overcome the "infantile disorder of leftism" and permitted the existence and restoration of private and capitalist relations and free trade and a combination of private with public interests via transitional interim forms such as concessions, mixed private-state enterprises, and cooperatives of small producers. All this developed alongside state enterprises' transition to entrepreneurship and integration with other economic structures under state control and regulation. Lenin considered state capitalism an interim link between small-scale and socialist production by means of the rapid development of production forces and the development of accounting and control. This represented the model for a new type of socialism, a theoretical solution showing the way to countries with underdeveloped and averagely developed economies.

In his last articles, revising the concepts of socialism which had been rebuffed during the implementation of NEP, Lenin said that our viewpoint of socialist building had changed substantially. Many of Lenin's ideas on NEP were not, unfortunately, put into effect after his death.

Proceeding along the socialist path, we in Vietnam sometimes grasped ideas about socialism from Soviet primers and the practice of the thirties. Life and experience gradually enabled us to see that, despite temporary active influences, the model of democratic-centralized, administrative-supply socialism contained potential defects and had increasingly adverse consequences. This model is not in line with our life's requirements. The CPV Central Committee decisions adopted in 1979 heralded the beginning of the transition to a new mechanism—with incentives for individual interest, the introduction of contract forms along with the strengthening and intensification of state and cooperative sectors, the use of individual and private economic structures, and the application of market relations. The Sixth CPV Congress elaborated the course of renewal. The decisions adopted by subsequent plenums and the CPV Central Committee Politburo gave a strong fillip to comprehensive renewal, above all in the economy.

The socioeconomic successes achieved during renewal are beginning to give Vietnam a new look. They have helped to curb inflation, to begin stabilizing prices and strengthening our currency, and to expand trade. A mixed-commodity economy with socialist orientation, the democratization of social life, and guarantees of the people's right to be the master of the country under Communist Party leadership are the distinguishing features of the process under way in Vietnam today.

Economic renewal facilitates the phased stabilization of the situation in the country. At the same time the CPV is gradually renewing the political system, the substance and methods of work of party, state, and mass organizations and cadre policy and stepping up organic ties between the party and the people, creating a firm foundation for speeding up the development of production and boosting the people's living standards.

Hence we conclude that the CPV must be tireless in implementing the course of renewal, which is a revolutionary necessity and a vitally important issue for the country. This process must rest on Marxism-Leninism, a reevaluation of scientific socialism, and the diagnosis and timely, correct solution of contradictions that arise in order to ensure that socialism develops dynamically. It is necessary to counter erroneous extremist trends which create conditions for an increase in anticommunist and antisocialist elements striving to divert the process of renewal from the chosen path and pose a new threat to socialism.

Renewal is a long and complex process. It must be implemented in stages, gradually, and reliably and also necessitates self-renewal and an increase in CPV responsibility for both the successes and the failures, since no other social force can undertake this important historical mission.

The successes secured in renewal in Vietnam over the last three years are the result of quests and the creative application of Lenin's idea of socialism and attest to Leninism's mighty vitality.

We must always remember Lenin's instructions that Marxism is not a dogma but a guide to action. From its experience the CPV has seen that the revolution only achieved great successes, at a time when dogmatism and stereotypes would have presented it with great difficulties, through the clear assimilation and creative application of Marxism-Leninism under specific Vietnamese conditions.

The victorious completion of renewal in Vietnam will be the most convincing confirmation that we have mastered the essence and the core of Marxism-Leninism.

Near East & South Asia

U.S. Hostage Reed Freed 30 Apr

LD3004185790 Moscow TASS in English 1823 GMT 30 Apr 90

[Text] Damascus April 30 TASS—American hostage Frank Reed, 57, was freed in West Beirut at about 17:30 GMT today, a Syrian Foreign Ministry spokesman told reporters here.

Reed was abducted by a previously unknown group the organisation of Islamic Dawn on September 9, 1986 near Beirut airport.

He is the second American hostage to have been released in Lebanon in the past week.

Iran's Besharati Cites 'Close' USSR Ties

LD3004144690 Moscow TASS in English 1435 GMT 30 Apr 90

[Text] Abu Dhabi April 30 TASS—Perestroyka, glasnost, and changes in the Soviet Union have promoted the development and strengthening of relations between Iran and the Soviet Union.

"Over more than 70 years that have passed since the 1917 October Revolution. Iranian-Soviet relations have never been more close and friendly than now," 'Ali Mohammad Besharati, Iran's first deputy foreign minister, told a news conference in the Iranian Embassy in Abu Dhabi today.

The Soviet Union's policy of new thinking "is having a major impact on all countries and has led to great changes in the international atmosphere," he emphasised.

Besharati reaffirmed Iran's solidarity with Arab countries' struggle for a just settlement in the Middle East, for Israel's withdrawal from the occupied Arab lands, and against Tel Aviv's expansionist policy.

PLO Envoy Discusses Goals, Soviet Jews

PM3004173090 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 16, 17-23 Apr 90 pp 18-19

[Interview with Palestinian Ambassador Nabil 'Amr, by Dmitriy Zgerskiy; date, place not given; first paragraph is editorial introduction: "Simple Answers to Difficult Questions"]

[Text] "I like awkward questions, and I am ready to answer them right away," said Nabil 'Amr, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the State of Palestine to the USSR, when Dmitriy Zgerskiy, NEW TIMES correspondent met him for an interview given below.

[Zgerskiy] In my opinion, peace talks between the leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and those of Israel are inevitable for a fair settlement of the Palestine problem. The slogan "Zionists, get out of the occupied territories now!" is very popular with the Arabs. Will the PLO demand that Israel should immediately withdraw from all occupied territories or will it agree to a transition period?

['Amr] Peace talks between the PLO and Israel should begin as soon as possible, since the situation in the occupied territories has become very grave. A Palestine-Israeli dialogue would pave the way to negotiations concerning the comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. We consider an international conference as the most suitable form of such negotiations.

All Arab countries, Israel, and permanent members of the Security Council should take part in it.

We do not demand at all that all our goals, rights and aspirations should be realized at once. We have developed and suggested a detailed description of the settlement of this problem. Why should it not be settled the way it was done in Namibia? Why not attain the same results with the participation of the United Nations which will also ensure guarantees for such a settlement?

The State of Palestine has been recognized by 107 countries. Why, then, have the Palestinian people not been given an opportunity to exercise their right to self-determination and to their own state on the Western bank of the Jordan River and in the Gaza Strip?

Our principle—two states for two peoples and peaceful, normal relations between these two states on the basis of equality and equal responsibilties.

[Zgerskiy] As far as I know, the Saiga organization of Palestine has been unwilling to accept the very existence of Israel. There are, also, other Palestine organizations whose goal is to destroy the State of Israel. When the State of Palestine is formed in currently occupied territories, those organizations will also come back to their native country and might launch a war against their neighbour. What do you believe is a way out of such a situation? In the opinion of Zionist "Hawks," the way out of this situation is through the annexation of Arab Palestine, isn't it?

['Amr] The truth is that the PLO is the only legitimate representative of the Arab people of Palestine. Our organization should not be considered from the viewpoint of certain small social strata or groups. The people of Palestine approximte 5,000,000. They are scattered all over the world, including Arab countries. Naturally, some factions of extremists can appear within such a large group. From a realistic and practical point of view, the PLO actually represents the Palestinians. It is the most influential and the strongest organization endowed with the right to speak, sign agreements and ensure their fulfillment on behalf of the Arab people of Palestine.

I do not think that organizations or groups formed in certain Arab countries or elsewhere can reverse our advancement towards peace, which is hampered merely by Israel's indecision or obstinacy.

[Zgerskiy] Isn't the State of Palestine exposed to another danger in its native land? I mean an invasion of the Islamic extremist-minded fundamentalists. Among the people in the occupied territories (approximately 70 per cent of the population) Islamic fundamentalism is extremely popular, yielding only to the PLO, and in the Gaza Strip it is nearly second to none in popularity. I think that, having moved to Palestine, Hizballah detachments will find favourable opportunities for imposing their doctrine upon young people in various ways, including by force of arms. What is your opinion on tackling such problems?

['Amr] In my opinion, the scope of the activities and the influence of Islamic fundamentalists in Palestine are exaggerated. Moreover, I think, there is also some misunderstanding and the wrong interpretation of relations between fundamentalist organizations and the PLO and these Islamic movements. From the beginning to the end of occupation diverse patriotic groups of Palestinians coexist in common struggle, resisting occupation and trying to find their independent state.

I do not see any grounds for fear that either today or in the future the Palestinians will witness the reign of Islamic despotims. There are several reasons for that. To begin with, almost a quarter of all Palestinians are Christians. Furthermore, we have a very high percentage of well-educated people, highly qualified experts and academicians among them. We also have many philosophers, people engaged in cultural activities, and other professionals. This alone is a guarantee that the Palestinians will never yield to any forms of arbitrary rule.

We have been striving for the settlement of the problem by peaceful means. Our policy has been realized in the resolutions of the Palestine National Council, which includes representatives of all patriotic forces of our people, Islamic groups among them.

[Zgerskiy] In 1947 the United Nations granted Jerusalem a special international status, in spite of its being in the heart of Arab territories. Israel recognized that status of Jerusalem. As a result of its wars, Israel has made the Holy City its "eternal and indivisible" capital, in defiance of the UN resolution. Not long ago the United States reaffirmed its support of that Israeli action. The Arabs of Palestine consider Jerusalem their capital. There will certainly be argument over Jerusalem's status. What should be the result of this argument?

['Amr] We Palestinians really consider Al-Quds (Jerusalem) the capital of our Arab State. Moslems, Christians, and Jews consider Al-Quds their religious capital or the place of pilgrimage for the representatives of three faiths. Israel declared the city its eternal and indivisible capital. Some people in the United States supported Israel's decision. However, Israel took a unilateral step here. All problems connected with the Arab-Israeli conflict should be discussed at a forthcoming conference on a comprehensive settlement, including the status of Al-Quds. I am sure that the fact that Al-Quds is Israel's "external" capital has not been recognized in the world. Even the United States will not be able to recognize it officially. The statements in the Congress regarding this do not necessarily signify political decision of Washington officials.

Hence, the seizure by Israel of Al-Quds (in 1967) as well as other Arab territories is actually their occupation and by international law they should be freed at the earliest possible date. As to the final status, it should be determined at an international conference attended by all concerned parties, including Security Council permanent members. Yet, we Palestine people insist that Al-Quds become the capital of our Arab state.

[Zgershiy] Now I should like to ask you a very topical question concerning the massive emigration of Jews from the USSR. What measures do you consider expedient for preventing the settlement of Jewish emigrants from the Soviet Union on occupied territories, without violating the international law?

['Amir] This question is really very topical. I would say that it is the main question now. The massive emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union has provoked a heated, at times even a very bitter response not only from the Arab people of Palestine, but also the rest of the world.

From the very beginning, the PLO decided to discuss this problem from various angles with its friend, the Soviet Union. This problem is dangerous for peaceful process, above all. At a time when we advance our peace initiative and the entire world supports it, and even exerts pressure on Israel and the United States in order to hasten this process, suddenly, a massive influx of Jews into Israel begins. Naturally, it has given Israeli leaders strength, and they have immediately toughened their positions.

We discussed, with our Soviet friends, the danger of this turn of events and the danger of emigration for Israel's Arab neighbour countries and for the Palestinians. After all, Yitzhaq Shamir said that in order to settle the masses of Soviet Jews it would be necessary to revive the idea of Greater Israel. This implies the annexation of all Palestine lands and, under the pretext of overpopulation, expansion towards Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon.

Israel has presented the problem of emigration with intentions to drive a wedge, to sow dissension between the Soviet Union and its friends in the Arab world.

Of course, the Soviet Union has undertaken initiatives in this connection. The USSR has placed this problem on the agenda of the UN Security Council to enforce the prohibition of settlement of emigrants in the occupied territories. From the very beginning, 1967, the USSR has regarded Israeli settlements in Arab territories as unlawful. The Soviet initiative of establishing an international inspection and control body to prevent the unlawful settlement of emigrants has been of major significance.

However, the USSR can still undertake a great deal in this area, I should like to note that the Soviet Union could supply its citizens of Jewish descent with better information about the true state of affairs. It would be good to explain to those who are going to leave the USSR what awaits them.

It is wrong that anti-Semitism is growing in the Soviet Union. I live in the USSR and maintain contacts with various social groups. Anti-Semitism appears in the statements of those people who want Jews leave the Soviet Union [sentence as published]. I have not heard anything about pogroms. True, I have heard that they will be possible, but nothing of the kind actually takes place.

In my opinion, the Jews who leave the USSR should know that they will not live the happy life which is promised to them. To Yitzhaq Shamir they are nothing but cannon fodder for future wars. They should be aware of the fact that if they are settled in occupied territories they will live in the Palestine home, and they will be used as soldiers to kill Palestine insurgents. They should also be aware of the growing inflation in Israel and of the fact that Israel's foreign debt per capita is the largest in the world. Let them know about the demonstrations of Eastern Jews, Sephardim, against new comers. The demand is that the problems of Sephardim should be solved before anything is done for those who have yet to arrive.

In the Soviet Union people do not hate Jews, as it is often said. Soviet Jews enjoy equal rights and other ethnic groups. I declare that Soviet Jews have no hostility towards the Palestinians. I maintain the warmest friendship with many of them. We are even planning, in the near future, to conduct with them a serious dialogue concerning all problems of the Jews and of emigration, because it is of concern to us. In the future, I see the Palestinians and Jews living as good neighbours. We have had enough wars. We Palestinians have suffered from them more than enough. But we are ready to forget everything for the sake of peace for the Jewish and the Arab peoples. I would like Soviet Jews to become the force of peace, not the means for evil Zionist designs.

I should like your magazine to offer its pages for our dialogue with Jews. It would contribute to the cause of peace in the Middle East.

[Zgerskiy] Let us imagine that all conflict situations between two states in Palestine have been settled. What do you think of relations between them? I mean economic contacts, armed forces, customs, currency, water resources, trade, etc.

['Amr] Let us at first concentrate our efforts on ending the war. Let us concentrate our attention on creating guarantees for peace and stable relations between the two states. After that everything else will be mere details. Let us begin with that which can be done today. Let us build our home of peace bit by bit. And let us not put the cart before the horse.

In conclusion, I should like to express my gratitude to the editors of your magazine, well known and widely read abroad, for its wise approach to our problems, and for the attention and understanding with which it treats the just cause of the Palestinians.

Sub-Saharan Africa

NEW TIMES Views Shevardnadze African Tour

PM3004170090 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No. 16, 17-23 Apr 90 pp 14-17

[Galina Siderova article: "The African Safari and Mirages of Cooperation"]

[Text] "We are late," my fellow travellers from the Foreign Ministry lamented. Our plane, though, landed in all its destinations on the Black continent strictly on schedule. We have been late in restructuring our economic relations with the majority of African states, particularly those states which we have been assisting for years—with weapons, political advice, material resources. Will we manage to catch up?

37 hours of flight were interspersed with a kaleidoscope of countries, leaders, unforgettable landscapes of deserts, savanna and tropical forests, revealing beyond this facade the genuine face of Africa, the land which quite recently the Soviet Union tried to bring in line with its ideological dogmas. During this unusual safari I had a unique opportunity to observe and compare. What I discovered was that the more zeal a country displayed in adhering to those dogmas, the more pathetic were the results.

The itinerary of the Soviet foreign Minister's first visit to Africa included Angola, Zambia, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Tanzania and Nigeria. Of a whole range of regional, political and economic matters discussed by Eduard Shevardnadze with his counterparts to the south of the Sahara of special interest to me were issues relating to our economic and military cooperation.

On the other hand, only a short time ago, the leader of any African nation needed only to declare his commitment to Marxism-leninism, in order to be assured a generous share of Soviet aid. This year alone Soviet economic aid to other countries totals 12 billion rubles, i.e., 1.4 percent of our GNP. The figure - relative as it is, given our vague prices still allows us to make comparisons. In terms of its share of GNP, our aid to foreign countries exceeds that of West Germany three times, of Great Britain - 3.5 times and of the U.S. - almost 6 times.

Having established a pattern of cooperation with African states, the Soviet Union has, to a large degree, trained them to become perennial debtors. It now faces a dilemma; whether to cut the links with the Third world and focus on its internal problem? Waive the debts? Or perhaps, demand they be paid up? How can the relations between the Soviet Union and its partners, in particular in Africa, be restructured so that they become benefical for both sides? And above all, how do you set about convincing your partners such a change is needed? There are no simple answers to these questions. The Soviet Foreign Minister did not have them either. He set out for Africa on this trip to look for them.

Currency-free interests rates

Shortly before we left the Soviet Union I tried to find out what was behind the debt figures (which, it transpired later, did not necessarily tally with the ones supplied by the host countries we had visited). The only thing I discovered in Moscow was that the debt consisted primarly of military supplies, shamefully referred to as "special" shipments.

The data in the West (used for lack of any other source) suggests that the Soviet Union accounts for 32 percent of weapons sales to the Third World. Soviet weapons trade is 28 percent of the world's whereas the country's overall share of international trade is a mere 5 percent. In the 1980s the U.S.S.R. exported an average of 25 percent of the weapons produced within the country. It's worth mentioning though, that export prices far exceed internal prices and many of the weapons sold to other countries are obsolete and would have been discarded and destroyed anyway. Yet the debts continue to increase, and the favourite argument of the military ("We are earning the country hard currency") is causing ever more doubt. My attempts to understand how decisions on weapons sales were made eventually brought me back to square one. I was repeatedly referred by one official to another, and then to the chief Engineering Agency of the now nonexistent State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations. I was also advised to contact the Ministry of Defence, then the "highest political leadership of the country," and finally the corresponding departments of the recently created Military for Foreign Economic Relations. The only clear, and characteristically blunt answer was given by Deputy Defence Minister Army General Vitaliy Shabanov, when he said that "his ministry does not trade, it provides professional counselling."

Africa proved to be more illustrative, particuarly Angola.

The capital of the country which has relied most heavily on Soviet military aid welcomed us with the hot and wet embrace of the ocean, and offered sights of young men in khaki uniforms armed with Soviet-made machine guns, empty stores and the absence of water in our hotel. Luanda has already grown accustomed to intermittent water and power supplies, since the systems built by the Portuguese long ago need frequent repair or replacement. The situation is agravated by the UNITA raids.

Every Friday people are given their scarce share of rationed foodstuffs. If a family happens to have guests from a famine-stricken village, soneone is sent to a local market to exchange this food - most often imported canned products - for something they are more used to and which could serve a great number of people. The arriving food supplies are often looted, and the lack of any efficient infrastructure provides a good base for profiteering. At the market, money can but everything - from a machine gun to a tooth brush.

Official Mercedeses and a few posh hotels built by Western companies and empty of travellers are a stark and sad contrast to the uneasy and fearful town, which for all its squalor, reveals signs of the former brillance typical of the country which used to be called a gem of the South Atlantic. There is practically no housing construction in the city, and so people themselves make small adobe huts, which only last until the first rain.

All of these hardships are ascribed to the war. What struck me most about the Angolans was the indifference with which they accept this. The war, they say, necessitates Soviet military aid, and payments on credits are repeatedly delayed because of the war.

The government of Angola is seeking a way out of the continuing crisis, trying to engage the armed opposition group UNITA in negotiations. The settlement of the crisis in Namibia, welcome changes in South Africa and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola have all created favourable conditions for national reconciliation in the country, yet the situation remains complicated as the two sides' views concerning Angola's future differ: MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) wants to remain the only legitimate party and is therefore seeking the disbandment of UNITA and general elections, to be held in a few years' time on an individual basis; meanwhile UNITA, headed by Jonas Savimbi, is determined to press for equitable elections to compete against the ruling MPLA.

The changing situation sheds a new light on the question of Soviet military aid to Angola (which accounts for much of the 4 billion ruble debt of the country to the Soviet Union). One agreement of this kind inevitably entails another: aircraft supplies lead to the sale of bombs... The Angolan government gets munitions from Bulgaria, communications equipment from France and Great Britain - for a higher price, but of better quality.

According to various sources, some 600 to 1,000 Soviet military advisors and specialists are stationed in Angola today. They are not involved in military operations and their number is gradually decreasing. Yet the Angolans are reluctant to let them go, since the Angolan army relies mostly on Soviet armaments...

What do they need the MiGs for?

Soviet military aid continues to flow into the countries which have long since ended war, yet Soviet military experts are still there, though not as many as there used to be. A Soviet military delegation has recently visited Tanzania, a country which owes 310 mln convertible rubles to the Soviet Union, with military aid taking up nine tenths of the sum.

I asked Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze if curtailing military aid to African states was discussed during his talks with the African leaders, considering the growing indebtedness.

E.S. Of course we don't want to base our policies on military cooperation. Nevertheless talk of its immediate end is premature. We should be negotiating with our partners about the concept of sufficient defence. How much weaponry does a country need? When we raise the subject in our talks with the African leaders, they are prepared to listen, as they well understand that no country is able to wage wars endlessly. Angola has spent $20 billion on war, and Mozambique - $16 billion. But the spectre of war on the African continent is now fading as democratic changes get under way in South Africa. Yet immediately cutting all military aid to Africa would be unfair, since all military equipment gradually becomes obsolete and has to be replaced. What scale such aid should take today should be defined through negotiations. There are already possibilities of paying up some of the old debts as new areas of cooperation take shape. And the military are receptive of these ideas...

N.T. Arms sales for hard currency - according to widely held views - are not such a bad thing. Suppose we do eventually receive all payments for the weaponry. What is more beneficial in the long run: hard currency today or the instability undeniably caused by arms trade with countries which remain hotbeds of tension?

E.S. We have to compile a complete inventory of arms sales. We have to look at the figures for each country separately and arms trade as a whole. We have tabled such a proposal at the UN, and it's under consideration now. Yet so far we are faced with the fact of continuing arms trade, and we are involved in it too.

N.T. Has the question been touched upon at Soviet-American meetings since the talks on arms trade limitation were broken up by the American side in the late 1970s?

E.S. Yes, it has. We are in full agreement with our American counterparts over the nonproliferation of missile technology and limitations on trade in other types of weapons. Yet there is a market for conventional weapons. The scale of this arms trade, as well as the demand for arms will diminish as seats of conflicts are removed. The growing changeover from cooperation to interaction between the Soviet Union and the United States is likely to promote this process... [Shevardnadze ends]

This made me think of something else. The resolution of the Namibian conflict - which set an example of international cooperation and good will - cost the international community some $400 million. Soviet military aid to the "Frontline states" has also indirectly helped Namibia to gain independence. Yet the question is unavoidable: will it not prove to be less expensive in economic and political terms to cooperate with the Americans in cutting back on arms supplies to Angola today? Up until 1988 Angola faced a real threat from South Africa and was repeatedly raided. The Soviet arms supplies and military presence were justifiable then: we helped the legitimate government of the friendly country to repel the aggressor. But what about today? The situation in Angola more and more reminds me of a growing conflict between the leaders of two warring political factions, which has increasingly overshadowed the interests of the people of Angola. Together with the Americans we are being gradually drawn into an internal conflict, contributing directly or indirectly to the fratricidal war in that country. Even today Soviet military advisors find it hard not to be in the front line of hostilities. The argument you are most likely to hear is this: "My charge is out on the battlefield, so my staying here would be cowardly..."

"Why would a small African country need a MiG-29?" one Moscow diplomat asked rhetorically. It seems to me, however, that there is an answer to this question. The answer is the same as in the case of independent nuclear deterrence potential in Britain. The prestige of a state - however big or small - in the minds of many political leaders is still determined by possession of the most sophisticated military technology, whereas the idea of sufficient defence is still very vague. In the mid-1980s, the countries south of the Sahara spent one tenth of their budget revenues for military purposes. And a complex military and political situation in the region was not the sole reason for that.

It is for this reason that the big powers, who act as the chief suppliers of weaponry, should initiate the process of scaling down the weapons trade. All the more so as the buildup of armaments may lead to unpredictable consequences. More and more often weapons end up in the possession of forces against whom they were intended, or else fall into the hands of terrorists.

Previously, the export of arms was part and parcel of our confrontational world outlook. Today it is ever more contrary to the concrete steps taken by the Soviet leadership to remove the power factor from international politics. And even commercial benefits from the sale of outdated equipment at higher prices cannot compensate for the high cost of instability in some regions of the world.

Inefficient departments...

Let us return to the economic aspect of the issue. In Angola I heard one Soviet representative say: "We are tied to them by their debt." What did he mean? On the one hand, the Soviet Union still hopes to get something out of the huge sum the African states owe it. This, however, is far from easy given the severe crisis in some of these countries. Other countries, however, are richer and mutual trade with them is a matter of common sense and pragmatic businesslike approach.

"We have to learn the science of economic cooperation," says Eduard Shevardnadze. "We are still guided by old standards, which is particularly true of our embassies and other agencies abroad."

Yet Angola, a country ravaged by the war but full of natural resources, emerged much more pragmatic than its "big brother." Angola's chief trading partner is the U.S., the only Western power which has not yet established deplomatic relations with Angola. It can well be described as its main "political enemy." The U.S. accounts for 75 percent of Angola's oil exports, earning the country 90 percent of its hard currency inflow. Much of this oil is produced by American companies in Cabinda, and until recently the oil fields were guarded by Cuban soldiers.

It was only a short time ago that the Soviet specialists from the Siberian region of Yaleutiya began to explore the possibility of cooperation with Angola in diamond extraction, and now the Angolans have shown interest in the Soviet technology of not fully utilized oil wells. Yet so far, the most outstanding example of bilateral cooperation is the monument to Angola's national hero - Agostinho Neto, now being erected in the centre of Luanda.

Take another example, Nigeria. an industrial enterprise in Ajaokuta was cited as a symbol of bilateral cooperation at the ongoing going Soviet-Nigerian talks. The metallurgical complex - the biggest of its kind in Africa - has been under construction for ten years now. 2,500 Soviet experts are now working in Ajaokuta. And the expenses involved make up the bulk of Nigeria's foreign debt to the Soviet Union, running at 200 million convertible rubles. Meanwhile the steel to be produced there, according to the latest estimates, may prove to be too expensive and therefore difficult to sell...

The Soviet Foreign Minister spoke of the "virgin lands" for cooperation between the Soviet Union and Zambia and Zimbabwe - a country which used ten years of independence to cultivate and perfect its most efficient agriculture. Here several thousand farmers are able to adequantely provide for the needs of the entire country. And it was no accident that on the trip to Harare from Kadoma where the Soviet Foreign Minister was received by Zimbabwe's president Robert Mugabe, Eduard Shevardnadze was asked by his counterpart Nathan Shamuyarira to stop by a nearby farm: the farm boasted generous corn harvests, well-cared-for cows, good organization of labour and steady profits.

Instantly I recalled Tanzania with its two "exemplary" state-owned agricultural enterprises, created with Soviet help and equipped with Soviet machnery - two gigantic ailing monsters, less efficient than the nearby small farms.

Yet it was Tanzania that helped lift the spirit in this journey.

...And the businessmen

"You only go to Africa for commercial purposes, you go there to do business," explains Vladimir Klimov, the Soviet manager of the joint venture Tanmot Trucking, trying desparately to swing the car out of yet another ditch, which dot every road in Tanzania. "Charity only corrupts both them and us."

The Soviet transport agency Mosavtotrans and Tanzanian businessmen formed a joint enterprise, with the Tanzanian side contributing to it in local currency. The Soviet side has supplied all the garage equipment. The Soviet MAZ trucks - 25 of them - have been purchased by Tanmot for hard currency and on credit. Despite pessimistic forecasts Tanmot is operating, transporting cargoes from the port of Dares-Salaam to hinterland countries of Malawi, Zambia, Zaire, Burundi and Uganda. In the few months of its existence the company has already started to receive payments in hard currency.

Are there any problems? Vladimir Klimov speaks of the characteristic red tape in Tanzania, whenever you have to fill out any documents on cargo transportation, and bad roads - during the rainy season all but one turn into impassable barriers. These, however, come as no surprise for any Soviet. What's more, says Vladimir, he has for the first time got a taste of competion. MAZ trucks may not be as popular in Tanzania as Mercedeses, better suited for local conditions, yet the first African safari has drawn some attention to Soviet trucks, which is important.

Vladimir Kilmov hopes to get out of the red in a year or two and plans to set up another joint venture involving the Baltic Sea Fleet and a truck-producing plant in Belorussia. The new enterprise will expand, considerably, the geography of work. Moreover, in Tanmot the Soviet side owns one third of the capital, whereas the second joint venture will provide it with half the capital.

"A law regulating foreign investment will soon be adopted in Tanzania," says Vladimir, "the main thing is to establish a foothold in their market and invest in the most promising areas."

Experts believe business will expand in Tanzania only if infrastructure is developed. Soviet businessmen will then be able to penetrate into the internal tea and coffee market, already controlled by Western companies, as well as some other areas of interest.

"Here is one of the ways to get your money back," Eduard Shevardnadze was telling me after the talk with Vladimir Klimov. "By investing local currency in some promising business, which will bring profits. And that is the answer to the question of whether we need cooperation with the developing countries of Africa. Much of what we lose is explained by our incompetence. But whenever we come across businesslike people who have an enterprising spirit, things return to normal, and we discover that there is a way out. Don't forget that it's not just the debt we are talking about here, but the need to - at long last - make up for lost time and begin fruitful cooperation

Well, we often arrived in the developing countries of the Third World right on time and offered help for which many African leaders are now grateful. Yet, in my view, the aid was often misused, as some countries developed a sort of consumerist approach to freedom and independence. How can you expect to help develop an efficient economy anywhere abroad when at home things are far from perfect.

The reforms implemented in the Soviet Union have prompted the developing countries to reevaluate their relations with the Soviet Union. They look to us with interest and caution. Some fear that we will now turn our back on them, while others that cooperation with the Soviet Union in new conditions may become more efficient and fruitful.

I had an enlightening talk with Alhaji Abubakar Alhaji, Nigeria's Minister of Finance and Economic Planning.

A.A. Much of what is happening in the world and, more specifically, on the African continent depends on the outcome of changes under way in the Soviet Union.

N.T. In the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet opinions are heard more and more often that the country's resources should not be diverted to help others but concentrated on pressing internal problems. Is that worrying you?

A.A. I often hear from the people of Nigeria: why do we go on helping Burkina Faso or Cape Verde with foodstuffs and means of transportation, when we have problems of our own? A politician should be able to be above these philistine considerations, and try to look beyond the horizon, further than the others can look. You also should not forget that your security depends on the security of your neighbours. [Alhaji ends]

The questions of debts, military and economic assistance are all intertwined in our relations with the outside world, including the developing countries, making up the bulk of humanity. What should the Soviet Union do? Get immersed in solving internal problems or continue to face the world?

Paradoxic as it sounds, I think we have to find the golden mean, combining our internal and external obligations so that we could continue to reap benefits from both. The role of the Supreme Soviet may be crucial in assessing aid packages and gaining the right to approve them in every little detail in future. So far, only a general approval has been required from the country's legislature. The U.S. Congress has long since established such practice.

Prior to our visit to Tanzania the U.S. waived $80 million in Tanzania's debt, making a grand gesture worthy of a great power. The Soviet Union today can ill afford such gestures without the accompanying businesslike approach, as I was reminded by the mirages of cooperation with Africa which haunted us through the yellow-and-green hills of Africa.

RSA's Buthelezi Queried on Clashes, De Klerk

MB2804161390 Moscow in English to Southern Africa 1900 GMT 27 Apr 90

["Summary" of telephone interview with KwaZulu Chief Minister Mangosuthu Buthelezi by Yelena Olgina; date not given—questions and answers read by unidentified announcer and correspondent]

[Text] [Announcer] Dear friends, we are all concerned over the reports coming from the province of Natal, South Africa, where the clashes between the supporters of the ANC [African National Congress] and Inkatha have acquired a tragic turn.

How long can they last? Will the nationalistic movements of the indigenous South African population be the (?ones) which will undermine the process of democratization which is just beginning in South Africa?

To explain those questions, our correspondent, Yelena Olgina, telephoned to the city Ulundi and asked the leader of Inkatha, the state minister of the KwaZulu bantustan, Dr. Buthelezi, further questions.

Unfortunately the quality of the recording is unsuitable for broadcasting; therefore, we'll confine ourselves by giving a summary of the conversation.

The first question was:

What do you think are the prospects of a settlement of the situation in Natal?

[Correspondent] Yes, the situation in that province evokes great concern. We propose to Dr. Mandela and members of the African National Congress to meet for discussion of the situation and to search for ways of its solution. I think that a meeting like that is necessary because it concerns the lives of our citizens. Let's hope that a way out will be found.

[Announcer] What are the principal differences that divide the ANC and Inkatha?

[Correspondent] Well, I wouldn't say that insurmountable contradictions exist between our two organizations. On the whole, our relations are quite normal. Both the ANC and Inkatha fought for the freedom of their people, but we were always here, and a part of the ANC leadership went abroad.

Our people are very poor, and both these organizations must do everything in their powers to make our people live better. Therein lies the guarantee of the future settlement in South Africa.

[Announcer] How realistic, from your viewpoint, is the political course of President Frederik de Klerk?

[Correspondent] Such steps taken by him as the release of Nelson Mandela, and some other measures taken by the government, speak in favor of him. De Klerk is the first white leader of South Africa who (?faced) the indigenous black population of the country. I think he understands the needs of the African population. If this policy would be continued, it could give good results.

As far as I can judge, his policy course has considerable support in the country.

[Announcer] Reports have appeared in some of our mass media that the members of Inkatha are getting trained in Israel. What can you say about that?

[Correspondent] No, that is not true. I cannot say where this information comes from, but it is incorrect.

[Announcer] Dr. Buthelezi, thank you for the interview.

East Europe

Bucharest Anti-Communist Demonstrations Noted

LD0105081890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0530 GMT 1 May 90

[Text] There are many people at University Square in Bucharest today. People are gathered there for a reason that is far from festive, however. Listen to our correspondent in Romania, Sergey Zheleznyak:

[Zheleznyak] At roped-off University Square the demonstration is continuing. More precisely, it is an open air club of anti-communists. To mark the international holiday of solidarity with the working people, another anti-communist meeting will be held here today, with the traditional chanting of "Down with communists!" "Down with Iliescu!"

Literally every television news bulletin carries appeals, pleas, and demands from workers and peasants in various regions of the country. The pleas are for order to be restored in the capital center. They want to decide for themselves for whom they should vote on 20 May. They want no pressure from the street. They are worried about serious problems for there is virtually not a single enterprise that is not aware today of the grievous legacy of the dictatorial regime.

It is against this background that meetings between the candidates for the post of the country's president are taking place. The greatest number of people gather at meetings with Ion Illiescu: 100,000 people gathered at each meeting in Iasi, Bucharest, and Cluj. The leader of the National Salvation Front believes building a modern economy in Romania must necessarily be carried out by the joint efforts of all political parties, and as soon as possible, but without excessive risk. Competition must not be introduced at the expense of the working people; they must not be deprived of their certainty in the future.

As a sign of solidarity with the Front, many carry bouquets of roses to the meetings with Iliescu: It is this flower, the symbol of democracy, the Front chose as its emblem for the elections. In Romania, roses start blossoming luxuriantly on 20 May, the day set for the elections.

Demonstration Reflects Romania's 'Instability'

PM3004151390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Dispatch by IZVESTIYA correspondent V. Volodin: "Governmental Crisis Possible"]

[Text] Bucharest—The blockade of the central square of Bucharest in front of the Intercontinental Hotel is in its sixth day. Even the torrential rain falling on demonstrators fails to disperse the people (an average of 6,000-7,000) gathered on the square, which was the focus of action against the Ceausescu regime last December.

Slogans reading "Down with Iliescu!" and "Down with the dictatorship of the neocommunists!" have for days on end fluttered over the square, which is lit up at night by torches made from rolled-up newspapers. In addition to the provisional government's resignation the demonstrators are demanding the adoption of a law banning former Romanian Communist Party activists from taking part in political life for a long time—which, in Iliescu's opinion, would be an antidemocratic act infringing the civil rights of a substantial proportion of Romania's citizens.

It cannot, of course, be said that such a rally in a city of 2 million reflects the political feelings of all Bucharest's inhabitants. As I noticed when down on the square, only some of those present actively respond to the alternating speakers' appeals. Despite the tricolored banners rising above the crowd and the placards and slogans plastered over the capital's university building, a large number of people come to the square out of curiosity rather than any desire to overthrow the National Salvation Front and its leaders. Time and again I heard people in the crowd say that Iliescu, for all his mistakes, is the most acceptable candidate for the post of president of Romania.

It is indisputable that certain miscalculations on the National Salvation Front's part have reduced its chances of success. Incidentally, Iliescu himself handed the opposition a trump card when he described the demonstrators as an unruly assembly of vagrants and hooligans. It is not surprising that such a statement merely swelled the ranks of demonstrators, who have now appeared on the square wearing badges reading "Vagrant and Hooligan." Even cars taking part in the demonstration are adorned with placards such as "This car belongs to a vagrant."

The general political instability prevailing in Romania is also reflected in the mood of demonstrators, who are deprived of any impartial information about the state of affairs. The weakness of the Romanian press in full display and television's verbosity and lack of any opinion of its own are creating in the minds of the population of Bucharest, in my opinion, the impression that censorship holds sway and that intrigues by the now-extinct Securitate are afoot, thereby forming the conditions for a governmental crisis. And that, in my view, could break out at any time. A National Salvation Front rally is scheduled for 27 April. Whether or not a governmental crisis does occur in Romania will depend on the extent of support given to Ion Iliescu by its participants.

RSFSR's Vinogradov Receives Romanian Envoy

PM2704130190 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 27 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Conversation Held"]

[Text] On 26 April RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Foreign Minister V.M. Vinogradov received V. Sandru, Romanian ambassador to the USSR.

Questions of the development of ties between the RSFSR and Romania in various spheres were discussed during a friendly conversation.

Romanian-Soviet Friendship Society Established

LD2804181690 Moscow TASS in English 1634 GMT 28 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent Vasiliy Arbekov]

[Text] Bucharest April 28 TASS—A new Romanian-Soviet friendship society, "Gorbachev", was set up in the Romanian town of Drobeta-Turnu-Severin after the December revolution. It aims to promote Romanian-Soviet friendship and cooperation in the social and cultural spheres.

Artists and art enthusiasts who joined the Gorbachev society seek to facilitate access to national literatures, music and fine arts. They plan to publish, together with the Soviet NOVOSTI press agency, Soviet literature in Romania and organise exhibitions and film festivals devoted to the Soviet Union. They have prepared a photo exhibition and a book exhibition for Victory Day, May 9.

Jaruzelski Cited on 'Historic' Katyn Admission

PM3004082790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Apr 90 Second Edition p 1

[TASS report: "Statement By W. Jaruzelski"]

[Text] Warsaw, 26 Apr—USSR President M.S. Gorbachev's handover to the Polish side of documents on the Katyn crime is of exceptionally great importance for history and for the future of Polish-Soviet relations.

This was stated by Polish President W. Jaruzelski at a meeting here with representatives of the country's public. He also stressed that the handover to the Polish side of the documents which had been found and the condolences expressed by the Soviet side are an important and long-awaited act. This is a sign of the times and a historic breakthrough. Without M.S. Gorbachev and without perestroyka, who knows how long it would have taken for this problem to be brought to light.

Turning to his recent trip to the USSR, W. Jaruzelski stated that the visit paves the way toward overcoming the difficult and painful pages in the history of relations between the two countries.

Account of GDR Premier's Parting Comments

PM3004151990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Talks in the Kremlin"]

[Excerpts] On 29 April there were talks in the Kremlin between USSR Council of Ministers Chairman N.I. Ryzhkov and GDR Council of Ministers Chairman L. de Maiziere.

The heads of government had a thorough discussion of the state and prospects of USSR-GDR relations, emphasizing questions of bilateral cooperation in view of the upcoming establishment of financial, economic, and social union between the two German states. [passage omitted]

A luncheon was organized in L. de Maiziere's honor on behalf of the USSR Government.

At a press conference for Soviet and foreign journalists before leaving the USSR the guest described the visit as important and useful. It is the first foreign trip by a GDR government delegation since the formation of the new cabinet, L. de Maiziere pointed out, and the fact that it was to Moscow indicates the great importance we attach to our relations with the Soviet Union.

Having talked about the substance of the meeting with M.S. Gorbachev and the talks with N.I. Ryzhkov, the speaker noted that the issues they had touched on had been discussed in a thorough and businesslike way. There had been a coincidence of interests. He also expressed interest not only in continuing economic cooperatiuon between the two countries, but also in expanding it.

Answering journalists' questions about his country's potential membership of NATO, L. de Maiziere stressed that it could only take place if the North Atlantic bloc's structure and strategy were to change. In his view, this organization should less and less implement military tasks and pay more attention to political and economic issues, arms control, and disarmament. As for neutrality, it cannot be the solution to the problem, the speaker stressed. [passage omitted]

Yazov, Eppelmann Have 'Businesslike' Talks

PM0105082190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 May 90 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "Conversation Held"]

[Text] Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR defense minister, met on 29 April R. Eppelmann, GDR minister of disarmament and defense, who is on a working visit to the USSR as member of the GDR government delegation. A conversation on questions of mutual interest took place.

The meeting was attended by Army General M.A. Moiseyev, USSR first deputy defense minister and chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff; Army General P.G. Lushev, USSR first deputy defense minister and commander in chief of Warsaw Pact states' Joint Armed Forces; and other generals and admirals of the Soviet Armed Forces. Admiral T. Hoffmann, commander of the GDR National People's Army, and other officials were present on the German side.

The conversation proceeded in a businesslike atmopshere.

Socioeconomic Issues in German Unification Eyed

PM0105083190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Dispatch by IZVESTIYA correspondent V. Lapskiy: "Not Forgetting the Main Issue"]

[Text] Berlin—The present period in the GDR is one of uncertainty, I would even say one of anxiety. People are wondering what the coming weeks will bring them. What is going to become of their jobs, wages, and pensions? What is going to happen to the kindergartens, summer camps, trade union leisure centers, and a many other things to which people here have become accustomed and with which they do not want to part?

That is why people here are forgetting about much else in their attempts to closely follow the unification process, whose outlines are becoming increasingly clear. GDR-FRG talks have begun in Berlin on a state treaty. The draft is already complete. GDR Prime Minister Lothar de Maiziere brought the working document from Bonn and has given it to members of his cabinet to study.

German unification is a question which equally concerns the GDR and the FRG. It would be wrong to claim that Bonn has taken the whole job of unification into its hands. But it would also be naive to imagine that the FRG intends to talk with the GDR as an equal. The main question that is rightly being asked of Lothar de Maiziere's government here is: Will it succeed in fully defending GDR citizens' interests—material and social?

Bonn is proposing a tough schedule: Monetary union is to come into force in the first days of July. This will not only mean the replacement of the ostmark with the deutschmark in the GDR: It will also entail radical changes in the economy, changes in the price system, and much more. The state treaty is to be signed even earlier: possibly in May.

Local observers are voicing the opinion that this process should not be hurried and that this important stage in unification should be properly prepared. Social Democrat and People's Chamber Deputy Gottfried Timm believes that interim decisions will be needed for a properly considered state dialogue. The following question must be answered, for example: With an essentially open border, how, during the GDR's switch to the deutschmark, are its industry and agriculture to be protected? There is no clear answer to this in the present version of the state treaty.

People here do realize, of course, that in the initial period the federal government will take a considerable financial load upon itself. But they also realize something else: The resources invested in the GDR will bring the FRG returns quite quickly. When the state treaty comes into force, G. Timm said, the FRG's economic territory will be increased by 16 million people.

The draft state treaty provides for the extension to the GDR of West German legislation governing pension security and medical and unemployment insurance. But, people are saying here, the GDR simply does not have the resources to ensure the practical implementation of the social legislation currently in effect in West Germany.

People here believe that at the talks which have now begun in Berlin the GDR representatives must secure the Bonn government's agreement to allocate funds to increase the wages and pensions of the republic's citizens. With a 1:1 exchange rate, for example, the wages of a worker in the GDR will be several times lower than the wages of an equivalent worker in the FRG. It is already feared that, unless measures are taken, masses of people will flee from East Germany to the FRG. Pensioners are also going to suffer: Steep price hikes are expected.

People are also raising the question of establishing customs regulations on the border between the two German states for a transitional period to help to protect the GDR's industry and agriculture and give them a chance to withstand competition. Incidentally, peasants staged a demonstration last Thursday in front of the People's Chamber building. On behalf of the 600,000 members of the agricultural trade union, they demanded that their rights be protected and, in particular, that the "outrageous" importing of agricultural produce from the West be stopped.

There are more than enough problems with the state treaty. Local parties and organizations are urging the government to show firmness at the talks so that the GDR does not become easy prey for those in the West who are selfishly hoping to turn German unification to their benefit.

Albania Changes 'Echo' East Europe Reforms

PM3004080990 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 27 Apr 90 p 3

[Yu. Timchenko article: "Changes in the 'Eagle's Nest'"]

[Text] A number of articles which have appeared in the Soviet press of late claim that there are no changes in Albania. Is this really so?

Comparing the current situation in Albania with the turbulent changes under way in most of the countries of East Europe, you certainly cannot claim that Albania is moving in the same direction.

Reports in foreign, and especially Yugoslav and Greek mass media, about recent antigovernment demonstrations and their brutal suppression in a number of Albanian cities have been refuted not just by the official Albanian authorities but by the press organs in question themselves.

Entering into polemics with those who would like Albania to follow the example of the East European countries, Ramiz Alia, first secretary of the Albanian Workers Party [AWP] Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania [PSRA] People's Assembly, has said that the radical changes in those countries have no bearing on Albania and that nothing like that could happen there.

The explanation given is that since the early sixties, when cooperation with the USSR and other European socialist countries was broken off, Albania has been following its own course of development. Albania has an image of its own which differs from the states of both East and West. It is also asserted that the PSRA intends to continue along the path of socialist building at a time when socialism has long been dismantled in the East European countries and the current reforms merely complete the "restoration of capitalism." This claim does not mean in the least, however, that in Albania itself everything remains as it was.

"We have viewed and continue to view our socialist society as being in a state of continuous dialectical development and renewal," Adil Carcani, chairman of the PSRA Council of Ministers, said in a recent speech. "Therefore we are not afraid of changing what needs to be changed. On the contrary, we have constantly sought and continue to seek new solutions which accord better with the prevailing changes and the demands of the times. However, we have introduced and will continue to introduce these changes within the framework of the socialist system and our socialist principles..."

For the Albanians, who spent almost five centuries under the oppression of the Ottoman yoke and did not establish an independent state of their own until 1912, there is no more important question than independence. The current leadership is credited with having preserved the country's sovereignty and independence.

There are no obvious signs of the existence of an organized opposition in Albania today which could stand up to the AWP—the only real political force in the country. This clearly is one of the reasons why the AWP, assuming responsibility for Albania's current and future development, does not accept the idea of political pluralism and a multiparty system (which, incidentally, has never existed in the country's history). It does not intend to give up its monopoly of power, which, as R. Alia put it, "was conferred on it by history itself, a history filled with the struggle for the motherland's freedom and independence." Therefore statements to the effect that the AWP will never share power with "any antipeople force" and will not tolerate a weakening of the dictatorship of the proletariat and a return to private ownership are accepted by the Albanian public as a matter of course.

Afraid that a reassessment of the former course might lead to a destabilization of the situation in the country, the AWP leadership favors the path of evolutionary improvement of the existing sociopolitical system. This, unquestionably, affects the scope, depth, and pace of the changes initiated by the decisions of the Eighth (September 1989) and Ninth (January 1990) AWP Central Committee Plenums. It is interesting to note that the changes in Albania often echo some of the buildup to transformations in East European countries in terms of their thrust—making allowances for the conditions prevailing in Albania, of course.

The "further revolutionarization" of the AWP and the preservation of its vanguard role in society is presented as the key task. The importance of stepping up the struggle against bureaucracy and discarding stereotypes, obsolete truths, and everything that "does not correspondent to the dialectic of development" is being emphasized. The AWP leadership is advocating a critical attitude to the work of leading cadres, who are urged to listen to the opinions and proposals of the working people and to involve them more extensively in policymaking.

The question of overcoming party duplication of state and economic organs' and public organizations' work has been addressed for the first time. Efforts to hold open party meetings, discuss pressing problems freely, enhance the role of elective organs, and cut back the cadre nomenklatura also represent new departures.

The principle of multiple choice is being introduced during the election of party officials and the appointment of state and economic leaders. No enterprise, institution, or higher educational establishment director can now be appointed by superior organs without the approval of the collective in question. Labor collectives are also authorized to oust any official who is failing to cope with his duties.

Leading officials including members of the AWP Central Committee and People's Assembly deputies may retain their posts for a maximum of two to three terms of office. To be elected for a third term in office, a candidate must secure at least two-thirds more votes than the rival candidate. On the expiry of the term of office of elective organs, one-third of their membership is subject to renewal at the next conference or party congress.

It is deemed expedient to augment party recruitment among representatives of young people and of the scientific, technical, and creative intelligentsia.

Socioeconomic difficulties in the country are prompting the AWP to restructure its activity. The government is elaborating measures to provide scope for economic methods of management. Alongside relatively traditional demands for reinforcing discipline and mobilizing the working people's enthusiasm for the fulfillment of plan targets, more and more attention is being paid to material incentives, the introduction of economic accountability in all production sectors, and expansion of the competence of enterprises, agricultural cooperatives, and institutions in the sphere of economic and financial planning. Labor remuneration in the state sector of the economy must be based not only on plan fulfillment as at present, but also on the end results of the work of the entire enterprise. District people's council executive committees are now authorized to manage funds obtained as a result of the overfulfillment of targets or expenditure savings by enterprises operating on their territory. A course toward the priority development of consumer goods production was set for the first time in the plan for last year and is being continued in the current year. At the same time the stability of retail prices for essential goods is guaranteed.

In order to stimulate the production of agricultural goods, it is planned to raise purchasing prices. Agricultural cooperatives will now be authorized to sell their above-plan output at city markets at their own prices. In addition to the development of small-scale collective farms, it is permitted as from this year to keep livestock on personal plots.

Much importance is being attached to the improvement of legislation, and in this context it is planned to reinstate the Ministry of Justice which was abolished in 1966. The next session of the PSRA People's Assembly is to debate draft laws on the institution of defense attorneys, called upon to guarantee citizens' legal defense both in the course of investigation and in court.

The processes taking place inside the country are accompanied by an expansion of Albania's foreign economic ties. To this end the Committee for Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries was set up at the end of last year. The leadership of the PSRA sees its main tasks in the foreign policy sphere in overcoming the country's isolation in the international arena and in the development of political, economic, and cultural ties with other states which "respond to friendship with friendship." Foreign trips which were formerly restricted to a limited circle of people have now become possible.

No matter how limited the changes which have begun to take shape in Albania are, they indicate that the society is on the move and no longer wishes to live as it did before.

West Europe

Yeltsin Admitted to Hospital in Barcelona

LD3004190990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1840 GMT 30 Apr 90

[Text] Madrid, 30 Apr (TASS)—USSR People's Deputy Boris Yeltsin, who is visiting Barcelona to participate in television debates about perestroyka in the Soviet Union, was sent to a hospital emergency department this evening. He felt ill in the television studio where he was given first aid at a first aid post. Boris Yeltsin was then sent to the hospital where he was examined by casualty specialist and a neurosurgeon.

[Madrid Domestic Service in Spanish at 1800 GMT on 30 April adds: "Boris Yeltsin, who has been in our city since yesterday, was admitted to the casualty ward of Barcelona hospital for treatment to pain in the lumbar region which came on shortly after his arrival. The hospital has reported that the Soviet deputy is undergoing a series of exploratory tests carried out by an orthopaedic surgeon and a neurosurgeon, after which the diagnosis will be made."]

Deputy Minister Queried on German Unity Talks

90UF019A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No. 17, 25 Apr 90 p 15

[Interview with A.L. Adamishin, USSR deputy foreign minister, by M. Maksimov: "On the 'Two Plus Four' Formula"; date and place not specified]

[Text] [Maksimov] Going the rounds currently is a biting witticism of Francois Mauriac, who once observed: "I love Germany so much, and this is why I am happy that there are two of them." The creation of one Germany is evoking an ambivalent attitude on the part of the Europeans. You represented the Soviet Union at the first meeting in Bonn on the "two plus four" formula. It is obvious, meanwhile, that the progress of the consultations on this topic has manifestly slowed and is not keeping pace with the development of events, in the GDR particularly. Nothing has been heard of the H. Modrow plan, which we supported, if I am not mistaken. Or was it eclipsed by Kohl's 10-point plan?

[Adamishin] There is no doubt that events are overtaking policy. This is precisely the situation so far, unfortunately. As far as H. Modrow's plan is concerned, it was, in my view, quite realistic and balanced and proposed the stage-by-stage rapprochement and, subsequently, unification of Germany. The same stage-by-stage path was charted, incidentally, in H. Kohl's 10 points also. There were aspects in it which we did not like, and we said so candidly, but there were also those which anticipated the gradual nature of the development of events capable of leading to German unity.

I believe that much of what was in H. Modrow's plan remains in political practice today also. While recognizing the inevitability of the unification of the two Germanys, we should try to conduct business such as to ensure that this movement not weaken the positive processes which have emerged in Europe in recent years—a strengthening of security, confidence, and so forth—but, on the contrary, reinforce them. In other words, on this key issue also operate in the spirit of the new political thinking.

[Maksimov] And how do you conceive of the unification process?

[Adamishin] First, German unity should be built stage by stage, in regulated and democratic manner. This presupposes primarily negotiations between two equal, sovereign states. This is the position adopted by both the USSR and the GDR, and, as far as I can tell, this is what the most responsible politicians in Bonn think. We must not allow unification to become the absorption of one state by another and to assume an undemocratic and, even worse, nationalist nature. This would evoke a negative reaction in many countries, including the Soviet Union, where the history of World War II is still an unhealed wound. Psychology is, after all, policy also. I emphasize this fact because I know that there are in both the FRG and the GDR forces aspiring to spur the process and make it uncontrollable. A struggle is currently heating up over the forms and calendar of unification, and, of course, no reminiscences of the Anschluss are appropriate. Is there a chance that a common-sense approach will gain the ascendancy? I would like to hope so. In any event, influential politicians in Bonn are giving assurances that they wish to confront neither the USSR nor any other state with faits accomplis and recognize that nothing should be done contrary to the interests of the USSR.

Second, it is essential to draw a final line beneath the outcome of World War II. From the Soviet Union's viewpoint, the best, most proper form for this is a peace treaty. Only after this could we speak of the termination of the rights and responsibility of the four powers. But testimony to the fact that there is such responsibility, incidentally, is the very "two plus four" formula of the negotiations, which includes the FRG, the GDR, the USSR, the United States, France and Britain. True, it is believed in West Germany that a peace treaty is too cumbersome, that it would be necessary to bring together all the countries which took part in the war, and there were several dozen of them, that 45 years have elapsed since it ended and so forth. Although just a few months ago they were saying something else, referring, for example, to the fact that without a peace treaty it would be difficult to conclusively determine a position on the issue of borders.

[Maksimov] You are talking about a peace treaty with a united Germany. But such does not exist. It is first necessary to unite and then sign a treaty, is it not?

[Adamishin] It is essential that the building of German unity and the foreign policy aspects closely linked with this proceed in parallel. If it is possible to agree on a peace treaty or other forms of a peaceful settlement close to this, it would facilitate the actual building of the future state and help determine its ultimate status.

The third aspect is the borders. It would seem that a big part of the road has been covered here and that complications should not arise. In fact, everyone, seemingly, recognizes postwar realities, and the Helsinki Final Act, signed by 35 states, recorded the permanency of the present borders in Europe. Nonetheless.... The Final Act is a political, but not a legally binding document. Yet such a delicate business as postwar borders should be enshrined through international law, which presupposes ratification of a treaty by the parliaments.

Fourth and finally, the most complex aspect, perhaps: the military-political status of a future Germany. The idea that a united German state should be a member of NATO is unacceptable to us, for very understandable reasons. Even allowing for all the reservations that the Bundeswehr would not be stationed on GDR territory and that Soviet forces could remain there for the time being. Why? Because the impetuous political changes have caught Europe still in a state of bloc confrontation, when the terms equilibrium and balance of forces are in use and when disarmament processes are only just being mapped out and when only one treaty—on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles—has actually been signed. Under these conditions the switch of the GDR to the opposite military bloc would rightly be seen as a disturbance of the evolved equilibrium. Germany's membership in NATO would not suit the Soviet Union and the country's public opinion. We need to look for other solutions, which would take account of the interests not only of the West but the East also.

There is a large field for political imagination and fantasizing here, for the solutions could be the most unexpected. One was expressed by our minister: A united Germany could for a certain length of time be in both the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact.

And if in this transitional period a united Germany could perform such a role linking East and West, this would appreciably strengthen the positive trends which have been discerned in Europe in recent years. This would mean also synchronization of German unification and the all-European process.

So the Soviet Union's idea would seem to me to be not just for today but strategic and corresponding not only to the question of the present—whether German is a member of NATO—but also to that of the future connected with the further building of a united European territory and the common European home.

People will say: This is a very difficult task. I agree. But it would be worth trying to accomplish it for the gain from a solution achieved not unceremoniously but by civilized methods would seem tremendous and for everyone.

We should not once again be pinning our hopes on the bloc spoon [lozhku] under conditions where there is talk on all sides about new, collective security structures. There are specific proposals on this score, and not only from us but also from the FRG, Britain, France, and Italy, what is more. What they have in common is an appeal for the replacement of the opposed blocs by new, nonconfrontational structures.

If we move in this direction, a united Germany should work not to strengthen one bloc but for the development of collective security systems on the continent.

[Maksimov] But where do the rumors come from, which are being blown up in the West, that the question of a united Germany's inclusion in the North Atlantic Pact is predetermined and that the Soviet Union has agreed to this in exchange for the continuation of our troops on the territory of the former GDR and payment for their upkeep?

[Adamishin] I can definitely confirm that this does not correspond to the Soviet position. Rumors, on the other hand, are really spreading persistently. What is behind them? The fact that under the present conditions of pluralism the press, television, and radio are giving publicity to opinions of Soviet scholars and commentators which say: There is nothing that dreadful in NATO imbibing the GDR; the new Germany would, after all, be under its constant supervision, in the bloc's embrace, so to speak. When the West hears such speeches, not everyone can resist the temptation to pass them off as official or portending a change in the USSR's viewpoint.

We recall that World War II was able to erupt largely because the Western countries and the USSR were unable to reach agreement on joint security structures in Europe and because there was a struggle over where, in which direction, to channel Germany's aggressive aspirations and to divert the threat away from oneself at the expense of one's neighbor. It is well known in what tragedy this culminated. Are we incapable of learning—in practice—the lessons of history?

[Maksimov] There was no Soviet delegation at the recent congress of the GDR's communists—the Democratic Socialist Party—as the former Socialist Unity Party of Germany is called. There was talk in Berlin to the effect that the Soviet Union has abandoned its friends and allies to the whim of fate.

[Adamishin] Such rebukes seem to me unfair. Take the case of E. Honecker. No one wanted to give refuge to an old man who had recently undergone a serious operation. Our country extended the hand of assistance, accommodating E. Honecker in a military hospital, although the reaction in the same GDR was ambivalent.

It has to be said plainly that a hunting down of communists virtually is being organized in some East European countries. The defamation is malicious so as to expunge the very socialist idea, that is, it contains a perfectly explicit ideological specification. This is no longer the rectification of political mistakes, it is a violation of human rights. Even such an organization as Amnesty International has called attention to it.

In this difficult situation our policy tries to be both balanced and humane. Of course, relations with new forces, with new people who have assumed office, are being maintained at the interstate level, and the contacts are taking shape perfectly well, for the most part. But we should not turn our backs on those who formerly considered themselves our friend and ally.

[Maksimov] Let us return to the problem of unification. The position of the three latter in the "two plus four" formula is not without interest. France, Britain, and the United States have their own particular interests in this matter. What do they amount to, in your opinion?

[Adamishin] One meeting on the "two plus four" formula has been held so far, and not at expert but at minister level, what is more, devoted mainly to procedural issues. Some things will change in the future, perhaps, but at the last meeting I did not notice particular differences in the conduct of our anti-Hitler coalition allies and the FRG. They remained closely grouped around the West German proposals, in the main. Each party undoubtedly has its own particular approach to the problem, and we are undoubtedly trying to find points of contact with everyone. But the impression meanwhile is that the West is acting in single formation in this formula.

[Maksimov] Will not the "two plus four" formula shortly become a "one plus five"?

[Adamishin] It seems to me that the new GDR Government, which was formed recently on a coalition basis, does not intend to adopt a facile approach to the republic's sovereignty.

[Maksimov] And what can you say about one further formula which appeared recently in the political vocabulary—"two plus 33"? Is this not too great a piling up of figures?

[Adamishin] If we really want to build a common European home—and we do inasmuch as this corresponds to our strategic interests and the policy of full involvement in world-economic relations—we cannot do without the consensus of all the participants in the building. The German question is central in this process and must in one way or another obtain the approval of all who signed the Final Act. This is why such great significance is attached to the top-level meeting of the 35 countries which the Soviet Union has proposed be held at the end of this year.

This meeting will hardly go into the details of unification, but the German question itself will undoubtedly occupy a significant place at it. This will be a very important intermediate stage en route to the building of German unity. Of course, when 35 countries sit down to discuss something, a result does not come in the twinkling of an eye, and, technically speaking, it is easier working on the "one on one" formula. But, surprisingly, in the time of the all-European process the participants have learned quite quickly to arrive at a common denominator.

[Maksimov] As of January 1991 our economic relations with the GDR are to be effected in convertible currency. Does it not seem to you that this will lead to a weakening of them?

[Adamishin] This is part of a broader set of questions: How the unification of Germany will be reflected in the economic interests of the Soviet Union. After all, we have very extensive trade, commercial and other relations with both the FRG and the GDR. Very great attention is being paid to this currently. West Germans, it seems, agree that a united Germany should take over the economic and commercial commitments of the GDR. Of course, anything may happen, and for this reason our pertinent organizations are preparing to reduce chance to a minimum. In short, if we do good work, both the political and economic changes, including the transition to payments at world prices, will be for us not a minus but a plus.

[Maksimov] It has been reported that you have obtained a new appointment—USSR ambassador to Italy. And this will evidently be your last interview as deputy foreign minister!

[Adamishin] It most likely will be.

Solton Discusses Upcoming 'Two Plus Four' Talks

LD2904153590 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 29 Apr 90

[Text] A meeting on the two-plus-four formula is to be held in Bonn on 5 May. Taking part will be the foreign ministers of the German Democratic Republic and West Germany, and Soviet Union, the United States, Britain and France. They will discuss the external aspects of German unification. What results can be expected from the meeting? The view of Yuriy Solton:

It's unlikely that any specific decisions will be adopted in a rush. But common approaches of principle may be outlined. This is simply necessary. The four victor powers are especially responsible for preventing the recurrence of the threat of war from German soil. But, will it be possible to speak about European security with confidence if, as NATOs leadership is pressing for, a unified Germany enters NATO? Certainly not. The military and political structures that have emerged in Europe after World War Two have ensured peace and stability in Europe for nearly 50 years. So, there is nothing more important today than to determine such a military and political status of united Germany that would not tip up the balance drastically. Moscow is convinced that this is quite feasible if a unified Germany becomes a militarily nonaligned state whose armed forces would possess a defensive potential only. It seems that the issue will be brought up in Bonn. There naturally are other issues including a proposal on the dual membership of a single Germany in both NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. However paradoxically [as heard] such an idea appeared its implementation could mount a practical step toward building new common European security structures. At any rate, Germany itself would not lose from this. This way or another the construction of German unity requires a settlement in terms of international law in order to sum up the results of World War Two. The most correct form of such a settlement, the Soviet foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, said on the eve of the meeting in Bonn, could be a peace treaty or an appropriate document. Shevardnadze said in an interview with THE IRISH TIMES that such a document should be worked out within the framework of the six with two German states to take an active part.

Ramifications of German Currency Union Examined

PM0105091790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Apr 90 First Edition p 5

[Dispatch by PRAVDA correspondent Ye. Grigoryev: "Second Trial Balloon. Exchange Rate of Mark Remains Fixed"]

[Text] Bonn, 27 Apr—With the return of the federal chancellor from his Easter holiday the wheels of the reunification machinery have once again begun to turn in Bonn: The FRG capital has hosted L. de Maiziere, head of the GDR Government, who met with Kohl.

This conversation is being viewed here as a prelude to the beginning of talks on the conclusion of a state treaty on the terms of a currency, economic, and social union between the FRG and the GDR. According to Bonn's drafts, it foresees the virtual transfer of the GDR's sovereign rights in these spheres to the appropriate government authorities and the FRG's Bundesbank.

Without leaving time for a comprehensive discussion of the problems, FRG ruling circles are speeding up steps toward unification. According to their plans, the treaty must be signed by 6 May—before the municipal elections in the GDR. And the very introduction of the Western mark as the monetary unit in the GDR is planned for 1 July. After approval by the leadership of the Bonn ruling coalition a proposal by the West German side has been published here regarding the terms for the exchange of GDR money when it is replaced by the Deutsche mark.

The proposal envisages that the salaries of GDR workers and employees will be exchanged at the rate of 1:1. The same goes for pensions, and also savings, but on a scale not exceeding 4,000 marks per person. It is proposed that savings over this limit be exchanged at the rate of 2 GDR marks to 1 Deutsche mark. They also want to introduce this exchange rate when converting the accounts and liabilities of GDR enterprises.

One recalls that a few weeks ago the Bundesbank launched a trial balloon by advocating that if the Deutsche mark is introduced in the GDR the planned salary exchange be implemented at the rate of 2:1, and savings at a 1:1 rate up to 2,000 marks. This provoked indignation in the GDR. In the FRG itself the opposition considered the Bundesbank's recommendation a breach of the promises made by Kohl to win over GDR voters to the side of the parties affiliated to the Bonn coalition. Now it has become obvious that the plans to "halve" the income of the GDR's working population have not worked. The FRG Government has had to compromise. But this does not mean that the entire plan for currency union is not fraught with painful consequences for people both in the GDR and in the FRG.

To the accompaniment of propaganda statements about satisfying workers' and employees' demands, concern for pensioners, and so on, Bonn stipulates that it does not envisage any payment of compensation when removing the existing GDR subsidies on foodstuffs and implementing price reform. Thus for many people it may turn out that with a 1:1 salary exchange rate the real purchasing power of that salary will be reduced by the rise in prices. Moreover, this wage itself will be at best half that of a West German worker in a similar profession. No wonder the number of migrants from the GDR to the FRG is increasing once again. Since the start of the year they have already exceeded 167,000.

In connection with the exchange rate proposal West German specialists and the press note that it also poses a risk for the situation in the FRG. First, the appearance under the exchange of an additional huge amount of money in Deutsche marks may sharply raise purchasing power and increase inflationary tendencies and the cost of living—in other words, seriously test the stability of the Deutsche mark. Second, the exchange structure is proposed without a clear idea of the nature of the financial burdens on the FRG in this case and how they will be provided for. According to proposals by certain specialists, the West German budget will have to receive additional annual contributions of between 40 and 60 billion marks. So, an increase in direct and indirect taxes is quite probable in the future. FRG trade unions are encountering a grimmer social climate even now. Employers are taking a tough stance at talks on the renewal of wage-rate agreements. For instance, metalworkers are being threatened with mass lockouts if they carry out warning strikes.

Bakatin Concludes Talks, Visit to Cyprus

LD2704220590 Moscow TASS in English 2133 GMT 27 Apr 90

[Text] Nicosia April 28 TASS—The visit to the Republic of Cyprus by Vadim Bakatin, member of the USSR Presidential Council and minister of the interior, is over.

The signing of an agreement on cooperation between the interior ministries of the two countries in combatting crime has become an important result of the visit.

The agreement, signed here, marks a new stage in the development and concretisation of Soviet-Cyprus cooperation and envisages regular exchanges of information and experience in the work of law enforcement agencies.

Special attention is devoted to coordinating efforts in the fight against the spread of narcotics.

A joint commission has been set up to meet twice a year to discuss drug-related matters.

Commenting on the signing of the agreement, the HARAVGHI newspaper points out that it has become the embodiment of those good principles on which Soviet-Cyprus relations are based.

The Soviet interior minister and his party were received by Vassos Lyssarides, acting president of Cyprus and president of the House of Representatives (Parliament).

A wide range of matters were discussed during the minister's meeting with Lyssarides who praised the Soviet Union's firm and consistent stand on the question of a Cyprus settlement and Soviet efforts being made in the international arena towards a solution to the problem of Cyprus.

General Kalinichenko Pays Visit to Finland

PM0105090590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Apr 90 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Visit Completed"]

[Text] Helsinki, 26 Apr—Lieutenant General I. Ya. Kalinichenko, chief of the USSR KGB Border Troops, has made a four-day visit to Finland at the invitation of Lieutenant General Matti Autio [name as transliterated], chief of the country's border troops.

The Soviet guest was received by Finnish President Mauno Koivisto. During the talk, which took place in a warm, friendly atmosphere, it was stressed that the Soviet-Finnish border is a border between countries whose foreign policies are based on the principles of friendship and good-neighborliness and it was noted that perestroyka in the Soviet Union promotes the expansion of contacts between the two countries' citizens and the improvement of mutual understanding.

Lt. Gen. I.Ya. Kalinichenko also met with Finnish Interior Minister Jarmo Rantanen and visited a border academy and subunits of the border troops and helicopter pilots, where he was acquainted with the organization of their service.

Finland's Holkeri on Relations, Cooperation

LD2804211690 Moscow TASS in English 1810 GMT 28 Apr 90

[Text] Helsinki April 28 TASS—Perestroyka and the major economic reforms that are taking place in the Soviet Union positively affect relations between the Soviet Union and Finland. Finnish-Soviet economic ties were given a new impetus by Mikhail Gorbachev's official visit to Finland in October 1989, the agreement on trade and payments for the years 1991-1995, signed during his visit, and other important documents, Finnish Prime Minister Harri Holkeri told TASS.

Finland is one of the Soviet Union's major Western partners. Finland imports more than 80 per cent of its oil and petroproducts, 100 percent of its natural gas, 40 per cent of its fuel and 70 per cent of its electric energy from the Soviet Union. Finnish exports to the Soviet Union cover more than 45 percent of the Soviet need in pulp, 70 percent—in paper, 30 per cent—in equipment for the timber, pulp-and-paper and woodworking industries.

Asked about new forms of cooperation, Holkeri said that the idea of joint ventures advanced during perestroyka was being carried out successfully by both sides. One hundred and fifty such ventures have already been set up. Finland was the first Western country to sign an inter-governmental agreement for the mutual protection of investments with the Soviet Union. Finnish and Soviet organisations and firms cooperate in various industries, from metallurgy and power engineering to the chemical industry and transport. Finnish firms are planning to help develop a comprehensive plan for the rational use of timber resources in the Soviet north west, especially in Karelia, and promote business contacts in the agro-industrial sphere.

The participation of Finnish firms in bulding facilities for the Soviet food industry and delivering equipment for them is worth 200 million roubles.

During Mikhail Gorbachev's visit the Soviet and Finnish sides signed documents to develop Soviet-Finnish cooperation on the Kola Peninsula, which is extraordinary rich in natural resources. This cooperation will cover ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, the production of fertilizers and building materials and the development of oil and gas resources on the Barents Sea shelf.

Two joint ventures, Artiktivi and Kolasportland, are already operating there. The Kola scientific centre of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Finnish firm Outokumpu are developing new technology to enrich copper and nickel ores.

Holkeri said that mutual cooperation will also cover ecology.

Speaking about difficulties in Soviet-Finnish trade and economic cooperation, the Finnish prime minister said that Finnish firms often complain that is is hard to find a person in the Soviet Union who is ready to final permission for an already prepared deal. It is necessary to improve the system of clearing settlements. But, despite all the difficulties, Finnish-Soviet contacts and ties are deepening and have good prospects, just as it should be between good neighbours.

Western Communists' Sense of 'Betrayal' Noted

PM0105113590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[Dispatch by PRAVDA correspondent A. Lyutyy: "What Would Marx Say? Reflections Following a Visit to Highgate and a Discussion with 33-Year-Old Nina Temple, Secretary of the Communist Party of Great Britain"]

[Excerpts] London, April—[passage omitted] Of course history will put everything in its proper place. But at the present time many people in the West would like to see both in our perestroyka and in the changes taking place in East Europe the complete collapse of socialism and also of all Marxist-Leninist doctrine. The desire to bury the legacy of the classics of Marxism as quickly as possible is passed off as its reinterpretation. And the Stalinist tyranny and other tragic episodes in our history are presented as the inevitable results of applying the teaching of Marx and Lenin in practice.

There are very different reasons for wishing to defame socialism. Sometimes unexpected reasons. In an article published in THE TIMES recently Kenneth Baker, chairman of the Conservative Party, tried to convince readers that Labour's accession to power in Britain would run counter to the whole course of change in Europe. He said that countries in the eastern part of the continent are getting away from state regulation of the economy and moving toward a market system, while Labour could return the country to "stifling socialism."

People in Britain are now reflecting a great deal in connection with the fifth anniversary of perestroyka. I would be sinning against the truth if I were to say that the attitude to it is entirely favorable. The tone of statements by political experts and newspaper commentators is becoming more cautious and at times skeptical. And in connection with the Lithuanian crisis certain press organs, unlike the government, have lost their self-control and begun loosing off poisoned arrows at Moscow. But respectable publications are still refraining from hysterics and urging people not to forget how much has been done in our country over the past five years.

There is no denying that perestroyka has enriched our relations with the West extraordinarily and made them more civilized, multifaceted, and diverse. This also applies to relations with communist parties in the West. By drawing some closer and alienating others in the past, we were robbing ourselves and narrowing the field for dialogue and cooperation with democratic forces. Much is changing today. But it is no secret that both here and in our country some people are speaking of a betrayal of the international communist movement and saying that perestroyka has called in question and even canceled out much of what communists in the West defended with such difficulty for so long. [passage omitted]

...What would Marx say about the present day? We can, of course, only guess at this. But Martin Jacques, editor of the journal MARXISM TODAY, has given an original reply to this question. THE FINANCIAL TIMES recently carried an article by him couched in the form of an interview with an imagined Marx finding himself among us today. And it includes these words by the great philosopher: "Marxism is at last becoming pluralist and plural. It is losing its exclusivity and developing along with other political traditions under conditions of equal rights, not predominance. And this is just how it should be, more than a century later."

Latin America & Caribbean

Delegation Meets Nicaraguan Assembly Speaker

LD2804134190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0055 GMT 28 Apr 90

[Text] Managua, 28 Apr (TASS)—TASS correspondent Dmitriyev reports:

The USSR delegation which took part in the events connected with Nicaragua's President V. Barrios de Chamorro assuming office, was received on Friday by chairman of Nicaragua's National Assembly M. Arguello. During the conversation, a few international problems of mutual interest were discussed, as well as prospects for the development of Soviet-Nicaraguan relations.

The delegation's leader, member of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet V.I. Matviyenko, noted the Soviet Union's readiness to expand ties between the two countries on a mutually advantageous basis. The special importance of a further stepping-up of interparliamentary ties within this context was stressed.

M. Arguello spoke for deepening Soviet-Nicaraguan cooperation in the interests of the peoples of both countries. She indicated the readiness of the present Nicaraguan Government to maintain normal, friendly relations with all states, irrespective of their socioeconomic system.

The conversation passed off in a warm, friendly atmosphere.

U.S.-USSR Joint Action on Nicaragua Seen

90UF0116A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 25 Apr 90 p 3

[A. Trushin report: "Pivotal April in Nicaragua"]

[Excerpt] Managua-Moscow—[passage omitted] The principal direction of the V. Barrios de Chamorro government will be a policy of economic stabilization. The opposition's election promises to put an end to inflation in the first 100 days in office can hardly be considered serious. The country has long had no small change, and prices of commodities are rounded off to numerous zeros. For example, a month prior to the elections 50,000 cordobas were given for a dollar, a month after, 120,000. When preparing to go shopping, I had to equip myself with a bag of substantial size for...money. Naturally, reining in inflation in this situation will be extremely difficult. The new president's advisers are talking a good deal about plans to start, after the inauguration, the process of privatization of unprofitable state-owned enterprises. This is being resisted on the part of the Sandinists, who believe that a strengthening of the state sector is an achievement of the Sandinist revolution. While declaring that the new authorities will continue the process of agrarian reform begun by the Sandinists, V. Barrios de Chamorro at the same time emphasizes that the land should belong only to those who are capable of working it. She hereby clearly hints that the land expropriated by the revolution should be returned to the former owners and that the agricultural cooperatives that have been unable to provide with food the 3 million-strong population of Nicaragua, which is rich in fertile land, should be denationalized.

At the same time, however, the new government is constantly putting its hopes in foreign economic assistance. Thus Francisco Mayorga, the president's chief economic adviser, said: "We can do nothing without foreign economic assistance. If this is not forthcoming, it remains for us merely to turn out the lights and leave." Indeed, the new government will not initially be capable of coping with the economic difficulties without outside help. It is requesting such from the United States, the Soviet Union and the West European countries. And the proposition that no one other than Nicaraguans themselves will be involved in the republic's revival is only rarely heard in the speeches by representatives of the new government.

The new Nicaraguan Government has inherited extraordinarily complex problems. It is intending to change much in the domestic political and socioeconomic field. In the foreign policy sphere V. Barrios de Chamorro intends adhering as a whole to the same policy the Sandinists pursued and maintaining relations with all countries regardless of their sociopolitical structure, with, it is true, one essential addition—the United States is to be switched from the category of Nicaragua's enemies to that of its friends. And this means that Nicaragua could be a unique location for the cooperation of the USSR and the United States not only in rendering aid to the republic but also in the political sphere. Both powers are capable of making a common contribution to a settlement of the crisis situation in Central America and the conversion of this region into a zone of peace.

Peru's Political Candidates, Issues Profiled

90UF0045A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
5 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[A. Zagorskiy report: "The Candidates Are in the Lists"]

[Text] Lima—Lima at this time resembles a giant political advertising exhibition. The walls of buildings and lampposts are bestrewn with election posters and flyers. Boards with the symbol of political parties and groupings "walking" along the main roads were such a hindrance to traffic that they had to be removed. Such a variety of posters and slogans is explicable—on 8 April Peruvians are to elect a new president and two vice presidents and fully replace the country's bicameral congress.

All participants in the election marathon agree that the main problems facing the country today are the socioeconomic crisis and terrorism. It is over these, in fact, that lances are being broken. Whereas in the first two years of its term in office the Peruvian Aprista Party (APRA) was able by raising wages and controlling prices to stimulate demand and achieve considerable economic growth (it amounted to 8.5 percent in 1986, for example), subsequently inflation, which has risen to 20-30 percent a month, began to grow rapidly, production has fallen, and the population's real income has declined sharply.

As far as terrorism is concerned, an eloquent indication of this is the fact that a state of emergency has long been imposed on more than one-third of national territory. Several armed extremist organizations are operating in the country. The most active—the ultra left Sendero Luminoso grouping—is carrying out acts of subversion in practically all departments. According to a special Senate commission, more than 3,000 people died in Peru has a result of political violence in 1989 alone.

How to extricate the country from the crisis? The dozens of political parties and organizations have in the course of the election campaign advanced a great multitude of proposals on this score. The main struggle—both for seats in the Chamber of Deputies and in the Senate—has developed among four political forces. One—the Peruvian Aprista Party, which adheres to social democratic standpoints—proposes that a solution be sought on the path of gradual populist transformations. Although recently the APRA Party has forfeited its authority to a considerable extent owing primarily to the abrupt deterioration in the economic situation, it still has considerable political weight and aspires to restore the voters' trust. Many people, however, note that in the course of the election campaign the APRA Party and its presidential candidate, Luis Alva Castro, have thrown all their efforts not so much into propaganda of the platforms of their own program as into criticism of their opponents, primarily the Democratic Front (FREDEMO) conservative-right bloc.

FREDEMO has united the Popular Action and Popular Christian traditional bourgeois parties, the right-wing Liberty Movement, certain smaller parties and a number of independents. Its presidential candidate, the well-known Peruvian writer Mario Vargas Llosa, is far ahead of his rivals according to public opinion polls. Not the least part here is played by the financial might of Peruvian bankers and industrialists, who summoned Llosa to the "captain's bridge" and invested big money in his election campaign.

The FREDEMO program is now at the center of attention largely thanks to its specificity. A most important component thereof is so-called "shock therapy" for the economy. Privatization of the state sector, abolition of price control, introduction of freedom of import transactions, a stiffening of tax policy, devaluation of the national currency in relation to the dollar and the lifting of employment guarantees are proposed. A number of the measures which it proclaims, particularly Mario Vargas Llosa's promises to reduce inflation to an annual 10 percent, are attracting like a magnetic the critical barbs of the other candidates, who believe that their fulfillment is practically impossible. Many people are calling attention also to the obvious fact that the Democratic Front program, regardless of whether it is practicable or not, would strike at the interests of millions of Peruvians, particularly the least well-off.

The United Left (Peru's communists are participating herein also) coalition and also the Socialist Left grouping, which has split off from it, are in the vanguard group of participants in the election marathon also. Formed in 1980, the United Left had by the end of the decade become a real alternative to the authorities in the country. Unfortunately, preserving the integrity of its ranks proved impossible, and as a result Peru's forces of the left found themselves split at the decisive moment of preparation for the elections, and Alfonso Varrantes, leader of the Socialist Left, and Henry Garcia, prominent figure of the United Left, became rivals in the struggle for the presidency.

Does FREDEMO's lead in the polls mean its election victory is guaranteed? Polls are polls, but how accurately do they reflect the alignment of forces in the new congress? Will Vargas Llosa succeed in gaining more than 50 percent of the vote? If so, it is he who on 28 July will be sworn-in in the Room of Gold of the presidential palace. If not, there will be a second round.

...Lima's street vendors recently began offering a new commodity—cardboard masks of the presidential candidates. They are not selling very well, it is true. But it is not the competition in masks, slogans, and posters which will decide the outcome of the election campaign but the candidates' capacity for leading the country out of the crisis.

Political & Social

Reportage on Moscow May Day Celebration

Events Called 'Unusual'

LD3004134290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 30 Apr 90

[Text] In Moscow the last preparations for the 1 May celebration are being completed. This year it will be unusual. Two demonstrations will proceed across Red Square. The first is being organized by trade unions, and then columns of the Moscow electorate association [Moskovskogo obedineniya izbirateley] will step onto the square. This new political organization was formed during last year's elections.

According to the preliminary assessments of the demonstrations' organizers, about 900,000 people will take part in the demonstration.

Tomorrow, at 0945 [0545 GMT] Central Television will begin a relay from the May Day rally.

Meanwhile, today, on the eve of 1 May, badges of honor and diplomas were awarded to a group of prizewinners from Soviet trade unions at the All-Union Central Council of Trades Unions. All those decorated are invited tomorrow to the platform on Red Square.

May Day Rally Detailed

LD0105100390

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 0550 GMT on 1 May links up with all-union radio to carry an 86-minute live relay of the May Day rally and parade on Moscow's Red Square.

Before the rally begins, the camera shows columns of people heading for Red Square and platforms with foreign guests among the crowds already present in Red Square. Archive photographs are screened, showing some of the first May Day celebrations in the USSR.

At 0555 GMT a recorded video report shows how Moscow prepared for the "unusual" celebrations this year. The reporter at the scene interviews people in Red Square and says that even this morning the militia did not know how the columns of people would be moving.

At 0559 GMT Gorbachev, Ryzhkov, Lukyanov, and Zaykov make their way to their positions on the Lenin Mausoleum. The reporter says at this point:

"Comrades, your attention. Coming onto the rostrum of the mausoleum are the country's president, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, members of the country's Presidential Council, government and party leaders, WFTU [World Federation of Trade Unions] Secretary General Ibrahim Zakhariya, representatives of working Moscow, and leaders of city organizations."

At 0600 GMT the rally is opened by Vladimir Shcherbakov, chairman of the Moscow city trade union council. He congratulates everyone on May Day and sends greetings to all working people in the world. He states that solidarity is required to yield positive results. Shcherbakov then invites Gennadiy Ivanovich Yanayev, chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), to speak. Yanayev says:

"Dear comrade president, dear Muscovites, esteemed compatriots. Soviet people of various generations have come here today to this historic square under the banners of May Day. They have come to demonstrate their loyalty to the glorious traditions of labor solidarity, unity, and fraternity. Those people have come here who, through their difficult labor, are waging a struggle for the great cause of perestroyka, for the socialist choice of our people.

"Mighty changes have gripped the country. All labor collectives have joined the movement. At the center of this movement is the working man with his social activity, with his hopes, joys, and sorrows. The world of labor is the main concern of perestroyka, it is its locomotive, its goal, and moral buttress. Working people understand better than anyone else how difficult the situation is in which the country finds itself. These difficulties can be explained. They have been caused by a bold turn towards genuine democracy and towards renewed and humane socialism. We realize that without major reforms our country will not retain its worthy position in the community of the world's peoples. We understand that these reforms will require great efforts. The transition to a regulated market economy cannot fail to affect the vital interests of the working people in its first stage. It is obviously impossible to completely smooth over and remove all the negative consequences of the planned radical changes.

Therefore the AUCCTU, Soviet trade unions, call for the implementation of this important turn toward the market on the basis of national accord after enlisting the conscious support of the people. The creation of an effective system for the working people's economic protection is an unfailing condition of the transition."

"Our country's trade unions are convinced that social justice can be properly safeguarded only by an efficient economy, and that also means high-productivity and committed labor. Equality in poverty is not our slogan. We are against decreasing living standards and barrack-room communism. However, we would cease to be trade unions if we did not defend and protect the social gains of the working class. We would cease to be trade unions if we did not insistently demand from the government real efforts to relieve the situation of the working people and, first and foremost, of those amongst them who are least protected. We would cease to be trade unions if we did not demand with all resolution the safeguarding of the right to labor guaranteed by the constitution. We cannot, we have not the right, to leave war and labor veterans, single mothers, orphans, and students to face the elemental forces of the market alone.

"Realism and endurance are the guarantee of further progressive development. We are against conflicts for the sake of conflict which disrupt the already extremely tense economic and socio-political situation in the country. Maximalism in demands does not signify reasonable and realistic decisions. Only in conditions of political stability and social consolidation can we really count on such essential improvements in labor and living conditions and in enhancing the efficiency of science and production, the level of education and culture, and saving the environment.

We are workers and citizens of a great multinational union. It is only on the basis of harmonious, civilized relationships, within the framework of the law, among all our peoples that we shall be able to facilitate life for ourselves and leave hope for our children and grandchildren. The strength of the working movement is in its internationalism. This concept is today being seriously tested in the Baltic, Transcaucasia, and in some other areas of the country. Attempts to make the right to labor and status in society dependant upon the nationality to which people belong are aimed at splitting workers' unity and serving the interests of ambitious politicians and irresponsible nationalists. Soviet trade unions call upon all working people of the fatherland to defend and multiply the glorious traditions of the internationalist fraternity of the working class and peasantry which is many millions strong.

"The heavy lot has fallen upon some generations of our compatriots to bear on their shoulders all the burdens of the civil war, the accelerated construction of a new, more just social structure, the very fierce battles of the Fatherland War and the dreadful postwar devastation. Millions of our fathers and grandfathers sacrificed their lives for the ideals of socialism and freedom. The elder generation looks to tomorrow with concern and hope. We cannot betray your hopes. On the eve of the most moving holiday, the Great Victory, we bow our heads to you once again in filial admiration for your feats.

"We share the joy of the centennial anniversary of May Day with millions of working people abroad. The policy of new thinking, openness to the outside world, inspire us to fresh efforts in strengthening the community of the planet's working people. True to the spirit of internationalist solidarity, we call on our brothers and sisters throughout the planet to joint and even more energetic actions to achieve the humane and democratic aims of the development of mankind.

"Soviet trade unions send warm greetings and fraternal sentiments of friendship and solidarity to the working people of all countries. Long live May Day! Congratulations on the holiday, dear comrades!" [applause]

Following the speech by Vanayev, at 0612 GMT a woman weaver speaks briefly. A banner in the crowd is shown: Prices under the control of trade unions.

At 0615 GMT a trade union leader from the Moscow Aviation Institute speaks. He says that people are worried by the coming changes, and safeguards should be provided to ensure that nobody is hurt in the process. Students are in the vanguard of perestroyka, he notes.

At 0619 GMT WFTU Secretary General Ibrahim Zakhariya speaks of the hopes that people of the world place in the Soviet Union and Perestroyka.

At 0624 GMT Yevgeniy Nikolayevich Karlov, a scientist, speaks of the need to protect people's social interests. He says:

"Comrades, the lack of confidence of the Soviet people in the efficiency of the policy that is being implemented requires that we should take a definite stand. Today we must answer the main question: What has to be done, indeed, for protecting the social and economic interests of each individual and of the union as a whole? The principal cause of the crisis situation is the fact that the leadership of the party and the country is chronically late in adopting and implementing cardinal measures both in policy and the economy. Lack of a clearly defined strategy inexorably leads to economic reform being implemented by fits and starts. The way the national economy is developing is a far cry from that envisaged in the government's program. The consumer market is falling apart even further. Budget deficit is growing and standards of living are falling. Wild price formation is going on which results in growing inflation. The media have announced that the government is preparing a package of measures aimed at speeding up transition to a market economy. Maybe this third attempt in the last six months at improving the economy will yield positive results, at last. The prepared proposals should reflect the following: To abolish the expenditure mechanism, to envisage the priority development of state enterprises which today produce practically the entire national income—as a minimum measure, state enterprises should be given equal rights with cooperatives—to guarantee mandatory social protection for the population strata with low and average incomes in deeds, nor just in words, as used often be the case in our country, to envisage an optimum correlation between planned and market economies for the transitional phase.

The defense industries, including the aviation industry, are making their contribution to satisfying the market with consumer goods. But the conversion program has proved to be ill thoughtout and, the main thing, of low economic efficiency because it was designed without taking into account the real profiles of enterprise operation. While implementing conversion in the defense industries, we must not lag behind the developed countries in our main field. The development of new materials, technologies, and specimens of aviation equipment is inconcievable without progressive financing by the state. The unfounded application of production models of financial autonomy to research institutes and design bureaus has lead to a situation when highly skilled specialists and scientists have to pay attention not to advanced scientific and technical projects but to those yielding immediate results. The system of financing science currently in force puts the brake on further scientific and technical progress. No other country of the world tolerates such an unthinking scattering of its scientific potential. The solution to these questions is closely linked with the solution to economic and political problems. Internecine strife and political and national confrontation have never led to the overcoming of difficulties but, rather, exacerbated them even more. The consolidation and the unification of Soviet people for solving a common task which reflects the interests of the majority of the people is the only path proved by history. [applause]

At 0628 GMT a metallurgical worker speaks. He says that the solidarity of working people is essential. He goes on to state that the market cannot be trusted, it is fraught with negative effects. People who live by honest labor should be protected first of all, he says.

Next, at 0631 GMT, Shcherbakov returns to the microphone and reads a proposed resolution, as follows: "Comrades, a proposal to adopt a resolution was put forward during preparations for the meeting. The following text has been suggested for the resolution:

"We, the representatives of the capital's trade unions, on 1 May, the day of international solidarity among working people, declare our support for the actions of all progressive forces in the struggle for the peace, freedom, and happiness of peoples. In conditions of the complex economic and political situation within the country, we adhere firmly to a position of protection of the working people's interests and of the impermissibility of getting out of the economic crisis at the cost of worsening the situation of the most deprived sections of our society. We call upon the working people of all nationalities to unite and not to permit a split in our ranks or to allow the seeds of nationalism and interethnic strife to germinate. We believe in the triumph of reason and will support humane and democratic transformations in the interests of mankind, which provide social safeguards for people of labor. We believe that all decisions which have a substantial influence on the standard of living and interests of the working people should be adopted only after seeking the advice of the people. We address this demand to the government: No to unemployment, yes to an effective system of protection for the working people, for the honest worker the life he deserves and fair payment for his labor. Only our unity and constructive labor can ensure social progress, our own well-being and that of future generations, renewal, and the prosperity of our homeland. [applause]

"Comrades, allow me to consider your applause as being in favor of approving and adopting the resolution [applause, some cries of dissent]

"Comrades, allow me to declare this meeting closed. Long live 1 May! [applause] Long live the international solidarity of the working people! [applause] Congratulations on the holiday, dear comrades! [applause]"

Following thea adoption of the resolution, at 0638 GMT Shcherbakov declares the rally closed.

At 0636 GMT the parade begins. Banners carry the slogan: "Conversion should not hit the pockets of the working people".

At 0637 GMT a link-up with Vladivostok shows May Day celebrations already drawing to a close.

Back in Red Square, there are more crowd shots.

At 0641 GMT correspondent Flyarkovskiy interviews people in the street about their May Day slogans. A woman prefers one she has just seen: "Real salaries for real work."

At 0648 GMT a link-up with Frunze shows the May Day celebrations there, with marching columns and flags.

At 0649 GMT a link-up with Alma-Ata shows marching columns. The announcer says that new banners refer to the Semipalatinsk and Aral problems. Nazarbayev is shown greeting people.

Brief link-ups show columns marching in Tashkent and Ashkhabad.

Back in Red Square, at 0652 GMT a recorded video report shows a reunion between U.S. and Soviet servicemen who fought together in World War II. U.S. and Soviet war veterans are interviewed on their impressions.

Further link-ups show columns marching in Kiev and Kishinev.

Back in Red Square the cameras show more crowds marching through the square. One banner reads: "KGB = Pamyat." As the leaders wave to them, the people in the crowd wave back, apparently in good-naturedly. There then follow long-range shots of the crowds in the square.

At 0716 GMT the announcer reports the end of the relay.

Gorbachev Attends

LD0105070790 Moscow TASS in English 0659 GMT 1 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 1 TASS—A meeting and a demonstration, organised by the City Council of Trade Unions, took place in the Red Square here today on the occasion of the day of internationalist solidarity of working people.

The Red Square activities were attended by President Mikhail Gorbachev and other leaders of the state.

Anti-Gorbachev Jeers Heard

AU0105092290 Paris AFP in English 0900 GMT 1 May 90

[By Francis Curta]

[Text] Moscow, May 1 (AFP)—Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev left the Lenin Mausoleum Tuesday to jeers from opposition demonstrators who were allowed in their tens of thousands through Red Square for the first time since the 1917 revolution.

Journalists at the scene saw Mr. Gorbachev and other official leaders leave the rostrum atop the mausoleum half an hour after opposition groups began their own march past in the wake of a parade by official groups organised by the trade unions.

Loudspeakers blaring music at full volume tried to drown catcalls and jeering by demonstrators who stopped right opposite the mausoleum.

One giant banner read: "Gorbachev get your hands off Soviet power", while some marchers waved Lithuanian flags.

Other banners read "Down with the bloody Communist Party".

Some demonstrators were seen to shake their fists at Mr. Gorbachev and they carried banners reading: "Out with the Ceausescus of the Politburo" and "We don't trust a party whose leaders are criminals".

All those on the rostrum, including Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov and other members of the Communist Party Politburo, left with Mr. Gorbachev.

The president, wearing a hat and raincoat, appeared to slowly lose patience as he watched banners carried by opposition groups.

Journalists saw him drumming his fingers on the wall. Fellow politburo member Alexander Yakovlev had his hands in his pockets and Yegor Ligachev, a hardline conservative, had his hands behind his back.

The official parade by some 50,000 people, carrying balloons, flowers and waiving, was carried live by television, but the broadcast ended when the opposition groups themselves started to cross Red Square, under the Kremlin walls.

The official celebrations, which this year marked the 100th anniversary of Labour Day, were organised by the trade unions rather than the Communist Party as was the case in the past.

Tass said some "extremist hoodlums" had raised "openly provocative" banners, giving no details.

Official banners carried for the official parade proclaimed: "Glasnost yes, demagogy no" and "Yes, to an economy market, no to unemployment".

Gennady Yanayev, the newly-appointed trade union leader, made a speech from the rostrum, applauded by only a few dozen from among the 50,000-strong crowd.

He called for major reforms, including a transition to a market economy.

"We understand that the changes to a market economy will adversely affect those least able to protect themselves in the country, and we would stop being trade unions if we didn't insist on people's right to work", he said.

'Extremist Outbursts' Impact Parade

LD0105142190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 1 May 90

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] Red Square welcomed Muscovites without the pomposity and grandiosity which until very recently accompanied the May Day celebrations. [passage omitted]

The rally ended. And Muscovites marched across Red Square from the Historical Museum to St. Basil's Cathedral.

Unfortunately, the final moments of the holiday parade of workers were somewhat clouded by extremist outbursts by individual persons, whose acts were clearly discordant with the general elation and mood of the people who had come to Red Square to express their support for perestroyka.

People's Deputy Bunich Comments

LD0105120290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1050 GMT 1 May 90

[Excerpts] Moscow May 1 (TASS)—[passage omitted] TASS correspondents interviewed participants in the May Day rally at Red Square. Pavel Bunich, USSR people's deputy, one of the leading Soviet economists, was among those who came here today. "We have no other way out but a market economy," he said. To make it work, man should be turned into a real owner of the means of production. And a way towards this has already been paved.

We need taxes instead of the currently existing requisitions from highly productive enterprises for the benefit of inefficient ones. Let us hope, the economist went on, that we will have such a law in two or three weeks. Correct prices are needed, that is, free market prices. One would like to believe that as of next year, many prices will become free. Provided, of course, that there is unconditional protection of the social rights of citizens. Finally, the fourth point: Competition is required. [passage omitted]

The number of those who took part in the procession proved to be considerably lower than expected. There were some extremist banners which called not for the consolidation of forces but for direct confrontation with constitutional power.

AUCCTU Leader Addresses Meeting

LD0105095590 Moscow TASS in English 0913 GMT 1 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 1 TASS—By TASS special correspondents:

Participants in a meeting in Moscow's Red Square today on the occasion of the International Day of Solidarity among working people called for pooling the efforts of Soviet trade unions to ensure social guarantees and protect the rights of working people.

The May Day holiday is celebrating its 100th birthday today.

Standing on the tribune of the Mausoleum were President Mikhail Gorbachev, Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov, Parliament Chairman Anatoliy Lukyanov and other party and state leaders and representatives of the work collectives of the capital.

For the first time, the demonstration and meeting in the Red Square were held as purely trade union activities, on the initiative of the Moscow City Council of Trade Unions.

"In light of the transition to a market economy, our aim is to establish a reliable system to protect the interests of working people," Gennadiy Yanayev, chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Soviet Trade Unions, told the meeting.

However this does not mean that trade unions champion equalisation approaches, he added. "We do not seek equality in poverty," Yanayev said.

The Soviet trade union leader described national concord and solidarity among the Soviet Union's workers as one of the major conditions for the success of perestroika. Only a stable political situation can guarantee the realisation of working people's rights, Yanayev said.

Ibrahim Zakhariya, general secretary of the World Federation of Trade Unions, addressing those present, pointed out the need for trade unions around the world to combine efforts to build a new, fair international economic order.

He spoke of the Soviet Union's contribution to reducing the nuclear threat and to building a world without hunger and poverty.

Participants in the meeting adopted a resolution expressing support for all progressive forces in the work for peace, freedom, and peoples' happiness.

"We are calling on the working people of all nationalities to unite and prevent our ranks from splitting. We shall continue to support humane, democratic transformations that ensure social guarantees for the working people," the resolution says.

The document calls on the government to prevent unemployment, to create an effective system for the protection of working people's rights and guarantee fair remuneration of labour.

Celebrations Noted in Various Cities

LD0105092690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0800 GMT 1 May 90

[Summary] Correspondents report on how the holiday is being celebrated in various towns across the country:

Leningrad: For the first time in many years there was no demonstration. Leningraders gathered on the Field of Mars and Palace Square, where there was a short rally organized by public organizations. Concerts, circus acts, and competitions are now under way.

Kiev: There was a march and May Day rally in the center of the city.

Yerevan: As is usual on May Day, the fountains were switched on. "Meeting the wish of the working people half way, the Yerevan CPSU City Committee and the City Executive Committee decided not to hold a May Day demonstration." Instead, there have been fairs and concerts. Meanwhile, construction workers who are rebuilding the devastated villages and towns after the earthquake are celebrating May Day at work.

Alma Ata: May Day rallies were held here and in other towns, but they had no fixed form.

Gorbachev Gets New Perestroyka 'Mandate'

PM3004110590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 1

[R. Lynev and A. Pashkov article under the "Topical Subject" rubric: "Urals Mandate"]

[Text] M.S. Gorbachev's trip to the Urals is over. How should it be assessed?

Dynamism, approachability, and charm are, of course, important qualities for a leader. But it is clear that an entire country cannot be reformed on the basis of these qualities alone. Much less a country such as ours. So at least three questions are appropriate in connection with this trip. The first: Why was it necessary? The second: Why was it held at this particular time? And the third: Why go to the Urals in particular?

In general, the president himself answered all three questions, and there was hardly any state secret about it.

And yet, we think, there is some point in summing up what he said to a certain extent.

So this was his first trip in his new capacity as the country's president, with a new level of powers and responsibility. And the timing, it seems, was not chosen because there was a "window" in the head of state's schedule, but because perestroyka has reached a new stage—the need to make new and exceptionally important decisions connected with the transition to the market, with changes within the party, and with the state's renewal. Before making such decisions it has now become the rule to consult with people, rather than deciding everything in an improptu fashion overnight....

Why the Urals...? If only because Leningrad, the Ukraine, Central Asia, the Far East, Kuybyshev, Orel, Tyumen, the Virgin Lands, Siberia, and the Baltic republics have already been visited. But the Urals have not. Although, where in the country can we still encounter at one and the same time such well-developed industry—including the defense industry—and such a concentration of the working class and scientific-technical intelligentsia (and with deep cultural and historical roots and traditions)? How will this force behave at the new turning point in perestroyka? Will it be a reliable buttress, as was the case in all the state's important undertakings and—it is appropriate to note—in all its trials. And at the same time—and we say this by no means to flatter the Urals people—they have always valued independence, directness, and openness of morals and arguments, which have often assumed a political and opposition thrust with respect to pressure from the center and from above. And, if you like, the Yeltsin phenomenon is part of that. It must be admitted that when Yeltsin headed the Sverdlovsk party obkom [oblast party committee], before important visitors arrived people would work hard to erect "green fences"—as they were sarcastically termed—to hide the muck and the rubble. But as soon as Yeltsin became an opposition figure, many of his countrymen forgave him this and other tricks.

Could Gorbachev fail to take this factor into account? Hardly. And not for nothing did he repeatedly stress in his speeches during the trip that he had come more to listen than to talk. We think he wanted to sense the Ural people's reaction to the progress of perestroyka. And they did have things to say in that connection. The acute and problematic dialogue with the president at "Uralmash," scheduled to last two hours, went on long into the night. What was discussed? How the pricing system should be altered on the eve of the transition to the market. What taxes there should be. How to equalize the economic management conditions enjoyed by state enterprises and cooperatives. In short, how to radicalize the economic reform.

Of course, you can imagine that during all the meetings in the Urals it was said that, as a result of the many years' abuse of extensive economic management methods and administrative management, this Russian center had been turned into a raw materials appendage of the rest of the country, including outlying areas. Bearing this in mind, Gorbachev should be prepared for diverse and numerous "green lights": from raising pensions to increasing food stocks. And he heard all this. But the main "green light" was the most weighty and demanding: Let's give the green light to economic freedom.

The guest assessed this sentiment as follows: It is no longer the center that is calling on the people to support perestroyka, but the people who are demanding actions rather than words from the center. Although there are doubts too: If the situation at "Uralmash" and other enterprises has become considerably complicated now, in the run-up to the market—what will happen tomorrow? What will happen?

We dare say that, despite their high level of politicization today, the bulk of the people still remain practical workers. But the president, who has a practical mind, must continue to be a politician. And, as a politician, during his trip he discussed different variations on the following theme: Yes, the transition to the market brooks no delay, but nor should it be hasty or ill-conceived. Consequently, we must weigh everything up so as to ensure that we switch to a new economy in a coordinated way and with the least losses.

In short, Gorbachev sees our country's transition to a new state as being radical but not a headlong rush. Some people are prepared to see this as inconsistency on his part, others are distressed because the directives from the center lack their usual clarity. But, after all, this is not a directive—it is a case of thinking out loud and inviting others to analyze the full complexity and contradictory nature of what lies ahead. And if we want to overcome contradictions—highlighting in them only what is closest to us, and rejecting everything else—we are still poor politicians.

The president has checked his political bearings with the Urals people. It seems to us that no substantive differences were unearthed. The Urals people have reaffirmed their mandate for the new stage of perestroyka, highlighting a number of proposals that were as definite as they were well-founded.

Anti-Gorbachev KGB Plot Alleged in Budapest

LD2804114690 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1000 GMT 28 Apr 90

[Text] [Announcer] Today's issue of MAI NAP declares with a huge headline: A KGB provocation has been foiled in Budapest. Jozsef Laszlo reads the more important bits.

[Laszlo] Well, if the story is true, then it is fantastic. I say if because at first reading, it appears just too fantastic really.

What is at issue here is this: As we reported a few months ago, in the USSR a Soviet cooperative [ANT] allegedly tried to sell arms abroad without any kind of export licence—tanks and airplanes. Well, it seems that the men of this cooperative appeared in Budapest and here—and this is where the twist comes in the affair—they became victims of a provocation; at least this is what comes out of the MAI NAP story, because KGB agents allegedly tried to use them to hurt the reformers in Moscow. I think this is the story briefly in MAI NAP.

[Announcer] A short time ago I phoned Dr. (Jozsef Igloi), head of department of the Chief Public Prosecutor's Office.

[Begin recording] [Announcer] Are you convinced that a provocation has indeed taken place and the Soviets wanted to mislead the Hungarian authorities?

[Igloi] As far as I am concerned, I do not see sufficient grounds for proof of provocation in itself, but it appears interesting—and everyone can draw his own conclusions from the fact that when the Soviet delegation, with a prosecutor and several investigators [vizsgalo] arrived here bringing the warrant [megkereses] of the USSR deputy supreme prosecutor, they did not make available to us all the evidence which would have set out unambiguously the subject in question.

In reality, it was not bribe money which they [the ANT men] received—whats more, not $20,000 but $140,000—but such a guarantee of contract is usual in international practice, i.e. in case the contract fails to be struck, this should act as so-called forfeit money. It was in this way also that the Soviet delegation handed over a tape recording. This tape recording was, however, translated with bits missing. It became clear from the translation we prepared that the two Soviet citizens had said completely unambiguously that this money was not theirs, they could not share this out, it belonged to the Soviet state. After this, a videotape recording was made available to us which was a copy, however, from which significant parts were missing.

On the basis of these data we had to conclude that their [the ANT men] defense, that they accepted the money as a deposit, a guarantee, and did so perfectly legally and not as personal bribe money, has grounds [alapos]. The [Hungarian] Chief Public Prosecutor set this out in a letter to the USSR supreme public prosecutor on 14 March 1990. In this, we referred to the fact that had they made the evidence available to us in good time, an illegal order to investigate would not have been issued, nor would an unjustified limitation of the freedom of a person, or speaking plainly, a detainment. Let me quote a sentence from the letter:

Following the assessment of all the circumstances of the case, we do not consider correct the activity of the representatives of the Soviet justice organs present [in Hungary].

[Announcer] Is it possible to say that through this affair they wished to discredit the reformers in Moscow?

[Igloi] In my view, yes. I do not know how well known it is that NEWSWEEK published an article relating to the sale of tanks in which this same ANT organization, cooperative, featured and—probably on the basis of reliable sources—it writes that it aims at discrediting Gorbachev or Ryzhkov, who support the cooperative movement.

[Announcer] What will now happen in the case?

[Igloi] As far as we are concerened, we have closed the case. The investigating authority has correctly stopped the investigation in the absence of a criminal act, and we naturally replied to the USSR supreme public prosecutor as I already quoted. The investigation is fruitless, i.e. the investigation has rather proved the innocence of those under suspicion. [end recording]

Discussion on Need for Continued KGB Activity

PM0105080590 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 29 Apr 90 p 2

[I. Baranovskiy report: "KGB Without Secrets"]

[Text] For many years the activity of this mystery-shrouded department remained a "blank spot" as far as society was concerned, but times have changed. Now magazines and newspapers write about the KGB, and the Supreme Soviet discusses it. Quite a few questions have built up around this organization—how to bring the KGB under the people's control, what work the committee should be doing now, and whether it is needed at all? After all, tension in the world is easing appreciably now....

This topic was the theme of a discussion at Moscow's House of Enlightenment yesterday. Questions from lecturers and propaganda workers of the Znaniye Society were answered by USSR KGB Deputy Chairman G. Ageyev and other senior staffers from this department. They described how in the past few years alone around 30 foreign agents and a vast quantity of radio electronic listening and surveillance equipment have been detected in the country. Here are just a few examples. An intelligence device disguised as a common or garden tree stump was discovered near an air defense establishment. It could detect the slightest emission at the military site—from a command to a missile launch. This information would then be instantaneously transmitted via a satellite communication system to a special center on U.S. territory. The entire operation took no more than a few seconds....

The meeting also saw a demonstration of the "Kambala" [name as transliterated] device. It was discovered on the bed of the Sea of Okhotsk near a communications cable linking Magadan and Kamchatka. It had 64 tape recorders designed to run for 3,000 hours....

One final interesting fact from this series. KGB staffers discovered some strange commands [vkladka] built into a computer system which we bought in the West. In response to a radio signal at a given moment this virus [veshchitsa] could cause the entire computer complex to crash. And this is not just a very costly machine but also a vast data bank.... Similar "time bombs" were later extracted from more than 100 computers in many cities in the country.

These figures alone enable us to answer the question of whether we still need the KGB today or not. Of course we do. Incidentally, the U.S. special services currently employ around 200,000 people and spend around $30 billion annually on their activity. Furthermore, each dollar, according to CIA evidence, is recouped tenfold....

The leaders of the USSR KGB services also talked at the meeting about foreign agents' recruitment methods, the tasks facing intelligence and counterintelligence, and the committee's struggle against organized crime.

Yakovlev Interviewed on Presidential System

LD3004171790 Moscow World Service in Russian 0935 GMT 30 Apr 90

[Second of three installments of interview with Aleksandr Yakovlev, Presidential Council member and Central Committee member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union]

[Text] Dear listeners, we are continuing to acquaint you with an interview which Aleksander Plevako, a director of Moscow Radio, held with Aleksandr Yakovlev, member of the Presidential Council and of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. Yesterday we broadcast the first part of this interview in which the interlocutors discussed the theory of convergence from the point of view of the new political thinking. Today we propose that you listen to a continuation of the conversation:

[Begin recording] [Plevako] Aleksandr Nikolayevich. Can you tell our listeners how the idea of the new thinking was engendered, how were its principles worked out? What was the impulse for working out the new political thinking? How did the discussion of its conceptual bases proceed? And a related question; there is an opinion that you, precisely, were one of those who created the new political thinking. Is this true and, if so, who were the others?

[Yakovlev] I don't wish to personify any particular phenomena or to ascribe to myself or to anyone any merits or achievements in this, or anything like that, although I don't at all mean to say that I was not au courant with the discussions and conversations about the problems both before the April 1985 plenum and a bit earlier and subsequently. It's all very complex; but to a certain extent or, from one aspect, it is simple. You see, if you think about the formulation of words which make up this phrase, the truth of the new political thinking is very simple—it is new. It is new. Phraseologically it is all very simple, but nevertheless this attracts people. (?Let us study this truth). Why, in fact? What is there in the words new political thinking that we didn't know? It's all very simple. Incidentally, here lies the danger of this name, too. Why? What danger? Because before this there were many people, politicians, in the West and here who, without fail, depicted each of their new doctrines or concepts as new and as proceeding from special thinking—political, economic, social thinking etc. But personally I think it came too late, it was too late. If in 1956 the country's leadership had had sufficient courage and knowledge, then the current perestroyka would not be so painful as it is.

[Plevako] And perhaps it wouldn't have been necessary at all?

[Yakovlev] Perhaps it wouldn't have been necessary at all. Most likely I would agree with you. If after 1956 our policy had been consistent, precise, clear, if it had been attuned to the revolution, then I believe that we would now be on a quite different level politically, economically, and socially. You see, the painfulness of these processes is revealed in many ways. I don't wish to repeat the arguments of our economics and politics, the mesh of views and confrontations of these views, that confusion, but there is even a difference in the reaction. If you look at the intelligentsia of 1956, with the new poets, poems, novels, books, you cannot count all of this as second rate, unnecessary. I believe that this period will be marked in the history of Soviet literature. Take a look now. Five years have passed. What names and titles can you give me that have been written during this period, precisely, not earlier? What can this be said about? That's how it is.

[Plevako] [Indistinct question]

[Yakovlev] It's impossible. But suddenly there has been some drop in morals among the intelligentsia, first of all. Take note of this aspect of the phenomenon—not among the working people, not with the peasants or the workers, but among the intelligentsia. Some shadowy aspects of the human immorality—lies, hate, intolerance, extreme intolerance. And hysteria has appeared, a clamor and demagogy. What's it about? It would appear that perestroyka contains, as one of its strongest aspects, an idea of morality without which human society cannot live, develop, or make progress. It turns out that there are many people who are indifferent to this. There is great indifference to the great idea. We say that perestroyka ought to humanize human development. They say: What is that, what is the use of it? Take your democratization and humanization. What does it all mean, in general? We say: We must make progress. There are people from various strata of society who say: No, we must return to the past. Some want to return to Stalin, some to the monarchy and others to the peasant way of life of the 19th century. So I only wish to say by this: That there have appeared by-products of social development which require very serious interpretation. And of course, the general explanation for this is the low level of culture in general, and of political culture in particular. I think that we have achieved something here, everything has become interlinked and now it is coming to the surface, splashing over.

This would all be normal if it had not turned into bloody strife, ambition, a struggle for power. So I want to say that this struggle of passions is no longer in the nature of a struggle, but of some immoral fuss. Serious attention ought to be paid to this. I very much hope that the healthy, commonsense section of the Soviet intelligentsia will nevertheless look at all these problems from a more responsible viewpoint, as it were, from more responsible positions. The intelligentsia has, after all, always been rich in new ideas. It has fulfilled some of the functions of a spiritual shepherd, of an educator, of some shining backbone whose accounts could be believed and respected. [Words indistinct] somewhat differently, and this is a cause of concern. This is a cause of great concern. Yes.

[Plevako] You are known as a major scientist both in this country and abroad. Can you manage to put these ideas down in books and monographs, or do you simply not have enough time for this, especially now....

[Yakovlev, interrupting] I manage to do this very rarely. And this is all very sad, of course, because...[changes thought] if you were to ask me what I like best personally, apart from my children and grandchildren, I would say that I very much love writing. But I need time for this. I need time for this, and there is no time. However paradoxical it may be, it sometimes appears that...[changes tack] so far it is probably more responsible not to be writing something for oneself, although you might regret it subsequently... yet, to attempt to take something through to the end and try to do something useful for the country, for its social development, to tear our common fatherland out of 1,000 years of [words indistinct] our democracy, out of our essentially [words indistinct], true freedoms and inviduals worth were trampled upon.

[Plevako] Can you say something about your appointment as a member of the Presidential Council?

[Yakovlev] To some extent, it is thought, the presidency is capable of resolving problems which could not have been resolved previously by the government, the parliament or the Central Committee, first of all, concerning perestroyka. As our president has already noted, the inroduction of presidential rule is not in itself a panacea. There has never been such a thing. But the introduction of the post of president and his power, his authority, is, I think, a certain completion of the ladder of popular power. Second, in a country on the scale of ours, with our history, that is, the specific situation which now exists requires a certain unity around some idea, some central symbol which personifies this power, this unity. Third, I think that the decisions which will be adopted will be difficult to dispute because they are constitutional. They proceed from a law-based system which has taken shape from a law- based state. Whereas before a nonparty person, say, or a dissident within the party itself could say: That decision by the raykom or by the Politburo is to me illegal and is therefore not binding upon me; now the decision of the president, according to the Constitution, is binding upon all. Like it or not, this person, if he does not fulfil the decision, is to a certain extent setting himself against society and against its rights and laws, especially since, as stated in the amendments to the Constitution, the main task of the president is to execute laws which have been adopted by the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet. I think we all have to understand this peculiarity and get used to it. We have never had anything like this in the country, never. Any analogies about bringing in a monarchical system are simply stupid. There cannot be any analogies here. If we recall the elementary facts of history, these analogies collapse and become nothing. Presidential power represents the interests of all, as it were, and not the interests of individual social groups, individual parties, certain interests, be they of individuals or not. It should reflect the general interests and be uniform for all in its decisions, in its justice or injustice, legality or illegality. But, I repeat, the complexity here is that society will gradually have to become accustomed to this.

[Plevako] The measures which are intended by the Presidential Council proceed, of course, from objective requirements. But, at the same time, they must obviously take account also of the priority of those dissatisfactions which exist. for example, the economy might be first, but perhaps crime is a greater worry, etc?

[Yakovlev] Yes, that's true, and I believe that that spectrum of understanding for the new political thinking must also include the priorities of removing what has been accumulated and what is splashing over into dissatisfaction. These dissatisfactions are evident. You see, the housing problem wasn't created by perestroyka. Considerably more housing is being constructed than in the past, yet the level of dissatisfaction is higher. [Words indistinct]. So we must change our housing policy. We must create [words indistinct]. We must concern ourselves about low paid people, about pensioners, so that they don't suffer at all. This is now a question of law and order. I have at the moment an instruction from the president to coordinate all this work by ministries, [words indistinct] KGB, the Procuracy and so on, the law enforcement bodies, the public, the press, and all public organizations into a struggle to enhance law and order, into a struggle against crime, in order to look at this problem not just from the point of view of law enforcement but also from the social point of view—such problems as that of foodstuffs, say. As Mikhail Sergeyevich has already said, one of the next sessions of the Presidential Council will be devoted to agrarian reform, for we need to work out a mechanism to implement the land law, agrarian reform, land reform. And a great number of issues arise there. We must put an end to the senseless argument about what is better: The collective and state farms [kolkhozes and sovkhozes] or individual farms, family farms. The one that is more efficient is the better one. Whichever one is better is better. That is indeed true. If a collective farm is functioning well it should continue to be assisted in every way so that it can function even better. But to think that a collective farm in which there are four houses and no people, and where everything is done by outside forces which have been mobilized—to think that this is something which needs to be defended, this is of course nonsense and here we must seek some other methods of agrarian activity. For the land is an urgent matter. [end recording]

[Announcer] You have been listening to the second part of an interview with Aleksandr Yakovlev, member of the Presidential Council, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member, by Aleksandr Plevako, a director of

Moscow Radio. The third and final part will be broadcast tomorrow at the same time. The interlocutors will discuss the problems of perestroyka in the system of state administration and will clarify the concept of differences of opinion in the Presidential Council.

Komsomol Deputy Addresses 21st Congress

90US0799A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 13 Apr 90 p 3

[Speech by A. Sharonov, USSR people's deputy from the VLKSM at the 12 April morning session of the 21st VLKSM Congress]

[Text] Dear Congress Delegates and Guests!

Thirteen months ago the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] for the first and, evidently, last time in its history acquired the right to directly elect 75 USSR people's deputies. A unique situation was created, in which the youth social and political organization acquired a real opportunity to participate directly and on an equal basis in the management of the state through its representatives in the highest organs of power.

It is difficult to describe in 20 minutes the highly multilevel activity of the group of USSR people's deputies from the VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] over a whole year. For this same reason there will be few names in the report.

The working group prepared material in brief, of which you now have copies. In addition, with the aid of the congress' information service you will be able to familiarize yourselves with the results of the roll-call vote of the VLKSM deputies at the congresses of USSR people's deputies. In today's report from the group of deputies we would like to give you merely the most significant results of our activity and pay the main attention to an analysis of the reasons for our successes and failures and possible, in our view, ways of rectifying the situation and paths of further work.

The main thing in the activity of any USSR people's deputy and group of deputies is law-making. Here it may be said that the deputies from the Komsomol participated in the discussion of practically all issues examined at the congresses and sessions, laws, resolutions (they approach 100 in number) and numerous personnel appointments; that the majority of decisions took account of our remarks and proposals and that in several bills these amendments were highly material or determining even. This applies to the principles of legislation on the judicial system and the laws on leasing, the land, and local self-management and to the decisions on an amnesty for former servicemen in Afghanistan who committed crimes, on the political evaluation of the commitment of forces to Afghanistan, on the early demobilization from the ranks of the Armed Forces of approximately 200,000 students, on elimination of the consequences of the Chernobyl accident and others.

Mention may also be made here of the substantial ground work which is being prepared by deputies from the Komsomol. This being primarily the Press Act, in respect of which many fundamental additions have been made, and also the concept of a youth press, which it will be necessary to defend in earnest under the conditions of a market economy and the dearth of paper, has been prepared and discussed, and the law on citizens' right to association, four versions of which we examined, and we are now preparing to submit the reworked bill to the USSR Supreme Soviet. Nor could socioeconomic laws, which will have a very serious effect on both the interests of young citizens and the interests of youth enterprises, have passed by the young deputies unnoticed. We are now working on the laws "On Leave" (we are defending a block of apprentice leave here) and on pensions (pensions for young invalids and orphaned children). Separate mention should be made of the youth economy. It was primarily deputies from the Komsomol who sought abolition of the tax on scholarships (the law was passed in its first reading) and the abolition of tax on bachelors (the law was enacted) and succeeded in conjunction with the VLKSM Central Committee Finance and Budget Department in persuading the USSR Ministry of Finance to alter the procedure of taxation of the youth center wage fund, which was highly ruinous for them. Experiencing an acute shortage of scientific studies in the sphere of the youth economy (no one in the country is studying this in earnest), we enlisted young economists and entrepreneurs in the joint work and have prepared, on the basis of naked enthusiasm, proposals for the bills on the socialist enterprise and enterprise and organization taxation. However, to be candid, their acceptance by the Supreme Soviet is not assured inasmuch as the attitude of the majority of deputies in the Supreme Soviet toward questions of the youth's participation in the economy is cool, to put it mildly. You could sense this yesterday from M.S. Gorbachev's response in this connection. So it would be useful for the congress, within the framework of a debating center, to discuss these problems and adopt in this connection unambiguous resolutions with which it might be easier to get these amendments adopted.

We were among the first in the Supreme Soviet to begin preparation of the Employment Act, inasmuch as with the introduction of the market youth unemployment is becoming a reality, and also of the section on youth enterprise. We are thus attempting by this block of economic laws to legislatively enshrine the position and rights of the youth in the socioeconomic system of society.

There are deputies from the Komsomol also among the most active developers of the concept of military reform and the system of national (federal) security and there are members of the group tackling the problem of Soviet Germans. Small groups of our deputies went in the first days of the tragic events to Baku, Yerevan, and Fergana, and in Dushanbe R. Odzhiyev, a deputy from the Komsomol, was the leader of self-defense squads of the city and was in charge of protecting vitally important facilities of the city and the unloading of railroad cars. Incidentally, last summer, during the strikes in the Donbass, Deputy A. Tsarevskiy was the leader of a strike committee of Stakhanov, whereas all the city's party and soviet leaders had resigned.

During the year there was also a number of significant extra-parliamentary activities. The all-union charitable foundation "Intellect of the 21st Century," which could become the basis for an alternative system of education in the country, was formed with the active participation of VLKSM deputies. Five Komsomol deputies are members of the board of this foundation. Our representatives were also part of the preparatory committee of the All-Union Student Forum and our delegates to it were quite active. An inspection of the living, social, and recreational conditions of the students of VUZ's [higher educational institutions] in 240 VUZ's in 25 cities was conducted in conjunction with the USSR People's Control Committee. As a result, proposals pertaining to the updating of the normative base regulating these problems were formulated. The All-Union Maritime League was formed with the telling support of young deputies.

A decision to transfer the whole prosthetic industry to the Ministry of General Machine Building and the "Energiya" Production Association was adopted on the initiative and with the active participation of S. Chervonopiskiy. The 120 enterprises involved will be developed into 600 world-level prosthesis centers. The first models of our prostheses, on one of which a young Soviet woman of ours ran marathons in competitions in the United States, are already available.

The activity of the Komsomol deputies has assumed the most harmonious form in the committees and commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet: Some 33 people's deputies from the VLKSM are working in 15 of the 22 committees and commissions. The Youth Affairs Committee, in which 16 of the 39 members are deputies from the Komsomol, stands as a detached residence here. In nine months the committee has become a really operational parliamentary structure. Practically all the serious legislative innovations concerning the youth and an analysis of all (practically) bills from the viewpoint of the interests of the youth emanate from this committee. An offspring of this committee, to a large extent, was the passage in its first reading of the law "General Principles of Official Youth Policy in the USSR," which we attempted to push through an overburdened Supreme Soviet in six months in order to lay the foundations of youth policy and afford this process an opportunity to develop in the republics and oblasts at the local level. We have some possibilities of having this law enacted conclusively in this session even, but for this we will need also the effective and cogent support of the VLKSM Congress. I would like here to thank, on behalf of all the deputies, the authors of the law headed by D. Pollyeva and I. Ilinskiy. This group has altogether proven to be to a large extent a godsend for us under the conditions of the dearth of systemic knowledge of the youth, and we have continuously availed and continue to avail ourselves of its services.

Work in their own territories constitutes a considerable portion of the deputies' activity. Although this activity is not connected with the work of the group as a whole, it is for the majority of the deputies their main work, and mention has to be made of it, the more so in that there have been appreciable results here. Thus Bektas Mukhamedzhanov was the sponsor of the creation in Kazakhstan of an ecologically clean children's food industry and an ecological expert appraisal center within the framework of the Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement; in Chita Oblast Vladimir Gordeyev contributed to the creation of a youth vocational guidance center, joint ventures with companies of the United States and China, and the construction of two youth apartment houses; in Bratsk comprehensive ecological expert appraisal began with the active participation of Galina Belyakova of the USSR State Committee for Environmental Protection, and many deputies from the Komsomol managed to resolve issues concerning the construction of youth cooperatives. I could go on, but the congress would evidently agree that this activity cannot be expertly appraised here. This should remain wholly within the spectrum of the oblast and kray Komsomol organizations, which see the deputy's entire activity on the spot. I can only add to this that in the course of the reports of deputies from the VLKSM prior to the 21st congress not one plenum of a Komsomol oblast committee, kray committee or republic Central Committee made a negative evaluation of its deputy or demanded his recall. This is food for thought, with reference to the results of the activity of the group as a whole.

Permit me now to turn to an analysis of the activity and results of the group of USSR people's deputies from the VLKSM as some kind of system and integral organism. This, I believe, is what is most important for the congress on the question at issue.

To proceed from the classical outline of political activity, the Komsomol, in this situation, is a political organization with its own parliamentary faction, whose main mission is to defend the interests of its organization in parliament. The situation could provisionally be portrayed in the form of a pyramid, the main part of which (or the "brain"—the VLKSM Central Committee) is engaged in the formulation of its own policy and position on all the most important issues of social life, while the small and pointed apex (the group of Komsomol deputies—the "hands") is to push and realize these decisions in the structures of power. This is the classical outline. This is not what the Komsomol has in reality.

First of all, the Komsomol Central Committee, in our view, has proven incapable of performing the functions of a political body and brain of the whole structure shaping the program of the activity of its deputy faction. In the whole year the Central Committee found no opportunity to closely attend to and analyze the activity of its deputies and make some evaluations and changes. Only at a VLKSM Central Committee plenum at the end of the meeting's agenda was our report on our work at the congress heard and "noted" without analysis and discussion. Becoming a political organization in a moment is evidently not possible.

In the whole year the first secretary of the Central Committee participated only once in the work of the Youth Affairs Committee, and once in the work of the Supreme Soviet. The whole year the Central Committee plenums passionately discussed the situation in the Komsomol, failing to see the group of deputies as a powerful weapon for pursuing its policy and enhancing the authority of the VLKSM. The Central Committee was able to remain silent on every key political issue which excited all of society: the government's economic program, Articles 6 and 7 of the USSR Constitution, the nominees for the highest offices of state, the presidency, land, property, and questions of the federation. All this led to the group of deputies from the VLKSM participating directly in the discussion and adoption of these issues and being called on to defend the interests of the organization while finding itself totally deprived of the organization's viewpoint. Can you imagine a harmoniously operating group of fellow thinkers without a unifying goal and clear tactical aims? As far as the instructions of the VLKSM Central Committee are concerned, this is a good document, but it served to meet other ends and represents a declaration of the political principles of the Komsomol, not the tactics of the activity of the parliamentary group.

Some people will ask, possibly: Where is your common sense and political convictions? Each deputy has all this, and all this undoubtedly influences the decisions which are made.

As regards political convictions, I may say the following. Our deputies raised the question concerning Articles 6 and 7 of the USSR Constitution at the Second Congress of People's Deputies and prior to it also, but were not understood or supported either in the Central Committee or at the congress. Three or four months go by, and these changes are being implemented. At the second congress we did not support the government program and presented our own concept, but once again failed to meet with understanding and were unable to have our say at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, and even KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA presented our appeal with sizable cuts and ambiguous comment. This government program lasted four months. We are by no means fortunetellers, many of you saw this. It was simply that we stated our position and would have liked to have been able to count here on the support of the Komsomol Central Committee.

It is not, after all, a question of a deputy determining his position at will but of a parliamentary faction connected in a sense with its political organization. In addition, the deputy is quite a powerful and costly resource, and it is simply wasteful using him under free flight and self-loading conditions, it is just the same as a cargo hold transporting air.

So, in our view, an efficient parliamentary group may take shape only when it is based on a political organization with a clear-cut position, when it is presented with practicable assignments and when it answers for their accomplishment to the organization.

Analyzing the situation further, we must come to the following question: What, in fact, does the apex of the classical pyramid—the group of USSR people's deputies from the VLKSM—represent and is it capable generally of performing the assignments entrusted to it and acting as a system?

The roots of the group's condition today are to be found in the sources of its origins. Inasmuch as the law did not allow election by Komsomol district, which would have been the lesser evil, the VLKSM Central Committee Plenum was faced with practically "blind" elections: Initially 102 out of 207 candidates were elected in three days, and after six weeks of a virtually ineffective election campaign, 75 deputies out of 98. The artificiality of the situation was manifested in the fact that there was a shift in the election criteria: Account was taken not so much of the candidate's readiness for parliamentary activity as of his resume and affiliation to this territory or the other. This is not the fault but the problem of the Central Committee inasmuch as it is impossible to conduct elections otherwise in three days. There were also, unfortunately, attempts to decide matters through "peaceful negotiation": You are on our side, we are on your side. Such elements of group egotism led to such striking personalities as Sotnikov, Pollyyeva, Bek, Vecherov and many interesting Komsomol officials, who would have occupied a fitting place not only in the group but, I believe, in the USSR Supreme Soviet also, not fitting into the Procrustean electoral bed. But what this amounts to is the authority of the Komsomol, which everyone aspires to enhance.

The group got together for the first time shortly after the elections (we need here to make something clear and to pay tribute to the VLKSM Central Committee leadership: We are the sole group of deputies with excellent conditions (and we avail ourselves of them) for getting together prior to the congresses and sessions for the purpose of preparing documents and consultations with scholars and politicians, up to and including Politburo members). It was there, with common consent, that the principles of the group's activity were determined: the sovereignty of each deputy, reflection of the interests of the youth and consensus in the adoption and implementation of decisions. We considered important respect for one another and a renunciation of all organizational-compulsory structures within the group, counting on each deputy's good will and desire to work.

However, circumstances have evolved in such a way that today we have 20-40 deputies (depending on the situation) working in a group (precisely, in a group) regularly and, alas, 10-15 deputies whose names I have been unable to remember.

I would request here that all those who are now inwardly indignant and itching for a fight listen to the reasons for this situation and not shoot from the hip.

We should put among the objective factors first of all the absence of a firm position behind us (I have already spoken about this). When there are no clearly expressed demands on and criteria pertaining to the results of the group's activity and nothing binds the group, it also decomposes both quantitatively and qualitatively. Second, the possibility of working together in Moscow is quite severely limited in connection with the location of the majority of the deputies permanently at their place of work, the great distances and their commitment to local problems. This is a birthmark of our semi-professional parliament. Third, a toll has evidently been taken by a disregard for organizational matters within the group and also the inadequate provision of resources: The working apparatus of the group of people's deputies from the USSR consists of three senior officials of the Central Committee, who hardly have time to receive and send telegrams and copy documents. However, it should be said here that with the aid of this group and Komsomol Central Committee funds we have been able to organize the work of expert counsel more or less satisfactorily, as a result of which we have obtained the results of independent expert appraisal (frequently alternative) of the bills of interest to us.

As far as the subjective factors, that is, the extent of the readiness and sense of responsibility of each deputy, are concerned, I have to make something clear here. This is an extremely important matter which disturbs everyone, but neither I nor, I believe, any other deputy has the right to speak about this on moral and ethical grounds since to do so he would have to be a paragon of decency and professionalism, which is impossible. Do not force us, you will excuse me, to undress one another in front of you; do not set us at odds with one another. This by no means signifies, however, that the matter should be dropped. It is simply that it is your job as voters to learn what the "fruit" of this deputy or the other is. However, inasmuch as this question is in the air and some congress delegates have come with categorical instructions and opinions in this connection I will permit myself to express my personal viewpoint since I have an idea of a deputy's activity and the group and its composition.

First of all, practically all people's deputies (not only from the VLKSM) found themselves insufficiently prepared for parliamentary activity, which is perfectly understandable. This fact prompted the bulk of the deputies to upgrade their professionalism and competence, and caused some of them, unfortunately, to become demoralized. In addition, mention has to be made, alas, of instances of indiscipline on the part of certain deputies manifested in a disregard for joint actions, get-togethers, and participation in the preparation of documents.

As you can see, this aspect is just as important as it is punctilious. It requires great attention on your part and the adoption of measures, the recall of deputies, perhaps, but does not allow for an indiscriminate and rash approach.

Permit me, in conclusion, to draw certain conclusions and make certain suggestions. Do not think me importunate but I would like you, the congress and future Central Committee or another steering body to recognize that you possess a strong, at least potentially, medium for the realization at the highest state level of your own policy via "your people" in parliament. To achieve this it is necessary to become earnestly involved in the formulation of this very policy and to determine in what direction, for what reason and with whom to go and also, with the known means mentioned earlier, to stimulate the activity of your deputy corps.

As far as the mechanisms for realizing these intentions are concerned, I see a need here for, first, a prudent, flexible structuring of the group of deputies with an attachment to USSR Supreme Soviet committees and commissions with the organization of internal and external relations; second, the determination at Central Committee plenums prior to congresses and hearings in the USSR Supreme Soviet of positions on all key issues; third, the direct interaction of Komsomol Central Committee commissions with the corresponding groups of deputies from the Komsomol; fourth, the formation of a special political and legal commission of the Komsomol Central Committee which would express in concentrated fashion the political essence of the Komsomol and interact in integrated manner with the group of deputies from the VLKSM; and fifth, regular reports of the group and individual deputies at plenums and in commissions of the VLKSM Central Committee, at which you would determine who's who and adopt measures.

In addition, we have in this time accumulated certain experience of deputy's work and could, therefore, on the basis of consensus, interact with groups of young deputies in the republic and oblast soviets, creating to our mutual benefit a perpendicular [vertikal] for youth deputies. In this case the political and legal commission, which could incorporate several deputies and its apparatus, could be the methods center for the organization of the activity of the youth groups in soviets of various levels.

I would like in summation to say the following.

The activity of the group of deputies from the VLKSM contains certain experience and results and certain shortcomings and problems of both an objective and subjective nature. At the same time, however, the group of deputies is a most powerful weapon in intelligent hands. We see the shift in the center of gravity in Komsomol activity to political questions (struggle for seats in representative bodies and the use of them) as a serious and, possibly, the sole opportunity for the Komsomol to renew itself and survive, as a political organization, at least. It is essential to differentiate between the ends of activity—policy—and the means of achieving them—intra-league and other questions—and order priorities correctly.

We are ready and willing to work together with you in this and hope as a minimum for understanding, as a maximum, for support on your part.

Komsomol Secretary Views Draft New Rules

90US0799B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 13 Apr 90 pp 3-4

[Speech by V. Zyukin, secretary of the VLKSM Central Committee, at the 12 April session of the 21st VLKSM Congress; time of day not specified]

[Text] Dear Comrades! We have to adopt decisions which are fundamental for the future of the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] and each of its organizations. A particular place in them is occupied by the VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] Rules which regulate the entire set of intra-league relations and determine the underlying principles and norms of the life and activity of the Komsomol and the organizations which are members of it.

The draft new rules were almost a year in preparation. They were prepared by a special commission of the VLKSM Central Committee drawn from the ranks of members of central elective bodies and representatives of all the union republics.

What tasks did it set itself?

First, taking into consideration in the rules the transitional period being experienced by the country and the new processes occurring in society and the youth movement, and therefore making the VLKSM model the most flexible possible, having embedded in them self-regulating mechanisms promoting the organization's self-development and making it possible to reorganize itself into a movement and preventing destructive tendencies.

Second, bringing the statutory rules of the VLKSM's life and activity into line with the requirements of modern Komsomol practice.

Third, creating statutory guarantees for the realization of a new, democratic type of youth organization.

From the very first stage of preparation of the new rules the commission attempted to make the maximum use of the intellectual, creative potential of the whole Komsomol, accumulating all the standpoints and views on the future of the VLKSM which had taken shape and which are emerging.

The Komsomol organizations have been notified constantly and extensively of the work that is being done. It is sufficient to observe that as the draft was elaborated, amplified, and supplemented in the pre-congress period, it was published four times in the newspaper KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA.

Importance for the increased constructiveness and substantiation of the draft was attached to the additions submitted by delegates to the 21st VLKSM Congress at regional meetings.

A number of experiments pertaining to the formation of the elective bodies, the creation of Komsomol organizations according to the principle of function, a change in the structure of the Komsomol city and rayon committees, and determination of the optimum system of registration of VLKSM members was conducted in the Komsomol organizations of the country to hone the new organizational mechanisms for their subsequent enshrinement in the rules.

The draft new VLKSM Rules submitted for your attention were shaped, on the whole, in this atmosphere of collective creativity, the interlinkage of various opinions and extensive glasnost. They were examined in very great detail in the council of representatives of the delegations to the 21st VLKSM Congress. The congress delegates have the council's proposals pertaining to additions and alterations to the draft VLKSM Rules.

Before turning to a specific description of the draft VLKSM Rules, we consider it necessary to notify the delegates of the concept for the model of the league by which the VLKSM Central Committee commission was guided.

The essence of the concept for the model of a renewed Komsomol, which was shaped collectively, is that the VLKSM should be a youth organization with a clear-cut political program and a high level of intra-league democracy and structured with regard for the specifics of the state and social arrangement and the possibility of self-development.

This was the predominant view formed on the basis of the more than 17,000 proposals and 38 drafts which were received.

For the radical renewal of the league the draft realized the following main approaches:

first, the affirmation and assurance of the real freedom and rights of VLKSM members in the organization;

second, establishment of the genuine priority of the primary Komsomol organizations;

third, an extension of the democratism of all intra-league relations and the precise delineation of the authority of the center and the union republic LKSMs [Leninist Communist Youth Leagues] and local organizations;

fourth, removal of the ossification and predetermination in the composition of the Komsomol and creation of the necessary flexibility and receptivity to new features in its organizational composition.

Tackling these tasks, we deemed it necessary to enshrine in the rules only the general principles and norms necessary to ensure the coordination of the action of the VLKSM's constituent organizations and to guarantee the democratism of intra-league relations. One further common approach was the exclusion from the draft of the surfeit of procedural issues, a package of draft possible resolutions of the 21st VLKSM Congress of a statutory nature being proposed for this.

The organizational foundations of intra-league life were changed fundamentally and infused with new democratic content in this connection. The set of provisions contained in the previous rules and constituting the principle of democratic centralism has been transformed into a new democratic system of intra-league relations. Of all the proposed changes here, we shall distinguish three most important points.

First, the establishment of the truly democratic nature of the relations of the majority and the minority. You know that there have been a great many arguments in this connection. In our opinion, the optimum version has now been found: The interests of the majority are secured by its right to speak and act on behalf of the entire organization and its right to dispose of its property; the interests of the minority, on the other hand, are expressed in the right to uphold its position, appealing to public opinion, structure itself organizationally within elective bodies, engage in activity which is not in conflict with the rules, and determine its position organizationally, up to and including secession.

Realization of these provisions will be an important condition of the self-development of the VLKSM and each organization and will make it possible to create, in the good sense, creative competition in the interests of the common cause.

Second, an appreciable addition is made to the statutory provision concerning the binding nature of the decisions of the higher for the lower organizations. It is contemplated that this provision will operate only in cases where the decisions of the higher authorities have been adopted by them within the limits of the competence with which these authorities have been endowed by the lower organizations themselves.

It is frequently asked: "How will the lower organizations determine the competence of the higher authorities?" In our view, a pretty good example here is the draft resolution of our congress entitled, "Functions and Authority of the VLKSM Central Committee and the Bureau and the Secretaries and Apparatus of the VLKSM Central Committee," which is offered to you. This is a realization of the new provision of the rules at VLKSM Central Committee level. Union republic LKSM congresses and Komsomol organization conferences and meetings could do likewise.

In this connection I would like to call your attention to the third innovation, which, among other things, corresponds to what has been said above. Practically no disagreement has been evoked by the new provision to the effect that a delineation of the competence of the higher and elective bodies is established within the VLKSM and that the functions and authority of the elective bodies are determined by a decision of the VLKSM congress and the corresponding congresses of the union republic LKSMs and Komsomol organization conferences and meetings.

Now about questions of membership in the league. We would note first of all that the fundamental position of the new rules is preservation of single membership of the Komsomol. This is not only a factor of our unification in an all-union organization but, what is most important, a guarantee of the equal rights of VLKSM members, regardless of their place of work, service, study and residence.

In accordance with the general process of democratization of the statutory provisions and numerous proposals, it is contemplated introducing in practice so-called "free withdrawal" from the VLKSM. It is envisaged in this connection that membership in the league may be terminated in accordance with the wishes of a Komsomol member after he has notified his primary organization of this in writing and has handed in his Komsomol card.

The pivotal idea of the draft is the establishment in the league of the real priority of the primary Komsomol organizations. They are endowed with the plenitude of rights, some of which in their own interests they voluntarily delegate to regional Komsomol authorities.

The proposed provisions determine that the primary organizations independently decide all questions of their life and activity, concerning membership in the Komsomol included, determine the structure and periodicity of meetings, dispose of their financial resources and property, are legal entities and engage in publishing activity.

For a broadening of Komsomol members' possibilities in the unification of their efforts considerable importance will be attached, together with the production principle for the creation of primary organizations, to their formation on the basis of affinity of socially significant interests of the VLKSM members—by categories of the youth, for the realization of socially significant programs, in political clubs and ecology formations, and so forth.

In addition, the introduction of this provision creates conditions in our organization for the birth and development of a new, so-called "club" system of composition, whereby, depending on the specific features of the club, the VLKSM could act as the basis on a par with the primary organizations.

It is anticipated that these organizations will not only be a part of the corresponding territorial organizations but could also unite in regional, all-union societies and associations, which would make it possible, on the one hand, to make the composition of the VLKSM more flexible and, on the other, to consolidate and coordinate the work of such organizations on the problems of interest to them and in the accomplishment of tasks common to the whole Komsomol.

The commission believes that this entire set of provisions pertaining to the primary organizations will create the conditions for the efficient and normal functioning of both the primary components and the league as a whole. No one and not one higher body will be able to limit the rights of the primary organization.

As distinct from the rules currently in effect, the draft shapes for the first time the foundations of a federative arrangement of the Komsomol. The new processes occurring in society, the renewal of the Soviet federation and the formation of a Russian LKSM are confronting us with the task of making appreciable changes and additions to the statutory provisions regulating the mutual relations and rights of the union republic LKSM and the VLKSM Central Committee.

The draft enshrines primarily the inalienable right of the union republic LKSMs in the sense of their being voluntary, independent, social, and political organizations of the youth of the union republics and exclusively on the basis of a voluntary and equal approach uniting in the VLKSM and participating in the solution of all-Komsomol questions via guaranteed representation in the higher and central elective bodies of the Komsomol.

While having voluntarily associated with others, each league preserves in full its rights and independence. But in the name of common interests and proceeding from the need to accomplish tasks common to the whole league and to solve youth problems at a statewide level, they form central elective bodies of the VLKSM and voluntarily endow them with the corresponding rights and authority, which are collectively formulated and enshrined in the decisions of the congress and the VLKSM Rules.

Consequently, whereas the union republic LKSMs recognize the necessity and expediency of such association and jointly determine common positions and affirm them in fundamental documents, the draft stipulates that they are guided by the program and rules which they have adopted and the decisions of the VLKSM congress. In sum the aggregate of these documents represents in essence and in content a union treaty between the union republic LKSMs, proposals pertaining to the elaboration of which were expressed in the pre-congress debate.

The renewal and infusion with real content of the federative principle of the composition of the VLKSM required the insertion in the rules of supplements concerning guarantees of the sovereignty of the union republic LKSMs. This is ensured in the draft by precise determination of the competence and authority of the VLKSM Central Committee and the direct representation of the union republic LKSMs in the VLKSM Central Committee and Central Committee Bureau and also by their right to withdraw from the VLKSM, a decision on which is adopted according to the results of a referendum.

Considering this and other circumstances, we consider it necessary simultaneously with the adoption of the VLKSM Rules to determine also certain organizational-statutory matters in connection with their adoption. You have them in the draft resolution of the congress, which is appended to the rules. Specifically, it is proposed to form a commission of the 21st Komsomol Congress which, in conjunction with the VLKSM Central Committee, regulates and removes the contradictions in the draft rules and enforceable documents of the union republic LKSMs and, if necessary, studies the expediency of new alterations to the Komsomol Rules with regard for the formation of the normative base of the LKSMs.

If in the course of this work it is necessary to appreciably revise the concept of the league adopted by this congress, the VLKSM Central Committee and the congress commission could be entrusted with convening an all-union Komsomol conference or VLKSM congress.

In renewing the model and organizational composition of the league we believe that fundamental significance here should be attached to enhancing the status of the Komsomol organizations of the autonomous formations. For this purpose the draft proposes the conversion of the oblast organizations in autonomous republics into republic organizations and the election in them of republic Komsomol committees and also the assurance of the direct representation of the Komsomol organizations of the autonomous republics, oblasts, and okrugs at the time of the election of delegates to congresses and the formation of the VLKSM Central Committee.

Comrades!

Appreciable changes have been occurring recently in the Komsomol organizations of the USSR Armed Forces. Collegial bodies: The All-Army Council of Komsomol Organizations and the corresponding councils of army formations have been formed for the first time on a democratic basis.

The reform of the political system and the introduction of a multiparty structure have given rise to debate concerning problems of the army Komsomol. Proposals for the abolition in the rules altogether of the section on Komsomol organizations in the armed forces are being heard also. The position of the commission and the VLKSM Central Committee on these matters is as follows: The Komsomol of the armed forces is today the sole institution exercising social protection of the young soldiers. In addition, we deem it impermissible to deprive by some decree, even if this be a decision of the

VLKSM congress, millions of young men of the opportunity of membership in the VLKSM. The activity of the Komsomol organizations of the armed forces has specific distinguishing features and is organized in accordance with the VLKSM Program and Rules and also the regulations adopted by the all-army Komsomol conference. And the representatives of these Komsomol organizations should themselves primarily determine their future.

The section "VLKSM Property" which is formulated in the draft was supported, in the main, in the course of the discussion. It is determined on this basis that the Komsomol organizations and their elective authorities, from the primary upward, exercise the competence of proprietor (possession, use, disposal) in relation to the part of the VLKSM property which is formed at their level. It is determined here that in the event of an organization's withdrawal from the VLKSM, the question of the organization's property is settled by it with its higher elective body.

If these proposals are aggregated with the property proposals which were expressed in the report of the first secretary of the VLKSM Central Committee, the optimum version of the question concerning VLKSM property may be determined.

Comrades! We are grateful to all who have displayed concerned participation in the preparation of the draft VLKSM Rules.

In conclusion, I would like to say, that in the opinion of the commission, the VLKSM Central Committee and many delegates to the congress, the proposed draft new rules contain a basis for radically changing our league and making it a proper youth organization participating in the social and political rearrangement of the country.

Komsomol Auditing Commission Issues Report

90US0798A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 13 Apr 90 p 2

[Report by N. Klykov, chairman of the VLKSM Central Auditing Commission, to 11 April 21st VLKSM Congress]

[Text] Comrade delegates!

In defining the directions of activity and the criteria of evaluations, the Central Auditing Commission proceeded from the conclusions of the 20th Congress of the VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] concerning the necessity of decisively eliminating negative phenomena and contradictions in the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League].

It was noted three years ago that "we do not have any kind of preparatory time for perestroyka," and "the main responsibility for clearing the obstructions of bureaucracy and formalism rests with the Central Committee of the VLKSM." The Central Auditing Commission regarded these requirements of the congress as its own.

Today we especially acutely understand how important and timely these requirements were.

The reports of the Central Committee and the VLKSM Central Auditing Commission show the work on the fulfillment of the decisions of the 20th VLKSM Congress, the measures undertaken to debureaucratize the union, the establishment of systems of economically accountable associations and centers, and the formation of mechanisms for the realization of the interests of the youth. It is more important today to dwell on unresolved problems in order to be able to take them into account in the future.

Indeed, the critical comments, proposals, and letters that arrive from the localities speak to the fact that it was not possible to effect changes in the Komsomol, especially in the primary elements, or even in the Central Committee, in a fundamental way.

The materials of our control and auditing show that the requirements of the 20th congress to decisively put an end to excessive paperwork once again turned in practice into an increase in paper-shuffling in the Central Committee and its apparatus. The apparatus got even more bogged down in the preparation of plans, programs, and resolutions, and the elective organs of the Central Committee in their consideration. Thus, democratization turned out to be a new bureaucratism where pressing work began to get lost in continuous and, it seemed, urgent sessions, seminars, conferences, and meetings. This kind of tendency did not leave time for organizational work, and it did not allow the Central Committee to express its position in a timely way or to exercise control over the fulfillment of its resolutions. Therefore, many of them remained nothing more than declarations. For example, the Fourth VLKSM Central Committee Plenum approved a decision on improving information support in the Komsomol. This is simply necessary in a period of an information boom, the development of computer equipment, and the optimization of administration. A year and a half has already passed, and the matter is practically not moving. Twice, at the Fourth and Fifth Plenums of the VLKSM Central Committee, instructions were given to the Secretariat and the Bureau to develop a program to reinforce the financial condition of the Komsomol organization and to overcome the budget deficit. There were decisions, but there is no clarity on this question up to the present time.

Moreover, documents of the Central Committee were almost not getting through the multistage structure of Komsomol committees to the Komsomol members.

As a result, under the slogan of democratization, we began to move to a no-control-command system that was virtually unmanageable. Though this is an obvious result of the decentralization of the Union, when each of its elements becomes an independent organism with its own objectives, and which determines by itself the ways and means for achieving its own objectives.

Despite such very harsh conclusions, we are not trying to take the path of all-round criticism of the apparatus which embraced the Komsomol and society as a whole. The creative potential of the workers of the VLKSM Central Committee apparatus is very high. For the most part the personnel, who came from local Komsomol organizations, are competent.

The problem is not with the apparatus itself, but with its leadership. In our opinion, the VLKSM Congress and the new staff of the Central Committee must pay attention to a more efficient use of the potential of the apparatus, the optimality of its numerical strength, and the maximal subordination of its functions to the functions of the VLKSM Central Committee. Otherwise, it will once again be engaged in make-work. At the same time, in the interests of the entire union, there is also a need for substantial coordination of functions and an ability to coordinate the training, research, publication, and administrative establishments that are functioning here in the center, and also the cost accounting formations that are being aggressively developed.

Concerning Komsomol economics. There are some successes here, but a lot remains to be done for its improvement. In this regard, more prudent and consistent actions are necessary inasmuch as, under current conditions, they have a definite effect on the activity of the Komsomol.

The difficult financial situation we are now going through, and which we assess as critical, did not develop all of a sudden, and it is not possible to say that this was a complete surprise for us, the consequence of some kind of unpredictable or extreme conditions, and not the result of our own policy.

Given the sharp drop in the numerical strength of the VLKSM, and without seeking additional financial sources, a policy was continued until very recently to reinforce the staffs of city, rayon elements, and primary organizations. The growth of the wage fund for these purposes for the first two years after the 20th VLKSM Congress amounted to more than R80 million.

Substantial resources were invested in the maintenance and development of the material base and, in doing this, the volume of uncompleted construction was increased.

In our enterprises the mechanism of economic management became wasteful, and the economic levers and incentives worked poorly. Thus, in the "Orlenok" hotel system, the Central Auditing Commission uncovered internal economic reserves in the sum of more than R1 million.

After the 20th VLKSM Congress it was not possible to break the trend in increasing expenditure on the maintenance of the central apparatus. Under central apparatus we mean the workers of the VLKSM Central Committee, the Central Council of the All-Union V.I. Lenin Pioneer Organization, the USSR Committee of Youth Organizations, the VLKSM Central Auditing Commission, the VLKSM Central Archive, and the administrative management, which receive their wages from the budget of the VLKSM Central Committee. In three years (1987-1989), there was a reduction in force of officials. At the same time, the total number of workers increased as a whole.

Large expenditures not appropriate to the financial situation were planned under individual articles of the budget. It is realized that the Komsomol economy is in a stage of formation. The situation with the swelling managerial structure cannot be corrected through prohibitions. What is necessary is a flexible mechanism for managing financial-economic activity, optimally combining the independence of the Komsomol organizations and their cost accounting formations with coordination from the center, whose basis is economic methods of regulation.

Concerning control and control organs in the VLKSM. The pivotal idea of the proposed model of our union is not the person for the organization, but the organization for the person. So that this pyramid is not turned upside down, so that the organization does not again reach crisis manifestations, and so that it achieves its programmed objectives, it is absolutely obvious that a most important condition has to be adhered to—the establishment of a mechanism of restraint and disclosure and correction of errors, and, in the final analysis, the realization of the interests of Komsomol members.

Only in this case will the vital functions of the organization be determined, not by unerringly composed plans and programs but by an ability to correct them and to react to them in a timely way in a fast-changing situation. The basis of our approach is real control by the Komsomol member over the activity of elective organs.

The materials submitted in the Central Auditing Commission report show that, while supporting frankness in our organization, glasnost in work, and the pluralism of opinions, we realize with difficulty the need for control, and we react painfully to criticism, and also to specific proposals of the auditing commission to improve the activity of the Komsomol committees and their apparatuses.

The culmination of this nonacceptance was the resolution of the last Central Committee plenum, which I will quote word for word: "To consider it unsuitable to establish in the VLKSM—a democratic organization that is undergoing renewal—an unwieldy and parallel structure of control with its own organs and apparatus. To submit this viewpoint of the Central Committee for discussion at the 21st VLKSM Congress."

Practical steps, and not unsuccessful ones, to limit the sphere of influence of control and to reduce its role and significance were also taken previously, as we say, in the stagnant time. But the political decision on its actual elimination is being proposed, paradoxically enough, on a wave of democratic reorganizations in the Komsomol.

Here is the quite recent history.

At the beginning of the 1980's, on the initiative of the former leadership of the VLKSM Central Committee, the full-time post of chairman of the Central Auditing Commission was eliminated, and attempts were made to eliminate the apparatus as well. This was being done because the commission uncovered numerous cases of bad economic management, squandering of material and monetary resources, upward distortions of data and embezzlement, violations of procedures for distributing housing and vouchers, and machinations with hard currency.

In the VLKSM system, including subdivisions of the Central Committee, the sum of embezzled money amounted to about R500,000. In four and one-half years the prosecuting attorney, the Ministry of Finance, and the Party Control Commission of the CPSU Central Committee brought order to our Komsomol club. Hundreds of Komsomol workers were called to party, Komsomol, and administrative account. Many of them were convicted of a crime.

Only after this was the post of full-time chairman of the VLKSM Central Auditing Commission restored. Subsequently, the commission uncovered serious violations and shortcomings, and substantial reserves were found. According to the verification and auditing material, the VLKSM Central Committee made serious decisions, including organizational decisions on personnel of the economic services.

Today, proposals to eliminate control organs are being introduced at a time when gross violations of legislation and financial discipline in economic formations attached to Komsomol committees are far from being of an isolated nature. Now more than 4,000 are in operation, with a total volume of production and services of more than R2 billion.

Dozens of enterprises, organizations, and establishments that are subordinate to the center operate with a turnover in the hundreds of millions of rubles of financial and material means, and require continuous attention.

Thus, perhaps today, under conditions of a "renewing democratic organization..." we do not have problems, and everything can be decided on social principles, and the control organs have nothing to do? Far from it. The facts cited above show convincingly that, by ignoring control we are wittingly laying the groundwork for negative phenomena which, today, hurtfully strike the prestige of our Union.

At the congress it is necessary for us to answer the questions: Who needs control in our Union? Where did the wave for eliminating control organs originate?

Control is necessary to the Komsomol members: They form the elective organs for the realization of their interests, and they want to influence the activity of these organs practically. Did the Komsomol members raise at meetings and conferences the question of eliminating control organs and restricting their functions and rights? On the contrary, in their letters, proposals, and conference decisions on the results of the discussions of the documents concerning control, they recommend strengthening it and broadening the functions and rights of control organs.

Proposals for their elimination or restriction come from individual workers of the Komsomol apparatus whose activity, first of all, is controlled, and I do not think that these proposals will contribute to the prestige of the VLKSM or the Central Committee.

Previously, local auditing commissions, not having full-time chairman, were practically inactive. And this suited many people.

The Eighth VLKSM Plenum decided to broaden the power of the auditing commissions and to reinforce them with personnel. But now, when the commissions are getting on their feet and are beginning really to influence the state of affairs, they are encountering opposition.

Is the control structure, with its organs and apparatus, really unwieldy, as the last Central Committee plenum determined?

Basically, this is one to two workers of the auditing commission in an oblast, and in some places not even one, and eight officials of the Central Auditing Commission apparatus. Meanwhile 105,000 permanent workers, and more than 100,000 workers in cost accounting formations attached to Komsomol committees work in Komsomol organizations of the country; and more than 16,000 work on farms, enterprises, and establishments that are subordinate to the Central Committee.

I do not think that comments are needed here.

Uncontrolled power, as the saying goes, corrupts even a saint. But the specific character of our own organization: Substantial changes of personnel, their inexperience and maximalism in some places, and at times a reckless attempt at innovation, require the creation of a counterbalance which would restrain us from negative manifestations. There cannot be a democratic organization without some degree of democratic control, control of the Komsomol members themselves and of their representatives.

Changes that are occurring in the Komsomol and problems that exist in the central and local elective organs have required from us a review of the opinions concerning control-auditing activity and its place and role in the VLKSM.

The intent of our proposals is to fill the activity of the control organs with a new content: not to control only the results of already accomplished work, not to go over and over again that which can hardly be changed, but to participate in the development of decisions when the grounds for future results present themselves. For example, in the preparation of decisions for the development of economic activity in the Komsomol, no study was made of questions of organizational and economic-legal support and control. Now, however, without a mechanism for regulation and influence, we are reacting "helter-skelter" to telecasts and newspaper publications and the reports of investigative organs concerning problems that exist here.

The intent of our proposals is not to control just narrow procedural questions but to come out as an advocate and guarantor of putting into practice new statutory norms and democratic principles in our organization.

In reporting on the state of affairs to the delegates of the congress we are not trying to cancel the great work that the Central Committee and its apparatus have accomplished in this very difficult period. Although the Central Auditing Commission did not attempt to come to absolute conclusions but rather to propose specific measures, we self-critically evaluated our contribution, which we talked about in greater detail in the report.

The experience of past VLKSM congresses indicate that Central Auditing Commission reports are approved virtually without discussion. We propose that the delegates break this "tradition," and that they render their own evaluations and comments on the findings and proposals of the commission.

Mausoleum Arsonist Reportedly Lithuanian

PM0105093590 Moscow TRUD in Russian
1 May 90 p 4

[A. Trushin report under the "We Report the Details" rubric: "Incident at the Mausoleum"]

[Text] Moscow—We have already reported that an unknown person hurled two cans of gasoline at the parapet of the V.I. Lenin Mausoleum at 1920 on 28 April, in front of the Muscovites and visitors to the city gathered on Red Square.

The fire was quickly put out. The mausoleum did not suffer any damage. The incendiary was detained by personnel from the department guarding public order on Red Square. At first he flatly refused to answer questions asked by the law-enforcement personnel. What has been found out now? We put the question to L. Belyanskiy, deputy chief of Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee Internal Affairs Main Administration:

[Begin Belyanskiy recording] The man we arrested is called Kazimir Ilich Almazov, born in 1941, of Lithuanian descent. Since he had no documents on him and he is still concealing his address, these are only preliminary data which need additional checks. [end recording]

An initial psychiatric examination right after the crime revealed no mental abnormalities. An additional examination to be carried out soon will produce conclusive findings. The arsonist is now in the detention center at Butyrki; criminal proceedings have been instituted against him under Article 206, Section 2.

Biryukova on Kremlin Medical Arrangements

PM3004092190 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 27 Apr 90 First Edition p 3

[Report on interview with A.P. Biryukova, (candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and) deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Bureau for Social Development, by TASS correspondent A. Aladinskiy; place and date not given: "An Act of Justice"]

[Text] In accordance with proposals made by the Commission of Privileges, the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for the Protection of the People's Health, and the USSR People's Control Committee, which were made at the second Congress of USSR People's Deputies, institutions and organizations in the USSR Health Ministry Fourth Main Administration were transferred to general use. TASS correspondent A. Aladinskiy asked A.P. Biryukova, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Bureau for Social Development, to comment on this fact.

[Biryukova] Yes, the Fourth Main Administration, which recently was the "talk of the town," has indeed been eliminated. Government members' opinion was clear when we examined this question—the Fourth Administration could not continue to exist in its present form.

This administration appeared in 1953, when it was transformed from the Kremlin medical and sanitation administration, which among the people was simply called the Kremlin Hospital. The sanitation administration, which was formed in 1919 on the personal instructions of Vladimir Ilich, provided medical assistance only for government members and their families living within the Kremlin and for people's commissars and their deputies. Then it gradually expanded and subsequently began to serve leading personnel of all union ministries and departments and social organizations, eminent scientists, cultural workers, figures from the art world, and foreign ambassadors, in addition to government and CPSU Central Committee members. Family members, including children, also registered at the administration accordingly.

But it would be untrue to say that only the "privileged upper strata" received medical assistance at the Fourth Administration. War invalids and participants and many labor veterans holding the medal "For distinguished labor during the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945" were also treated here. In addition, foreign citizens—representatives of communist and workers' parties, literary and arts figures, and activists from foreign societies for friendship with the USSR—were examined and treated every year in the Fourth Main Administration institutions. Around 20 percent of those who were treated at the Fourth Administration Central Clinical Hospital were people who were not on that administration's books. Of the 60,000 people annually who stayed at health resorts belonging to the administration, half were workers and employees of scientific research organizations that did not belong to the system served by the Fourth Administration. For example, workers from Rostovugol and Gukovugol and the Southern Machine-Building Plant in Dnepropetrovsk, various enterprises in Kuybyshev, and from the Kama Truck Plant and the Volga Automobile plant took convalescence or treatment at administration resort sanatoriums last year.

[Aladinskiy] What material resources were at the Fourth Main Administration's disposal? And what was involved in the transfer act, if I can put it like that?

[Biryukova] It consisted of three health centers, three hospitals, and a maternity hospital. In addition, the main administration had 19 sanatoriums and seven rest homes with 5,500 places.

Today, a significant proportion of the administration's medical and treatment institutions have been transferred to general use and turned into medical diagnostic and rehabilitation centers for children, invalids, and war and labor veterans.

Thus, a consultation and diagnosis center for children living in the Sokolnicheskiy and Baumanskiy Rayons of Moscow has been organized in the building of the former health center for children. About 10,000 children have already been examined at the center in the period from 18 September 1989 through 1 February 1990 on referral from rayon health centers. Almost half of them received the necessary treatment, in addition to consultative and diagnostic assistance.

The maternity hospital building with all its equipment has been handed over to the needs of Moscow's health service. It now houses one of the women's consultation services in the capital's Kievskiy Rayon. Another health center has also been handed over to the USSR Health Ministry.

The combined hospital and health center on Michurinskiy Avenue has also been transferred to the USSR Health Ministry so that an All-Union Diagnostic Clinical Center can be set up there. Citizens from all over the country will be able to get examination and treatment there. The center's approximate throughput is 220,000-250,000 people a year.

Thirteen well-equipped sanatoriums and rest homes have been transferred to the authority of the USSR Health Ministry, the V.I. Lenin Soviet Children's Trust, and the Leningrad Gorispolkom [City Soviet Executive Committee]. They include the "Dubovaya Roshcha" sanatorium in Zheleznovodsk, the S.M. Kirov sanatorium in Stavropol Kray, the Herzen and "Ilinskiy" sanatoriums in Moscow Oblast, and others. Around 24,000 people can be treated there annually.

Incidentally, over 2,000 children have already stayed in the five children's sanatoriums that were transferred in September-October of last year, including 648 children and their parents from Gomel and Bryansk Oblasts who suffered as a result of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Electric Power Station. The "Ay-Danil" sanatorium, under the USSR president's decree, will now only take in children and their parents from regions that suffered as a result of the Chernobyl tragedy.

Altogether 16 medical institutions and health resorts belonging to the former Fourth Main Administration, worth a total of nearly R180 million, have been transferred to the USSR Health Ministry, the Leningrad Gorispolkom, and the Soviet Children's Trust, together with 15 state dachas in Livadia, Gagry, Palanga, and the Moscow region. In addition, auxiliary institutions have been transferred: motor pools, canteens, farms attached to the sanatoriums, and construction organizations.

Bearing in mind the recommendations of the Commission on Privileges, the existing conditions for material and technical protection and personnel pay, and the calculated norms for spending on food and medicines, have been retained.

[Aladinskiy] And yet the need remains for regular, comprehensive medical supervision and treatment for members of the government and the USSR Supreme Soviet and for people's deputies. In the name of the same social justice, the huge expenditure of mental, nervous, and physical strength that is required today in the activity of leadership and the strenuous regime in which state leaders have to work must be taken into account. According to figures from the same Health Ministry, the incidence of illness among USSR Council of Ministers personnel is three times the national average. In that case, is the standardized "leveling down" fair?

[Biryukova] I think that that would clearly be unfair. Particularly since the departmental network of medical treatment institutions is developing today in all sectors of the national economy. At the same time, I would like to note that the conditions in the majority of departmental medical units, such as the medical centers in the Lenin Komsomol Motor Vehicle Plant, the Likhachev Motor Vehicle Plant, the Verkh-Isetskiy Metallurgical Plant in Sverdlovsk Oblast, the "Atlant" Association in Minsk, and the "Trekhgornaya Manufaktura" combine, are no worse than they were in the Fourth Administration's special clinics. The difference might be that they have no carpets or expensive chandeliers. But is that the point?

A decision has been made to set up a USSR Council of Ministers medical association on an economically accountable basis. It will give medical assistance to people who are employed in state activity. The functions of this association will include serving the USSR Congresses of People's Deputies, the CPSU Central Committee, members of the USSR Supreme Soviet, members of the Academy of Sciences Presidium, eminent scientists, and writers. For these deputies, four medical centers have now been created: one right inside the Supreme Soviet building, another in the building where the sessions of permanent commissions and committees are held, and two others in hotels where the people's deputies stay during sessions and congresses.

What remains under the new medical association's authority? One hospital, the Central Teaching Hospital and health center, where around 30,000 people will be registered, that is, fewer than half the previous number. They include all employees (including typists and other technical personnel) of the Council of Ministers, the Supreme Soviet, and the CPSU Central Committee, leaders of ministries, former party and government leaders who have retired, and war veterans. In addition, 11 sanatoriums and rest homes are being transferred to the direction of the medical and sanitation association.

Economic

'Fears' Over Market Economy Discounted

PM3004145790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Apr 90 Second Edition p 2

[Interview with Academician S.S. Shatalin and corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences N.Ya. Petrakov by M. Gurtovoy: "Step Toward Freedom"; first two paragraphs are editorial introduction; date and place of interview not specified]

[Text] The planned drastic shift toward a market economy has generated considerable fear in society. How founded are these fears, what has caused them, and what does in fact lie in store for us? Our correspondent spoke to Academician S.S. Shatalin and corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences N.Ya. Petrakov. Although one is a member of the country's Presidential Council and the other is the president's assistant, we asked them to voice their opinions not as official politicians but above all as well-known expert economists.

According to the academics, the step toward the market means a step toward freedom.

Petrakov: The roots of the suspicious attitude to the long-awaited changes are based in our history. We have created people with a nervous psychology. This is a very serious problem. It has been discussed at the Presidential Council. Freeloading and loss of initiative are the reverse side of the administrative system. Since the state dictates what to produce, whom to sell to, and what raw materials to use, people naturally form the following notion: "Since you know everything—feed me." Our propaganda proclaimed for decades: "The party will lead people to communism and plenty." That's patronage for you. Like children, the people are accustomed to expect to be fussed over, swaddled, and fed. But here we have to step into the world of free initiative, enterprise, and risk.

Shatalin: Those people who have for the last few years purposefully and, I think, deliberately tried to present the market as a bugbear for ordinary people bear considerable blame for these fears. They have depicted it as a kind of slave market where all of us will be sold into capitalist servitude. These were perhaps just honest delusions on the part of the authors, but more frequently they were the deliberate implementation of the propaganda element in a program to sabotage the changes. This sabotage is taking place in words and actions. As a scientist I am convinced of this. It is not only a feeling. The figures also indicate this. In the last two years the situation within the Soviet economy has clearly deteriorated, and we can now undoubtedly talk about a crisis. Stagflation is taking place. That is, we have stagnation in production, production is not increasing, and there is huge inflation with an unbalanced market to boot.

Radical economic reform was proclaimed politically, but extremely little has in fact changed. The main problem over the last two years being that, while abandoning planning and edict methods in the economy, or rather in an attempt to abandon them, we have failed to fill the economic vacuum with market methods of economic activity.

If there is no real radicalization of economic reform and if it is not brought close to the market, we will end up in a fraternal grave. Everyone who thinks that we can go backward is either hopelessly confused or ready to sacrifice the country for some gain.

But I believe that society is nonetheless gripped by the realization that the market is the only way out of the deadlock. It is well known that the Presidential Council represents a very broad spectrum of views. A tradition has developed during the Presidential Council's four sittings whereby everyone speaks. At the last sitting, everyone expressed the unequivocal opinion that the choice is clear. We must move toward an effective, regulated market economy with social protection for working people.

Petrakov: There is not indeed any alternative to the market. For many reasons. I will give three. The market is not the end in itself but the means of democratizing economic life. We say: "More democracy equals more socialism." The market will not conflict with socialism, and I do not know of another way of democratizing such a highly important sphere of public life. The market rouses people to work effectively. The administrative-edict has caused a setback here. There was a lack of drive and enthusiasm for a long time. Our history bears evidence of this. People can be subjected to repression for taking five ears of corn from the kolkhoz field and have big-stick discipline instituted. But you cannot force people to harvest 50 quintals of wheat per hectare through coercion.

Scientific and technical progress is yet another argument in favor of the market. It is only possible in conditions of competition and rivalry among producers, and amid the fight for customers.

Shatalin: The question of strategy has been raised. How are we to effect the transition? It is clear that we must minimize the cost of the transition to the market for all strata of the population. Perhaps we will all be able to avoid a price shock once we have gathered all our resources. At any rate the government's proposal suggests that prices for some categories of goods double or treble. I am sure that this can be avoided. Look at the extractive industry-end product. Chains of consumption. Anti-inflationary mechanisms can be constructed. We still have to work on a program. The stages need to be thought out better. Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov has said that there must not just be one option, there must be alternatives. You must not plunge into the market. You will drown. Some resources need to be collected for the consumer market. Many restrictions must be abolished and export-import policy changed.

Gurtovoy: In your view, how much time will it take to finalize the government program?

Shatalin: At least a month, even at our current position.

Gurtovoy: I think that this will somewhat reassure those people who interpreted the words "drastic shift" too literally. Remember, Mayakovskiy's naive streetcars which even continued their journey under socialism? There are people who believe that they will wake up to a market economy in the morning and the same streetcar ticket will then cost ten times the price.

Most debates about the market economy faltered over prices for probably no reason. After all, it is simple and even dangerous to just mechanically wipe out an old price list

Petrakov: Yes, that is one extremely simplified interpretation of the market: Let us issue prices and make enterprises completely independent. Something will turn up. This is not merely a delusion but a vulgarization of the market economy concept. Free prices also "operate" amid market competition. If we free prices and retain monopolism, that will only worsen the situation. We came up against this when we gave enterprises freedom of action. We either preserved their direct monopoly or the ministry monopoly. Prices immediately soared on the pretext of developing economic accountability. Thus, monopolism must be destroyed first of all. Sectoral ministries are the exact opposite of the market. Their existence is justified by the fact that it is impossible to buy various goods on the market. The minister realizes that he is needed because he can distribute these resources administratively in conditions of a shortage. It would be wrong to think that we can switch to the market using the current sectoral management structure. A sector ministry will not construct a market. That is suicide for it. The government has prepared working documents on antimonopoly legislation. But I am afraid that it may not work within the current structures. There is, for instance, a metallurgical ministry at present with its monopoly on steel smelting. We must either eliminate ministries or as a last resort completely change their functions. That is, they will offer enterprises marketing functions and make sectoral forecasts for scientific and technical progress—only when instructed, moreover. But this is also debatable. We have gotten carried away with cutting back the ministerial apparatus, but fundamentally different specialists are needed. Why keep the old sign? A switch to joint-stock forms of ownership is much more effective. There is a proposal to create a Supreme Soviet committee to manage joint-stock companies and an agency to control operations involving securities. In the next year or two it will be necessary to transform 2,200 enterprises in various sectors which account for up to 70 percent of fixed capital into joint-stock companies.

In our conditions this is the most feasible way of creating elements of competition within our economic system.

Gurtovoy: Biologists have a theory whereby evolution is no more than a movement toward greater freedom. Away from the ossification of an inorganic world toward universal freedom for modern man. What if we take the risk of extending this to the economy? Its progress represents greater freedom of choice...

Shatalin: Of course. Imagine our primitive feudal system of state ownership collapsing. You can work at an enterprise and own shares in it. You can work here and own shares in a neighboring enterprise. And you can remain a purely hired worker. You can offer your labor and estimate it at a definite sum. You may not want to be an owner; you may not want to take the risk. You have options.

The problem of ownership is not a question of academic philosophizing. It is a question of whether we can begin free enterprise tomorrow.

The economy only really begins to breathe if real owners appear. But in our country both the new laws and the party's congress platform proceed on the premise of the predominance of state ownership.

We proceed on the basis of "presumption of innocence" of state ownership. But it does bear blame. For the fact that we are bankrupts. We now want all other types of ownership to prove that they are no worse. Although private ownership has already shown its social usefulness worldwide, our state ownership has proved that it can bring the country "to the end of its tether."

Gurtovoy: So, we have a paradoxical situation. On the one hand we are not ready for market relations, psychologically, legally, or organizationally. On the other, we are at least two or three years late in introducing market relations.

On the one hand, whereas we have not dismantled, we have at any rate blockaded and virtually rendered the old managerial structures unworkable, and not created new ones...

Petrakov: Under these conditions, if we start by raising prices, that means really making them soar. This is both dangerous and ineffective. We must carry out a series of measures now to create forms of investment that the population finds attractive. We must open up new markets and allow people to invest their savings in production spheres through various forms of financing for enterprises, cooperatives, and farms. The whole money bomb now hangs over the consumer market.

The legalization of the black market in foreign currency is next in line. It must be sold to those who want it at a realistic rate of exchange. This is inevitable if we want to create economically open zones. And not fence them off.

Gurtovoy: Let us once again risk comparing the economic mechanism with the human mechanism. We can only avoid a hypertonic crisis and reduce the blood pressure by compelling capillaries throughout the body to "work" and receive more blood. And sport and saunas "cleanse" them. So you are proposing to cleanse the economic capillaries, and then they will accept the pressure of the money that has not been soaked up by commodities. And take it out of the consumer market.

Petrakov: This market itself has a host of possibilities. Why was the percentage price increase for gold and valuables determined by directive. Why not make prices for this group of commodities truly market-based? There would be no more lines outside jewelry stores or speculation. It is a pity that the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions is so frenziedly torpedoing the idea of commercial stores and auctions for luxury goods.

Gurtovoy: I cannot understand, incidentally, what interests working people have here. Are they being smothered with video equipment at stable prices? They would most probably not want to lose such delightful distributive levers and would like to be rulers of a rationed kingdom. I would not like to bypass such an acute question as our foreign economic ties. They have of late become the subject of purely malicious political speculation.

Shatalin: Let's take a broader view first. Some people reproach M.S. Gorbachev for the fact that perestroyka's foreign policy successes cannot compare with things at home. Certainly, the president should perhaps spend more time on the domestic economic situation. But how can one forget that it was this foreign policy that has enabled us to begin conversion and is saving billions of rubles from being incinerated in the military machine's furnaces. It is highly dangerous, murderous, disintegrating demagogy to set domestic against foreign policy. We are becoming part of a civilized world which once cut us off and tossed us aside with such vigor. This has given us our opportunity to learn and receive help from others.

I also voiced this viewpoint at the Presidential Council. We cannot cope without large-scale aid or—if we are continuing the play with words—large-scale cooperation. We need to import consumer goods, capital, brainpower, and ideas. This alarms many people. They say that we are dishing out our natural resources. But the whole world is becoming integrated. Transnational companies are being set up.

Gurtovoy: Let me cite a few figures. Foreign capital in the United States amounts to almost one-tenth. One-fourth of capital investments in the Common Market countries comes from outside.

Petrakov: Let us consider this problem in its most topical form. The shelves are empty because we work badly. And we work badly because, however much you earn, you can't buy anything. Is this a vicious circle? In my view, it must be broken by mass purchases of consumer goods from the West. If we continue to do this on a small scale, everything will still accumulate under the counters.

Our efforts must be channeled into creating sectors capable of producing output for export and exceeding the world level. That is how we can win a place in the world market. We—a country of forests—are suffering from a paper shortage. We sell whole timber to Finland and then receive paper back. Why not invest funds and scientific developments and export finished, high-value output?

There are obvious reserves. We are increasing purchases of feed grain abroad. Even the simplest calculations show that it is more effective to buy meat and not waste dollars in the bellies of unproductive livestock.

So I am convinced that we should not begin with prices but by forming a market. The main components being the whole series of measures aimed at monetary and financial recovery, demonopolization, and the creation of conditions for competition. The second batch being the creation of a market infrastructure. Only then can we say that prices should be freed from rigid state control.

I have already expressed this opinion in the press, and I am not afraid of repeating myself: We can and must do without pricing shock therapy. The state should take on the main burden of reform, by fundamentally cutting back all nonsocial expenditure.

Shatalin: Am I an optimist? Without doubt. I am inspired to believe that we are mastering the situation by the rate at which our culture has surged forward on barely the first mouthful of freedom. I remember the revulsion with which foreign intellectuals spoke about our nomenklatura-based social sciences and the barrack-room art of the times of stagnation. A professor colleague of mine recently said to me amid the stunning beauty and wealth of Paris, as if intoning an axiom: "The center of spiritual life is shifting to Moscow."

If the revival of our spiritual life could be that rapid, I am convinced that an economic Renaissance is also feasible.

PRAVDA Analyzes Industrial Figures

PM3004124590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Apr 90 Second Edition p 3

[Article by Yegor Gaydar under the rubric "Statistics: Analysis Without Embroidery": "What New in the Economy?"]

[Text] For a long time now it has been impossible to surprise anyone with unpleasant news about the situation in the national economy. Against the background of stormy discussions about what to do with prices, taxes, and social protection, fresh figures about what is actually happening in the economy retreat into the background. Many of our readers will probably not make a deep study of the results of the country's development in the first quarter cited by the USSR State Committee for Statistics, especially as all newspapers do not now reprint them by order. Yet it is worth being interested in statistics: The trends manifested in them exert far greater influence on the choice of fundamental political decisions than the most resonant statements in the press or even from the Supreme Soviet rostrum.

Last year fluctuations in the volume of industrial production according to the month graphically reflected the tension of the country's political life. From them one could see how the entire country had come to a standstill in front of the television sets, observing the work of the First Congress of People's Deputies; how the mass strikes began; how interethnic conflicts began to rend the already frail fabric of economic relations. By the end of the year an absolute reduction of industrial production had become a reality.

The trend toward the decline of production continued to operate in the first quarter of this year. During the time the GNP reduced one percent and industrial production declined 1.2 percent. Production declined most markedly in metallurgy (minus 2.5 percent) and the fuel and energy complex (minus 0.8 percent). Of the most important types of output it is worth noting a reduction in oil extraction (minus four percent), coal extraction (minus six percent), the production of mineral fertilizers (minus seven percent), soda (minus 10 percent), and synthetic resins and plastics (minus three percent).

It is precisely because the process of the reduction of production is unfamiliar to us that it is particularly important to reveal accurately the factors causing it.

Some of them lie on the surface—the mass strikes. While in September last year, when the miners' strike reached its peak, an average of 100,000 people a day were not working, in the first quarter of this year the figure was already 130,000. By late March, when the tension in the Transcaucasus began to decline, the decline in production slowed down. Although no one can guarantee that a wave of strikes will not rise again and the influence of the recent blockade of railroads is still felt in the work of transport, nonetheless it is a case of short-term factors.

Imposed on top of them is the long-term process of the structural perestroyka of the economy. Over the quarter the production of the means of production in industrial fell 3.2 percent, on the other hand the production of consumer goods rose 4.7 percent. The influence of conversion in the defense industry began to have an effect. When the declining production of arms is not fully compensated by civilian output, that is a serious problem for the plant but not for society as a whole.

Something else is worse. The growing disorganization of economic relations and the decline in the effectiveness of labor incentives can also be obviously traced in the reduction of production.

For normal work under the conditions of reform the national economy needs stable finances and a firm ruble. It is these prerequisites of economic growth which the program for economic recovery should have shaped. It was planned, by limiting state expenditure and increasing revenue, to halt the rampaging inflation.

The figures cited for the first quarter are inadequate for a reliable forecast of the results of the fiscal year. But a number of symptoms (the rapid decline in deductions into the budget from profit, the ineffectiveness of the tax on the growth of the wages fund, large super-plan centralized capital investments envisaged by enterprises, and so forth) make it possible to surmise that the illness of state finances is still acute and there will be no success in substantially reducing the budget deficit.

A new factor in the development of the financial situation was the decline which has begun in enterprises' profits (by 7.4 percent for the quarter). A characteristic process deserving close attention. Let us recall that last year, against the background of a production that was marking time, profit through the increase in prices increased sharply. To all appearances the economy had entered a new stage of the depreciation of money. The funds accumulated by enterprises enable many of them simply to remain unconcerned with current financial results. When an opportunity opens up to obtain currency, production resources, or consumer goods for the collective, that is another matter. And it is possible to give no thought to how many cashless rubles you have in your account.

Financial problems sometimes seem abstract, divorced from people's real daily lives. That is an illusion.

A graphic example is the drastically worsened meat situation. Although it was hard to notice it from the empty store shelves, meat sales in the first years of the five-year plan did increase, albeit slowly. In the past quarter there was a sudden change. Purchases of livestock and poultry fell four percent. Meat production from state stocks declined six percent. The volume of sales to the population were successfully kept at approximately last year's level, but trade stocks rapidly decline. You cannot live for long on that.

A very important factor which has changed the situation is the critical feed situation. Last year despite quite a good harvest state grain purchases were markedly smaller. The farms preferred to hold on to their grain and to use it for exchange for other goods. The large stockraising and poultry raising complexes outside the main grain regions were in a critical situation.

It is now proposed that grain prices be urgently reexamined. In a different financial situation this would be an entirely sensible decision. But after all grain is already one of the most profitable types of agricultural output. And increasing purchase prices will simply enable the farms to satisfy their need for money with even smaller delivery volumes. As at the start of the New Economic Period we must think about organizing regulated product exchange.

The situation on the consumer market in the past quarter did not change fundamentally. The rapid growth of commodity turnover (R13.1 billion) to a considerable extent reflected the increase in average retail prices and the sale of alcohol and the sale of goods through cashless accounting (R5.4 billion). An important factor was the buildup of the delivery of imported goods (R3.4 billion). In practice the sale of clothing and footwear increased only through imports.

The flow of money printed to cover the state budget deficit and accumulated in the enterprises' economic incentives funds broke the barriers separating cashless turnover from cash turnover and simply swept away the goods which occasionally reached the stores. According to the plan it was proposed that over the year the population's monetary incomes would increase 7.3 percent. In the first quarter they increase 13.3 percent (R17.6 billion).

The long tradition of the relative stability of prices has strongly linked in the public consciousness the growth of financial incomes and an improvement in prosperity. Sensing that life is becoming harder, many people, despite the facts, sincerely do not believe that the increase in money incomes is a reality. Yet when production is stagnating and wages are rising rapidly, that is not a boon but a sign that the economy is gravely ill. After all, in this situation the position of any group whose income lags behind worsens not only relatively but also in absolute terms. And the desire to overtake others puts inflation at a higher level.

The stepping up of inflation is manifested everywhere. The growth of prices on the kolkhoz [collective farm] market has accelerated markedly. On average they increased 12 percent, including 16 percent for meat, 13 percent for vegetables, and 20 percent for fruit. But even where state prices are formally in operation, inflation processes are getting through. According to the figures of a selective study by the State Committee for Statistics, in the past three years the incomes of speculators in nonfood goods have increased 60 percent.

Of course, there are rays of hope. For instance, there has been a marked increase in sugar stocks. A hope is emerging that sugar distribution by coupon may be abandoned. To dash the waves of overstimulated demand, active use began to be made of imports. Mass purchases of detergents made it possible basically to stabilize the situation and as of 1 April stocks of detergents had approximately quadrupled compared with last year. Deliveries of coffee (17 percent) and vegetable oil (52 percent) from abroad increased noticeably. But under the conditions of the disorganized market some deficits are inevitably replaced by others. Textile stocks have begun to dwindle. The decline in the production of goods like pencils (15 percent), razor blades (four percent), and cigarettes (nine percent) attests that the prospect of ridding ourselves of the cares associated with acquiring consumer goods is obviously not a threat to us. Unfortunately, no currency is sufficient to buy everything in short supply in the country.

The development of foreign economic relations has been determined by two very important factors: the rapid decline in the volume of commodity turnover with the CEMA countries and the continuing substantial deficit in trade with the capitalist countries.

Exports to the CEMA countries have declined 9.7 percent and imports 11 percent. As a whole this is a natural process reflecting the restriction of the role of political considerations in economic cooperation. Where our ties are effective and are mutually advantageous, and there are many such fields, they are being preserved.

The continuing growth of the foreign debt causes far greater concern. In the first quarter the annual plan for exports in freely convertible currency was fulfilled 20 percent and for imports was fulfilled 32 percent. The deficit in the balance of trade with the capitalist countries was R0.9 billion. Having lost the chance to use the favorable situation on the oil market at the start of this year, now, in addition to extraction difficulties, we are again encountering the consequences of the decline in prices for our main export commodity.

Foreign suppliers have sounded the alarm. For the first time the Soviet side, which has always fulfilled its financial commitments irreproachably, has begun to default on payment schedules. Telephone calls from foreign companies asking for help in recovering their money and loans taken by Soviet enterprises are becoming as natural an element of the editorial office's life as requests for help with freight cars. According to Western bankers' assessments, the Soviet Union's creditworthiness has suffered more in a few weeks of the past quarter than in all the 20 preceding years of mounting economic difficulties.

To a considerable extent the blame rests with the economically accountable enterprises and firms which have acquired independence and which have brought to the foreign market their usual standards of financial irresponsibility. That is unpleasant, but not terrible. Foreign partners will rapidly learn who they are dealing with. Something else is worse. it seems that at state level too the gambler's desire to live beyond one's means is extending increasingly to the sphere of foreign economic relations.

Even through the forced optimism of the State Committee for Statistics report it can be seen that the quarter was a difficult one and that the destructive processes in the national economy have gathered strength. The money mass is increasing increasingly rapidly. According to estimates, its growth rate is approximately six to eight times quicker than in the early eighties. In the development of the financial crisis we have approached the boundary line beyond which, irrespective of the desire of the government or trade unions, suppressed inflation becomes overt inflation.

To stabilize the economy it is necessary to close the channels of direct credit for the budget by the emissions bank. State expenditure must be brought into line with state revenue. The necessary credit resources must be mobilized on a healthy noninflation basis. We must begin without delay the destatification of property and lift from the state's shoulders at least part of the responsibility for current economic life in the country.

But effecting such a change is far from simple. A situation well known in world practice is taking shape: The weaker the national currency, the more resolute and tougher the demand for ever new appropriations and the stronger the pressure on the mint. It is time to change the signature on the ruble and to say frankly that it is backed up by nothing. But meanwhile many deputies eager for popularity are seeking an unrestrained buildup of expenses and are destroying the money system still further.

The state budget deficit too heavy for the country's economy is spurring inflation. Yet the Supreme Soviet is discussing the questions of the targets for which expenditure should be increased, expenditure for which it seems no one intends to pay, and how much to reduce taxes.

We should not reassure ourselves with illusions, the growth of prices cannot be halted by persuasion or by order but only by radically altering financial policy. The figures of the State Committee attest that so far there have been no radical changes in this policy.

Agricultural

Agricultural Developments for 25-29 April

LD3004002790

[Editorial Report] The following is a compilation of reports on agricultural developments in the USSR carried by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian on 25-29 April, unless indicated otherwise. Times of broadcast, given in GMT, are in parentheses at the end of each item.

25-28 April:

No significant developments reported.

29 April:

The regular meeting of the operational staff for the material and technical supply of the countryside has taken place. It was noted that in the Ukraine, Moldavia, Georgia, Central Asian republics, as well as in Kuban and Stavropol regions, and in Rostov and Belgorod oblasts, the farmers have completed the sowing of early cereals. Mass work has started on cotton and sugarbeet fields. The sowing of sunflower seeds, rape, vegetables, potatoes, and flax is continuing. The state of winter fields is much better than in the past few years. (1100)

Mid-April Weather, Crop Conditions Reported

904B0204A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 24 Apr 90 p 2

[Article by S. Malikova, agricultural meteorologist: "Weather and Crops"]

[Text] Unusually warm weather predominated during the last 10-day period over the majority of the USSR's European territory. In the majority of the regions the average air temperature exceeded the average yearly temperature for this period by three to seven degrees, while in Moldavia, the majority of the Ukraine, Krasnodar and Stavropol Krays, and southern Belorussia, where it was cool at the beginning of the 10-day period, the average air temperature was close to the yearly average.

However, at night light frosts of minus one to minus seven degrees—in some places to minus 10 degrees—were registered in the air and on the ground surface. These frosts were extremely unfavorable for agricultural crops. The greatest frost damage was noted in Moldavia and the Ukraine, where grape racemes, the blossoms and ovaries of fruit crops, and in part the shoots of the early spring crops, sugar beets, sunflower, potato, vegetable seedlings, and tobacco were damaged over sizable areas.

The most significant precipitation (10-25 mm or more) fell on the central and northeastern oblasts of the Ukraine and on the southwestern central-Chernozem and central regions. There was little or no precipitation in other regions.

Winter crops grew over the majority of the USSR's European territory south of the Petrozavodsk-Kirov-Perm line. In the Chernozem Zone, Belorussia, and the Baltic region stalks of winter crops were observed growing; and over the rest of the territory the crops continued to tiller and take root. Plant development is 20-30 days ahead of yearly averages in the southern half of the territory and 10-15 days ahead in the northern half. The condition of winter crops in the great majority of the territory is good. The shoots of early spring grain crops are appearing in the central Chernozem region, the southern central region, and Belorussia. In the majority of the Ukraine, the southern half of Rostov Oblast, and the Lower Volga region the spring barley and oats were observed in the third-leaf stage. In the northern Caucasus and in the extreme south of the Ukraine the spring barley has begun to tiller, and in places in the northern Caucasus it has been noted forming leaf tubes.

The sowing of sugar beets was carried out very early this year (at the end of March). In the first 10-day period of April shoots were noted only in Moldavia, Krasnodar Kray, and several regions of Poltava and Cherkassy Oblasts. Great numbers of shoots appeared in the second 10-day period.

Shoots of flax were noted in the northwestern oblasts of the Ukraine, and crops from the early sowing were at the stage of the beginning of stalk growth. By 20 April the buds of pip and stone fruit crops had been observed swelling and blossoming south of the Tallinn-Leningrad-Yaroslavl-Izhevsk line. In the southern Baltic region, the majority of Belorussia, the central Chernozem region, the extreme south of the central region, and the southern half of the Volga region unfolding of the leaves of apple and cherry trees has been noted. In the majority of the Ukraine, in Moldavia, and in the northern Caucasus cherry, apple, plum, and pear trees continue to flower while apricot trees have finished flowering and the growth of ovaries has begun. Leaves have begun unfolding in the vineyards of the southern Ukraine and the northern Caucasus, and the appearance of the first raceme was noted in Moldavia, which is about a month earlier than the yearly average.

The warm weather held on in the republics of the Transcaucasus. Afterwards it cooled down somewhat. Frosts were noted in the mountainous regions of Armenia. The rains that occurred improved the water supply to the winter and spring grain crops, but it also hindered work in the fields and the pollination of flowering stone fruit crops.

In the agricultural regions of Siberia and the greater part of Kazakhstan the average air temperature was one to three degrees above the yearly average; while in the northern Ural, Aktyubinsk, southern Semipalatinsk, and East Kazakhstan Oblasts it was four to five degrees above average. Precipitation in the majority of the regions either did not occur or did not exceed five mm.

The weather in the republics of central Asia was changeable with frequent heavy rains, with hail in some places. The average air temperature in the majority of the regions was one to three degrees lower than the yearly average. In some places downpours hindered the sowing of cotton, the flowering of fruit crops, and the grazing of livestock. The winter wheats and barleys have been putting out stalks, and in the south of the territory the barley has begun to form ears. The growth of ovaries has continued on apricot trees, and flowering has ended on the rest of the fruit crops and the growth of ovaries has begun. Grapes are undergoing leaf formation.

Scientific

USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium Formed

LD2804052690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1412 GMT 27 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 27 Apr (TASS)—The Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences formed at the USSR Academy of Sciences General Assembly, which ended today, will be made up of 42 people. During the five days of work, a president, 12 vice-presidents, 16 academician secretaries of sections of the USSR Academy of Sciences, a chief academic secretary, and 12 academicians were elected as members of the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences for the next five-year period.

For the first time elections of some scholars to the headquarters of Soviet science were conducted on a multicandidate basis. Thus, four candidates were nominated for two Presidium seats from the biological sciences, five for three seats from the social sciences, and three candidates for one seat from earth sciences. However, the post of academician secretary of the department of philosophy and law of the USSR Academy of Sciences remained unfilled. Academician Viktor Afanasyev, former chief editor of PRAVDA and currently chief editor of KOMMUNIST, who aspired to the post, failed to obtain the necessary number of votes.

The immediate period ahead will not be easy for the new members of the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Not only are there a multitude of scientific problems to be solved, but a great deal needs to be restructured in the organization structure of science. The TASS correspondents asked members of the Presidium to tell them about their plans for work.

Konstantin Frolov, vice-president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, academic secretary for the Department of Problems of Machine Building, Mechanics, and Control Processes, links his future activities first and foremost with implementing fresh approaches to designing and creating various technical projects increasing labor safety to the maximum. In addition, Academician Frolov stresses the need to develop peripheral scientific centers and international cooperation.

Academician Ivan Kovalchenko, academic secretary for the Department of History of the USSR Academy of Sciences, considers that historians should in their scientific activity devote far greater attention to studying the development of the individual personality. Scientists should undoubtedly make their contribution to the restructuring of the whole of society.

The implementation of the "Human Activity" priority national scientific program is one of the tasks of Pavel Simonov, academic secretary of the Department of

Physiology of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The academician advocates greater independence for scientific institutes.

Marchuk Address to Academy Meeting Reported

PM2604131190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Apr 90 Second Edition p 6

[Report by I. Mosin: "Stop and Look Around. Notes on the USSR Academy of Sciences Members' General Meeting"]

[Text] In front of the Moscow House of Scientists there was a small group of people handing out leaflets to participants on their way into the USSR Academy of Sciences members' general meeting. The leaflet called on people not to nominate Academician G. Marchuk for the post of president of the grand academy. The authors of the appeal made serious charges: "His activities as president of the USSR Academy of Sciences have been marked by a willingness to neglect the interests of society and to judge specialists in deference to the opinions of the authorities." It also blamed the president for the unsuccessful system of certification of scientific cadres, inconsistent attempts to reorganize the management structure, and abandonment of promising forms of economic organization.

Is the president responsible for all these mistakes? Without a doubt. But, as one of the speakers aptly observed in his speech at the meeting, it is impossible not to make mistakes these days.

It is high time we realized that no matter how good, professional, and intelligent a leader we choose, his activities depend on a mass of factors. And even with the greatest will in the world, things do not always turn out as one would like. The report on the work of the USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium over the five-year period, which was delivered by Marchuk on the first day of the general meeting, enabled the participants to see and appreciate what the academy has been like in this tumultuous period: what new trends have emerged in the process of its development, how they have been dealt with, and what difficulties have been encountered.

The situation in Soviet science at the beginning of the eighties, G. Marchuk observed in the report, was fundamentally different from what it was in the sixties, when the sphere of science and scientific services was experiencing rapid growth. In recent decades the reserves for extensive development have been exhausted. The rate of growth of scientific cadres has declined sharply—by more than 90 percent in some areas.

All this has led to a sharp reduction in the capital-worker ratio in the USSR Academy of Sciences and republican academies. Soviet researchers have 75-80 percent fewer instruments at their disposal than researchers in many industrially developed countries.

Problems connected with constructing modern experimental and test facilities for scientific institutions have increased. The construction of 130 facilities for the USSR Academy of Sciences and union republican academies of sciences, worth around 2 billion rubles [R], was envisaged for the period 1983-1987. But allocation of capital investments for the 12th Five-Year Plan was 2.3 times less than envisaged.

In short, they have not been the best years in the history of Soviet science. Problems of financing, material and technical supply, and organization of scientists' work have increased dramatically. Science needed a new development impetus. It was provided by the June (1985) conference at the CPSU Central Committee on questions of accelerating scientific and technical progress.

A number of resolutions directed toward the accelerated development of certain spheres of scientific research—computers, new areas of biology and biotechnology, chemistry and chemical technology, high energy physics, and high-temperature superconductivity—were adopted.

At the same time, the USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium embarked on elaborating the concept for the perestroyka of basic science. It consists of creating the organizational-legal and material conditions for various scientific schools and trends to exist and compete, developing debate, and effectively protecting scientists' and collectives' creative activities.

This in turn demanded a review of the existing system for planning and financing scientific research and a switch from a rigid centralized system for distributing resources to scientific institutions to the financing of programs and projects on a competitive basis.

A radical review of the principles of material incentives for scientists' labor and of social policy in the scientific sphere in general was singled out as one of the chief questions. The government was asked to redistribute capital investments in favor of the social sphere. Out of a total of R1.3 billion, more than R200 million was channeled into the development of the academy's social sphere. The pressure was eased in many scientific centers.

It was suggested in the report—and one must agree—that if one tries to analyze the changes that have taken place in the academy, one can say that by and large the correct choice was made. Essentially, the ground was prepared and precedents were created that offer the academic community prospects that accord with the inner logic of the development of scientific research.

It must not be forgotten that this was the first experiment. The shortcomings became more visible and the prospects were more clearly defined. Now it is clear, for example, that the earlier 30-percent base fund for financing institutes does not ensure the fulfillment of basic research work. Therefore it is necessary to establish a financing system. The proportion of funds to be spent on basic research is to be raised to 60-70 percent. This finance will be disposed of by the institute itself via scientific councils, on a competitive basis. And this must be done as from next year.

The logic of development, the president stressed, is increasingly prompting us to consider the need to create a unified state basic science fund in the country, which would be used to finance research of statewide importance.

We are also pinning hopes on a form of public influence on and monitoring of the Presidium apparatus' activities such as the recently established councils on the main directions of scientific organizational and social activity, which representatives of scientific collectives would join on an elective basis.

Pensions for the academy's scientific personnel, above all doctors and candidates of sciences, remain a major question. The Supreme Soviet is currently examining a draft law on pensions which institutes of the academy helped to prepare. The principles enshrined in it must largely provide the requisite social conditions for this category of scientific worker.

All in all, these years have seen definite changes in the life of the Academy of Sciences which in many respects reflect the nature of the processes taking place in our society and country. But I would like to stress, the speaker said in conclusion, that in carrying out these transformations, the Presidium sought to preserve the academy's stability and its best traditions.

The creative activities of the scientific community need stability, and we have managed to protect the academy from many destructive actions. This was due to the efforts of all members of the academy. This fact is of fundamental significance in our extremely complex and tumultuous times.

...These are the difficult problems that face the grand academy. I have only discussed a few of them. And it is no accident at all that Academician G. Marchuk has been given the helm of the academy once again. The crew of any ship needs stable and reliable captains. The former and now the new president has demonstrated that, despite any lists, he has set the correct course for the ship and is holding it well.

The general meeting continues its work today. The president is presenting his new crew for the consideration of the academy's members.

Military

Yazov Presents Awards to Patriotic War Veterans

PM3004143190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Apr 90 First Edition p 2

[Unnamed correspondent report: "Their Frontline Awards"]

[Excerpts] Army General D. Yazov, USSR Minister of Defense, presented veterans of the Great Patriotic War with combat awards in the Kremlin's St. George's Hall 27 April.

This ceremonial ritual of honoring the heroes of the last war is the result of just one stage of a painstaking search carried out over the past 45 years by the USSR Ministry of Defense Central Archives, the Main Personnel Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, the Komsomol [All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League] Central Committee, and thousands of enthusiasts. [passage omitted]

The organizers of the festivities made sure that the veterans will remember this day. They invited comrades who served in the same regiment to the St. George's Hall and showered the veterans with attention.

Military Delegates to Party Congress Discussed

PM2604103190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Apr 90 First Edition p 1

[Report by unidentified KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Worthy People for Congress"]

[Text] The Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate Bureau has set up a commission on the election of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress. Hero of the Soviet Union Pilot-Cosmonaut Colonel V. Zudov has been ratified as its chairman. Major Generals G. Shevchenko and V. Lashtabega are its deputy chairmen.

The role and place of the commission and its practical activity in implementing the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee March (1990) Plenum were the subject of a constructive discussion at a recent session. It was addressed by Army General A. Lizichev, chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate. The commission's main tasks in the precongress period were defined. It was a question, in particular, of the need for joint participation together with political organs and party organizations in the preparations for and holding of report and election party meetings, and for analysis of progress in nominating, discussing, and selecting delegates for the 28th CPSU Congress. The commission members are also called upon to examine appeals and statements by communists and to receive visitors.

The conference participants were of the unanimous opinion that the most prestigious people who firmly uphold the positions of perestroyka in society and the Army should be elected from among the candidate delegates at the forthcoming party conferences in districts, groups of forces, and fleets.

Military Procurator on Recruitment, Training

LD2804135290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1130 GMT 28 Apr 90

[From the "Television News Service" program: Correspondent A. Vagin report from USSR Military Procuracy Board session—recorded]

[Text] Now, about one more problem. I mean the call-up in to the Army and the nonobservance by Lithuania of the union law. In the USSR Constitution, there is a law on state crimes: Article 17. Since Lithuania is still a socialist republic within the union, USSR laws extend to it. A report from the union procuracy:

[Vagin] Among many problems, the following was mentioned: The training of recruits does not measure up to necessary requirements. The low level of teachers of rudimentary military training in schools and the poor base of the Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy is not providing the Army with qualified specialists. Owing to a general deterioration in the health and physical training of recruits, the number of deferments of recruitment and premature demobilization from the ranks of the Armed Forces has increased. The board has examined a proposal on the replacement of military training in schools with additional physical training in military sports camps. Under particular discussion was the problem of the refusal of military service by the inhabitants of the Baltic republics. [Video shows military procuracy board in session] [A.F. Katusev, USSR general military procurator—identified by screen caption] In every Baltic republic there is a law on criminal culpability for refusal of service. It exists in Estonia, in Latvia, and in Lithuania. It is true that Estonia has already abrogated this law. Lithuania has pronounced it invalid. [Video shows Katusev being interviewed in front of the bulletin board and final shot of a Soviet military crest]

Baltic Republics

Landsbergis Sends May Day Greeting to Gorbachev

LD3004215590 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 2045 GMT 30 Apr 90

[Text] Today, Lithuanian Supreme Council President Vytautas Landsbergis sent a congratulatory telegram to USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev.

It reads: Highly esteemed president, allow me to extend congratulations to you and the nations of the USSR on the occasion of the 1 May holiday. May this day and its 100th anniversary remind everyone of the historic tradition of worker solidarity and may it strengthen mutual understanding between nations with the hope [word indistinct] of improving the situation and mutual relations.

Vilnius May Day Gatherings Described

LD0105111290 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0900 GMT 1 May 90

[Report by Guoda Salciute]

[Excerpts] [Salciute] I must tell the listeners that there were not very many people in the streets of Vilnius this morning. However, Lenin Square in Vilnius became the center of the May Day gathering. This was not a large-scale event; it was organized by the Federation of Socialist Working People.

[Unidentified voice] What kind of federation is this?

[Salciute] I do not know this, my colleagues and I tried to find this out during the May Day gathering. However, we failed to find this out.

Well, I would like to continue with my account of the event. This was not a large May Day gathering; it did not last very long either, about 20 minutes.

Following this, to the music of a military band, columns marched along Gediminas Avenue to Hill Park where according to organizers, the May Day gathering will continue and amateur arts groups will give concerts.

Most of those who came to Lenin Square at 10 o'clock this morning were middle-aged people, some wearing red ribbon bows on their suits, others wore no particular decorations, some had their spring flowers wrapped in the newspaper SOVETSKAYA LITVA, others did not.

The participants were standing on the paths leading to Lenin's monument. True, not all the paths were full of people. Meanwhile, the sidewalk by Lenin Square in Gendimanas Avenue was lined with soldiers. [passage omitted] Old flags of some republics were seen at the gathering. Well, along with traditional slogans [in Russian]: "Long live the working class-the leading force of our state," there were also topical ones: "No to separatism", "People will not pay for political adventures", "Down with ministers-adventurers", [in Polish] "Our workers' no to Lithuania leaving the USSR." Those were the slogans which were more or less reflected in the speeches made by the orators.

Mykolas Burokevicius, first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee-CPSU, spoke at the meeting. He congratulated the Lithuanian working people on the May holidays and pointed out that this year May Day was met under conditions of great political tension. He blamed the present Lithuanian government for the current political and economic situation in Lithuania; he said interests of the Lithuanian people are alien to the people who are currently in power in Lithuania. He urged everyone to fight for socialist democracy [passage omitted] The principle of internationalism was observed: Speeches were made in Lithuanian, Russian, and Polish.

This is a brief account of the start of May Day gatherings at Lenin's monument. I would not say it was either noisy or disorderly. Those people who cannot think differently, who are unable to cross certain framework of thinking because of the ideology which had been enforced on them during all these years, came to the gathering.

So much for the start of the May Day gathering organized by the Federation of Socialist Working People.

Rationing in Lithuania Expanded; No May Day Parade

LD3004204790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1930 GMT 30 Apr 90

[Unscheduled video report from Vilnius by television correspondent S. Dorenko]

[Text] [Dorenko] A number of communiques by the government of Lithuania have been published about the economic situation and about plans to stabilize the economy. Medicines, including antibiotics, clothing, and other goods are being delivered to the republic as normal. For the time being only sugar and washing detergents, as elsewhere in the country, are being rationed here. However, from 1 May, a quota system is being introduced for flour, cereals, pasta, salt, and margarine. The quota has been set according to the average consumption last year. This is being done with the purpose of attaining just and equal provision for the entire population. This is stated in the government communique.

It is difficult in the city to buy some newspapers. Things are truly bad in Lithuania with gasoline. The price of a can of gasoline on the black market is anything up to 50 rubles. In order to keep up the spirits of Vilnius residents during the fuel shortage, Sajudis today conducted a promotional cycle rally. The atmosphere was very festive, but it was sad for the onlooker.

And in the evening there was another event—a concert on Cathedral Square. Beethoven's ninth symphony was performed.

[Yuriy Rostov, studio announcer] According to the latest reports from Lithuania, unemployment has affected 10,000 people there, and it may treble this week. Some residents currently are making their gardens into vegetable patches, and an intensive search for scrap metal is underway. Incidentally, there will be no 1 May demonstrations in Vilnius for the first time in recent decades. According to evaluations, the probability is growing that the Lithuanian Parliament will heed the advice of Francois Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl. The leaders of England and France [as heard] recommended, as is known, that Lithuania should delay secession from the union for two years.

Goods Supplies Steady in Lithuania

LD3004194190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 30 Apr 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] I think that it now would be difficult to find a person who is unconcerned about the events taking place in and around Lithuania. Lithuania has reminded us, and itself too, that we are all connected by numerous threads, both within the country and in the world. Special correspondents report from Vilnius.

[S. Dorenko—identified by screen caption] After the government announcement that rationed distribution of a number of products will be introduced from tomorrow, demand for them has risen sharply. Incidentally, trade workers are sure that they can provide everything necessary for the consumers. Goods are being delivered on a regular basis, and their quantity has not decreased over the last two weeks.

[Unidentified supermarket workers] One cannot say that the supply has decreased, but the demand has increased a great deal.

[Dorenko] There is the usual choice of medicines in the pharmacies, but it is true that purchases made for the purpose of stocking up have increased here, too.

[Pharmacy worker] There are Soviet and imported antibiotics and vitamin preparations, but just recently people have been buying up a great deal. It is probably a sort of psychological fear of there being no medicines, so our our turnover has taken a big leap in recent days.

[Dorenko] In order for there to be no disruptions in supplies in the future it is necessary to take care of the harvest right now. The sowing has been done, but difficulties with fertilizers have arisen due to economic sanctions. Moscow has made a compromise. A proposal has been made for the resumption of deliveries of liquid gas to the Jonava nitrogenous fertilizer works. [video shows supermarket with cans on its shelves, pharmacy]

[R. Ozolas, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of Lithuania—identified by caption] We will discuss the issue of using additional gas for special purposes. We are planning to propose a treaty on reciprocal deliveries from Lithuania. [video shows Ozolas speaking]

[Dorenko] Another event today: This evening thousands of inhabitants of Lithuania came to pay their last respects to the body of Stanislovas Zamaitis, who immolated himself on Revolution Square in Moscow. [video shows crowd around a vehicle being used as a hearse, decorated with flowers]

Vilnius Commission Adopt Compensation Status

LD0105105290 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 30 Apr 90

[Text] The Lithuanian state commission set up to combat the economic crisis in Lithuania following Moscow's blockade has adopted statutes for distributing the funds donated by public organizations, movements, and private individuals. In a communique released by the commission it was noted that citizens who lost their jobs either fully or partly due to the economic sanctions imposed by the Soviet Union, as well as large families, senior citizens and handicapped people, will receive special grants to satisfy their daily needs.

Prunskiene on Readiness To Suspend Declaration

LD3004190990 Montreal International Service in English 1830 GMT 30 Apr 90

[Excerpt] In Ottawa, Lithuania's prime minister says her country is prepared to suspend its declaration of independence in order to begin negotiations with Moscow. Kazimiera Prunskiene, who is on a two-day visit to Canada, says that Lithuania is prepared to adopt the French-West German suggestion to that effect made last week. Mrs. Prunskiene made the statement after meeting for an hour with Canada's Minister for External Affairs Joe Clark who, she said, showed understanding and goodwill towards Lithuania. Mrs. Prunskiene will meet later in Toronto with members of Canada's Lithuanian community and businessmen and politicians. [passage omitted]

Interregional Group Urges Dialogue With Lithuania

LD0105101790 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0700 GMT 1 May 90

[Report attributed to Sajudis Information Agency]

[Text] And here is one more news report from Moscow. On 29 April, a statement on the situation in Lithuania was adopted by the USSR people's deputies, members of the Interregional Group. It reads: The situation in Lithuania is becoming critical and this cannot fail to concern the people's deputies and their electors. The decisions of the Lithuanian Seimas adopted on 11 March can be assessed in various ways, however, the priority right of assessment belongs to the people of Lithuania who had elected their parliament absolutely legally and according to the Lithuanian and the USSR laws and constitutions.

We resolutely stand against the introduction of direct presidential rule in Lithuania; we are also categorically against the economic blocade of Lithuania.

We want to remind you that the Second Congress of the USSR People's Deputies renounced the economic blocade in the Transcaucasian republics as a means of political pressure. As a consequence of this blockade, all the inhabitants had suffered including women and children. Now the government and the president of the USSR are resorting to this again.

The USSR people's deputies, members of the Interregional Group urge the governments of the USSR andd the Republic of Lithuania to start negotiations without delay. According to the USSR Constitution, union republic is a sovereign state and therefore, the arguments given by the USSR president that negotiations can be held only with foreign countries do not look very convincing. By mutual agreement, the subject of such negotiations could be any issues concerning interrelations between the USSR and the Republic of Lithuania, including the possible cancellation of all legal acts which had been adopted by the Lithuanian Supreme Council since 11 March.

Landsbergis on Independence; Western Reaction

LD3004144490 Warsaw Television Service in Polish 1730 GMT 29 Apr 90

[Interview with Vytautas Landsbergis, Lithuanian Supreme Council president, by unidentified correspondent; place not given, on 29 April—live or recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] Moscow says you no longer have to revoke your declaration of independence but only to freeze it, as they put it, and yet, economic pressure is growing. They have even withdrawn your supplies of coal. Lithuanians' calm merits admiration.

[Landsbergis in Polish] We have no choice. We have no weapon other than internal calm and solidarity in difficult circumstances. Other methods of supply are beginning to appear, along with a great deal of thrift.

[Correspondent] You have said many times, sir, that you are surprised by the world's attitude. Little Lithuania, which is striking out toward independence, was very much counting upon the help of the mighty in the battle with Goliath. Meanwhile, we have symbolic gestures. They do not want to do anything contrary to Gorbachev.

[Landsbergis] It is not true that we counted too much on assistance from the world, or that we counted exclusively on this assistance. We knew we might remain alone, as we did after the war, during eight years of persecutions and a struggle, one might say, for a principle, but in reality, a hopeless struggle.

[Correspondent] Do you think, sir, there is some way of appeasing the Kremlin so that it will, at last, begin to talk to you?

[Landsbergis] The Kremlin is a mystery, and one never knows with what one can appease it. In spite of the fact they persistently said and put forward a condition that would not be met, the revocation of independence, it now appears in a new form, in the formulation of, as if, a freezing of independence. It is not clear what they have in mind. To make this clearer, we would have to have contact, we would have to have some dialogue. If they refuse the minimum of dialogue, however, then they extend this state of suspension to (?smother), furthermore, maybe to bring about internal conflict in Lithuania, which they are counting on.

Deputy on Supreme Soviet Discussions on Lithuania

LD3004105290 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0900 GMT 30 Apr 90

[Telephone interview with Nikolajus Medvedevas, USSR Supreme Soviet people's deputy from Lithuania, by correspondent Guoda Salciute in Vilnius; date not given; from the "Lithuania Today" program—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Salciute] I think everybody is interested in hearing what Deputy Nikolajus Medvedevas, who just returned from Moscow, has to say. He was working at the USSR Supreme Soviet for the good of Lithuania.

[Medvedevas] A meeting of the internationalities group was to take place, and probably did, at which the issue of Lithuania was to be discussed. The issue of the blockade: A decision was adopted which renounces the blockade and demands that the authorities report on the issue at the Supreme Soviet, explaining the reasons for the blockade, its essence, and possible consequences for the entire USSR economy, as well as its political consequences. The leadership should be asked if they plan their actions with consideration for the future. [passage omitted]

Several attempts were made to raise this issue at the Supreme Soviet. However, the presidium and Lukyanov kept answering that now, when the president is absent, they can not say or do anything. This fact also caused a great deal of dissatisfaction among deputies because the Supreme Soviet has been practically taken out of the game, if I can put it that way. And this is a very dangerous feature. An attempt was made to set up a group of deputies who would start organizing, if not negotiations, then some type of dialogue. I do not want to say any more on this because this is all still at a very initial stage. [passage omitted]

A rally, organized by the Central Committee and trade unions, will take place and then there will be a march organized by the Russian Democrats. I have no idea how these will be paired together.

By a decision of the Council of Ministers, and it seems by the president and leadership as well, various anti-state and anti- socialist slogans have been banned. However, I doubt if any march or rally can do without them nowadays. People demand serious changes and their demands are taken seriously.

Kedainiai Council Chief on Economic Blockade

LD3004151190 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1300 GMT 30 Apr 90

[Remarks by Petras Boguska, chairman of the Kedainiai Rayon Council, from news report on effects of Soviet economic blockade, date, place not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] Modest and diligent deputies of the Kedainiai Rayon, electors and all the people of the rayon understand the scope and the consequences of the blockade. There is no panic or sense of being at a loss. [passage omitted]

Some organizations, such as the Administration of Land Reclamation Construction, organized a three-day working week thirteen hours a day. The yeast production shop is out of operation at the Biochemical plant, and other shops will also stop their operation because of crude oil shortage. The sugar products factory is being closed down because of lack of raw materials.

We have hopes that after the holidays, at least partially the chemical plant will be put back into operation, because there is a chance to get some raw materials.

Workers who are out of work are repairing their enterprises, some went on holiday. An account was opened in the rayon bank to raise money for allowances and relief for those out of work.

Reporter Questions Lithuanian Independence Logic

*PM3004224990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
1 May 90 First Edition p5*

[PRAVDA political observer Tomas Kolesnichenko article: "About 'Refugees' and Pesticides"]

[Text] I met an acquaintance the other day. He is planning to emigrate to the United States. He looked somber. With his parting words he cursed the Visa and Registration Department.

"Did they turn you down?" I asked.

"If only they had. But they reached a decision on my application without any delay and now only the formalities have to be got through."

"So why are you displeased?" I asked him once more.

"The problem is," my acquaintance replied, "that now I will not have either refugee status or political emigre status in the United States, which means that I will not be started off with free housing and all the other allowances, reductions, and benefits, but will have to make my own way...."

It goes without saying that all comparisons are relative and suffer from some imperfection or other. Especially as the economic aspect is just one aspect of the problem which we have lately begun referring to as the "Lithuanian knot." However, this conversation reminded me very much of the situation which the Lithuanian leadership is now doing its utmost to create. It needs a public outcry. It needs a public outcry more than anything else. A public outcry that the whole world will know about. It needs "help." Urgent economic and financial help from states, private firms, committees like the "Committee in Defense of Lithuania," and so on and so forth. It needs "protection," urgent protection—SOS! It is appealing to absolutely everyone....

V. Landsbergis has even gone as far as accusing President Bush and other Western leaders of a new "Munich conspiracy." On the one hand there stands "tiny, freedom-loving Lithuania" and, on the other, "Moscow the aggressor." Because if another "Munich" is indeed afoot, there has to be an "aggressor" and a "victim" to be tormented by it.

On the subject of Landsbergis, the French newspaper LIBERATION remarked (quoting a certain professor) that he "behaves more like a cunning poker player than a strategist." And in poker, as is well known, you have to call people's bluff. If we look closer we will see that the "declaration of Lithuanian independence" hastily adopted under cover of night is a bluff—a bluff by a bold, cunning player prepared to recklessly gamble on the fate of his people.

... We appeal to everyone: We need urgent assistance! comes the desperate plea to the "world public" from Vilnius. But why, actually? Who is stopping Lithuania if that is what its people really want—to leave the Soviet Union? To leave with dignity, keeping in their hearts everything good that has linked them to the Soviet Union. To leave while showing respect for the other republics and for the USSR Constitution. After all, for the first time we have created the mechanism whereby a republic may secede from the USSR. Divorce is divorce. And, if that is destined to be, let each go his separate way.

Of course, it will not be easy for Lithuania to set off autonomously on its voyage through the stormy waters of the modern-day world market. But at least that would be honest, although it would not bring the "refugee" status which would perhaps move a rich uncle from Philadelphia to pity.

It has already been said that we have not yet lived in a renewed Soviet Union with full autonomy for its republics, economic accountability, and so forth. Time will tell how this will work out. There are great hopes.... But it is not so difficult to "calculate" the situation that will develop in Lithuania if it severs all ties with the Soviet Union and secedes.

This was done recently in the U.S. newspaper THE NEW YORK TIMES by Harvard economist Laurence Summers and the Washington consultative firm "Planecom," which, the article claims, are advising the Lithuanian leadership.

I do not know what kind of advice they give Vilnius in confidence, but this is what the newspaper wrote, quoting them: "Lithuania has hardly any hard currency to pay for Western imports.... Lithuania also cannot count on being able to earn essential foreign currency by exporting to the West. Summers has estimated that only 20 percent of Lithuanian exports are of a sufficiently high quality to compete on the world market. Even the export of Lithuanian foods, contaminated by pesticides banned in Europe, looks problematic."

As far as the USSR is concerned, specialists from "Planecom" are convinced that its economy "can exist for many months without feeling the effects of these losses (i.e. the effects of economic rupture with Lithuania). Moreover, it can easily eliminate the economic bottlenecks that arise by finding substitutes in the West."

Summers is sure that, by preserving a dignified relationship, in the future Lithuania could come to play the kind of role for the USSR which Hong Kong plays for China. Perhaps. But that is another problem. I will just point out that there is already an agreement under which Hong Kong will join the PRC, but, in any case, all this could only happen "tomorrow." But Vilnius wants it "today." Like the song which goes "No, no, no, we want it now, we want it now!"

This prompts a question that is very important for the entire world community: On what grounds is the Lithuanian leadership throwing down an open challenge to the Soviet Union? Vilnius has just one answer to this: Lithuania has never been part of the Soviet Union, and so it is not a question of seceding from the USSR but simply of "restoring its independence." I must say that, this viewpoint is fairly widespread in the Western press and, what is more, it is incorporated in the U.S. Congress resolution adopted the other day on Capitol Hill. In my view, some of the "scientific justifications" of Lithuania's "right" to independence seem extremely naive. Take this "solemn" passage, for instance (incidentally, the authors of the resolution should bear the responsibility for some alternative versions of historical dates): "Because the Lithuanian state was historically an independent European power and existed as a sovereign state from 1386 until 1795; because the Lithuanian state was annexed by the Russian empire in 1795 but its people continued to resist the annexation" and so forth.... References to the 14th and 18th centuries do not hold water at all. If we follow this logic, Spain should be handed over to the Moors and Indonesia to the Netherlands, Kazan should be removed from the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, and so forth. The political map of the world was, unfortunately, carved by far from peaceful means in the past and in comparatively recent times too. It was carved on the basis of the principle "let the loser pay." At different times, different states could lay claim to the same piece of territory. So all these "historical rights" to territory which has been passed from one hand to another in the past are highly debatable and relative.

References to the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact do not seem logical either. No one is trying to defend this pact, we have already condemned it (which, strictly speaking, only became possible as a result of the democratic processes now developing in our country), but is condemnation of this pact really enough to "restore independence" to Lithuania? In that case, we should also recall the fact that this independence was "sanctified" in the past by the rapacious Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty, which "twisted the arm" of the young Soviet power. (In particular, a condition of the treaty was that Russia renounce its rights to the Baltic states. Under this treaty, all Lithuanian territory was placed under German control). In what way was that "peace" better than the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact? And why is that fragment of time which Lithuania spent as an independent state after the Brest-Litovsk Treaty in some way legally different from the historical period of 50 years which Lithuania has spent in the family of Soviet republics?

To say nothing of the fact that if you are going to quote any historical precedent you must have a clear idea of where this could lead. As a poet once wrote: "... Just think how much dinner costs before you invite your guests." I will give you a quotation from the newspaper LIBERATION, which published an article by Professor Tadeusz Kowzan—not because I agree with the article but to show that it is not all so simple....

The author recalls the history of Vilnius, which went over to Lithuania only in 1939, on the basis of the so-called secret protocol to the Soviet-German pact. "Until then, Vilnius and Vilnius Oblast belonged to Poland. Deeming the agreements between Hitler and Stalin invalid places the present Lithuanian leadership in a difficult position: Following the logic of international law, independent Lithuania will have to renounce its right to Vilnius. For the present I should point out that the authorities at Vilnius University—a bastion of Polish culture for centuries—refuse to open a Polish language and literature department; the Lithuanian church authorities do not allow any service to be conducted in Polish in Vilnius Cathedral, which was built by a Polish architect; and the Lithuanian authorities refuse to permit the Polish Government to open a Polish consulate in Vilnius. Perestroyka has so far had no effect on the status of Lithuania's Polish population," the author asserts.

A great many questions, and they all require a direct answer. Vilnius is evading an answer at present. It is being helped in this—and the people helping it have long been familiar to us. For example, I could name Z. Brzezinski, hastily "rehabilitated" by some of our Americanists. In a recent article published in THE WASHINGTON POST, he picked out several words which

"Soviet propaganda" is allegedly using to pacify the U.S. public. These words are "divorce," "constitution," "Lincoln," and "civil war." He gives a brief resume on each of them. Divorce? What divorce can they be talking about if Lithuania has never been "married" to the USSR? This was no marriage but coercion (again with reference to the well known pact). The Constitution? Well, the Constitution is sacred to a civilized country like America, but, according to him, in the Soviet Union the Constitution is "just a scrap of paper." Lincoln and civil war? Well, President Lincoln moved the troops from the North into the South in order to preserve the federation and the country's unity. But that was in the United States, of course, and not in the Soviet "empire." Brzezinski is not troubled by the danger of civil war in our country: As far as he is concerned, the sooner the Soviet Union falls apart the better.

Now the last but extremely important point. You cannot work for a lofty objective by using immoral methods. It is now clear that the Lithuanian leaders, who started out and worked as "friends of perestroyka," were getting ready to stab it in the back. And stab it in the back they did, realizing full well that they were jeopardizing not only the future of their own people but also the policy of new thinking in the international arena, the fate of democratization, and, finally, the fate of all progressive forces throughout the Soviet Union. Americans say of such people that they are prepared to burn down their own home just to fry themselves an egg.

However, something else has also become clear. The policy of new thinking has withstood this blow. It has materialized into an important, constructive factor which has not allowed the "Lithuanian problem" to reach the level of confrontation between the great powers.

I will give you a long quotation—not to hide behind someone else's opinion but to make it clear what the West thinks in this respect. The quotation comes from an article by T. Fridman, recently published in THE NEW YORK TIMES: "From the very outset, the Bush administration has urged the two sides to begin a peaceful dialogue. But, even since the situation in Lithuania has deteriorated, it has continued to do everything possible to postpone the adoption of any measures that will increase tension. Although official representatives do not say so publicly, they feel that Lithuania's conduct in this situation has been stupid: to simply proclaim independence and challenge Moscow.... Deep down, the administration has more sympathy for Gorbachev and his problems than for Lithuania's demands for instant independence. The democratic reforms initiated by Gorbachev and the arms reduction talks prepared and begun by him will make life better for millions of Americans and Russians. If, in order to preserve this process, 3 million Lithuanians must defer the question of independence for a few years, then, as American officials are saying in private, so be it."

Roughly the same view was expressed in the recent joint message to the Lithuanian leaders from French President F. Mitterrand and FRG Chancellor H. Kohl. It is no accident that the world press has christened this message "a small diplomatic bombshell." Essentially, V. Landsbergis has been publicly refused "refugee" status and advised to work for reasonable compromise—close to the one proposed by Moscow.

In conclusion, I will say this: Of course, the Berlin Wall could have been stormed five years ago, say, but how would that have ended? Future historians will assess the wisdom of those who achieved this peacefully.

History has no love of "leaps forward," even great ones. There is a time for everything. Since April 1985 we have probably covered more ground than in all the years of Soviet power. Ours is the path of democracy and the revival of self-consciousness in the peoples of our union. That is why it is so important to ensure that all the USSR's problems are solved through reasonable dialogue.

All other paths will lead us into deadlock.

Lithuanian Plans for Economy Questioned

PM0105121590 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 1 May 90 p 3

[Special correspondent S. Doronin article under the "Situation in Lithuania" rubric: "Let's Swap Meat for Paper"]

[Text] Vilnius—An analysis of the prevailing economic situation in Lithuania enables us to draw the following quite definite conclusion: The republic's incumbent government has no concrete action program for the emergency conditions. The steps that they are proposing are not making a substantial impact on improving the population's position.

The republic law "On Provisional Measures Under Conditions of the USSR's Economic Blockade" can hardly be constructive either. Leaving its biased title aside, let us take a better look at the substance of this act. Henceforth the republic is vested with emergency powers. It is entitled to remove and appoint an enterprise's leader, convert enterprises, change their plans, and make centralized use of material and financial (including hard-currency) resources belonging to local self-management bodies, state enterprises, cooperatives, and so on. It also makes provision for putting in agents to strictly monitor the fulfillment of the aforementioned measures. The most important point being that any wrongful act by anyone may be perceived as sabotage, with all the consequences which that entails.

How realistically is the republic's government acting, and can it forecast its own actions? The results to date indicate a lack of far-sightedness on the part of Lithuania's leaders when they declared Lithuania's unilateral secession from the Union 11 March. That is why the coming anticipated result is not the "long-awaited" freedom within the framework of the bourgeois Constitution of 1938 but a rapid downturn of the republic's economy. This will not result in an increase in the population's living standards but in the closure of many enterprises, stores that are emptier day by day, and increased unemployment. Incidentally, there are currently approximately 10,000 people out of work in Lithuania. What is every able-bodied Lithuanian citizen entitled to expect under current conditions? This is how Prime Minister K. Prunskiene, for instance, sees their future. Despite the loss of their main job they can switch to other work or retrain. There is also another option: They may be paid two-thirds of the basic wage rate for three months or a salary followed by unpaid leave up to three months. What then? The government program does not unfortunately look any further. Strict savings of energy sources have certainly been introduced, and active searches are under way for suppliers of the requisite industrial raw materials in other Union republics, oblasts, and cities. But can there be reasonable economic activity on the basis of V. Landsbergis' recommendations "to do what was done before—swap a freightcar of meat for a freightcar of paper or something of the kind"—in short, barter on a most primitive level?

You will not get far doing this. Lithuania's industry has, after all, been integrated into the Union economy for many years, and the overwhelming majority of its enterprises are totally and utterly dependent on partners currently outside Lithuania.

It is already clear that Western countries will not agree to any concessions on deliveries of oil, diesel fuel, and gasoline. With the best will in the world, the Lithuanian leadership is unable to pay $100 for a tonne of crude or $150-200 for a tonne of gasoline or fuel oil. You cannot describe the idea of preparing Lithuania's existing 20 oil wells—which can only provide 460 tonnes of oil a day as opposed to the required 16,600 tonnes—for exploitation as promising.

During the days before May Day drivers at a number of Vilnius' motor vehicle enterprises opposed the decisions taken by the parliament and government. Some 83 vehicles blocked the capital's traffic junctions, thus stopping traffic in the city for 60-90 minutes.

This action was not, of course, to everyone's liking. It was hard for people to understand from the worried rumors and the "loaded" evening television and radio reports of expected street disturbances that the drivers had taken this desperate step not at someone else's bidding but independently and for a definite purpose—to support the USSR president's decision by voicing a protest against the legislators' actions.

An important element must be seen in the action taken by the motor transport workers, whose discipline has always been top class: This was the first time, and they were the first to put up organized resistance to the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet's decisions. However the republic's mass media try to discredit this action, the drivers must be given credit for their courage. After all, they know that strict pressure will be put on each one of them—ranging from moral pressure to administrative measures. This has happened. Several people have already been dismissed for the others' edification and the republic's prosecutor, A. Paulauskas has informed them that criminal proceedings will most probably be instituted against the other people involved.

The idea is now being voiced with increasing frequency in the Lithuanian parliament that the operation of the laws that have been adopted should be temporarily suspended in order to begin dialogue with Moscow. For instance, the law on Lithuanian young men's military service and the law confirming the status of a citizen of the republic. But not the Supreme Soviet decision of 11 March. Only that proposal can hardly be considered constructive. There will be no dialogue on the basis of it.

Lithuania's 'Indebtedness' to USSR Refuted

904A0322A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 12 Apr 90 p 3

[Article by V. Yankauskas, chairman of the Lithuanian State Committee for Statistics: "What the Figures Say, or Once Again About the Objectiveness of Indicators"]

[Text] On the threshold of the First Session of the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania on 10 March 1990, Yu.D. Maslyukov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and chairman of the USSR Gosplan, [state planning committee] said that "...dialogue is necessary even when living together becomes difficult..." (IZVESTIYA, No 69). But in his responses to TASS and IZVESTIYA correspondents, Yu.D. Maslyukov begins the dialogue with claims that Lithuania, in 50 years of living as part of the Soviet Union, has become heavily indebted to other republics and the entire Union.

In response to a suggestion received, we will try as far as possible to comment upon and add to the thoughts and claims of the respected leader of an important economic department of the USSR, with which we cannot agree.

Yu.D. Maslyukov does not agree that Lithuania stopped in its development during the years of Soviet power. He suggests recalling the Lithuania of 1940 which manufactured one-third as much industrial products than the Union and in which almost 74 percent of its residents were employed in agriculture. The Lithuania of those years ranked among one of the last places in Europe and considerably lagged behind its neighbors—Latvia and Estonia—in volume of per capita national income.

Yes, Lithuania was an agricultural republic in 1940. But can this be regarded as a negative fact? The importance and significance of agriculture are obvious even now: Almost as much national income is created in agriculture (R2.7 billion) as in industry (R3.3 billion). As in 1940, more agricultural products are produced per capita in

Lithuania than in the USSR:

Table 1. Per Capita Production of Agricultural Products

Year	In Rubles		Lithuania Relative to the USSR, in percent
	Lithuania	USSR	
1940	656	393	167
1950	640	420	152
1960	904	570	158
1989	1,334	780	171

However, one should not rejoice over this. In surpassing the USSR in production of total agricultural products, Lithuania lags behind neighboring Western states considerably in agricultural production efficiency. Lithuania has a considerably lower yield (as in 1938-1940) of the basic agricultural crops:

Table 2. Comparison of Crop Yields (in centners per hectare)

Country	Rye		Wheat		Barley		Potatoes	
	1938	1987	1938	1987	1938	1987	1938	1987
Lithuania	11.6	27.8	12.3	38.7	12.5	31.1	114	107
Finland	15.6	22.3	19.6	23.2	16.3	25.1	144	151
Sweden	20.1	40.0	26.7	47.8	24.2	38.0	137	358
Denmark	19.5	37.6	35.1	...	34.2	45.1	181	325
Belgium	25.0	38.0	31.5	...	28.8	55.5	221	361
Hungary	12.7	19.5	16.6	43.7	16.0	38.2	74	160
Czechoslovakia	20.7	34.9	29.3	50.6	28.4	42.3	142	173

Lithuania also lags behind in milk yield per cow:

Table 3. Comparison of Milk Yield Per Cow (in kg)

Country	1970	1987
Lithuania	2,903	3,585
Finland	3,723	5,000
Sweden	4,070	5,822
Denmark	3,940	5,904
Belgium	3,597	3,935 (1986)
Hungary	2,252	4,864
Czechoslovakia	2,565	3,741

We also cannot particularly rejoice in the fact that labor productivity in agriculture in Lithuania exceeded labor productivity in agriculture in the USSR, since this indicator in the USSR in 1981-1987 was only 16 percent of labor productivity in agriculture in the United States. All the comparative data are widely publicized.

Therefore, one should not talk about the victory of socialist agricultural production. It can be asserted that just between 1961 and 1988 the losses in Lithuanian agriculture as a result of an inefficient system of production and production relations were more than R90 billion.

The Gosplan chairman is correct in claiming that production of industrial products in Lithuania has increased 84-fold compared to 1940. Machine tool building, shipbuilding, and other sectors of industry have been created anew. Rapid industrialization of Lithuania also created conditions for accelerating the rate of growth of industrial output in comparison with other republics. However, at what price? If one considers that the level of labor productivity in industry in Lithuania in 1988 was the same as in the USSR, consequently, it was 46 percent lower than in U.S. industry. Therefore, one also should not talk about the victory of the socialist methods of production in industry. In industry in Lithuania, as in agriculture, just between 1960 and 1989 the losses as a result of an inefficient system of production and socialist industrial relations (compared to the United States) were approximately R88 billion.

Other questions also arise concerning the rapid industrialization of Lithuania, and must be answered. For example, it is primarily Union-subordinate industry that has been developing, which mainly (60-80 percent) uses imported raw materials, and a large part of its output (50-60 percent) is shipped out of the republic. Consequently, the labor invested by skilled workers of Lithuania is exported. Thus, in 1988 alone, Union-subordinate enterprises transferred R714 million to the Union funds: R413 million in profit withholding tax and R301 million in deductions for the centralized funds of Union ministries and departments.

Comparing this sum with the increase in industrial production between 1961 and 1988 (8.3-fold), one can assert that more than R10 billion worth of financial resources of industry were exported from Lithuania during these years. Thus, in 1989, 43 percent of the Union-subordinate enterprises transferred from 40 to 90 percent of profits to the Union budget.

According to data of the Lithuanian Ministry of Economics (formerly Gosplan), in the last 25 years Union-subordinate enterprises and organizations transferred R8.9 billion to the Union budget, or 2.3 times the amount received in centralized capital investments. In addition, they transferred to centralized Union funds more than 1 billion in foreign-currency rubles and almost R99 billion in turnover tax.

In addition to the aforementioned direct export of financial resources, there existed hidden forms of export of additional output from Lithuania. One of them is the withdrawal of credit resources at the direction of the USSR Council of Ministers. In 1988 alone, the increase in credit resources withdrawn from the republic was R853.5 million, and between 1980 and 1988 the sum of these funds left under the authority of the USSR Council of Ministers increased from R1.2 to 4.1 billion. Between 1980 and 1988, Lithuania's economy (at a 10-percent profitability level) lost R728 million in revenue, and R1.6 billion when recalculated at compound interest. This indicates that capital investments for the Lithuanian economy were allocated not only for the purpose of assistance, but also taking into account the fact that they yielded a definite and often greater benefit than other regions.

So, whereas for 50 years capital investments were allocated to Lithuania as assistance, it should be recognized that the USSR's economy functioned abnormally and that someone at the center "helped" Lithuania in violation of the interests of other republics. I doubt whether even the respected Yu.D. Maslyukov would agree with that claim.

One of the social consequences of the rapid industrialization of Lithuania was the intensive immigration of residents from other Union republics. From 1958 through 1989, more people came into the republic than left it. People arriving from Russia accounted for half of the immigrants. In the last decade, Lithuania ranked third among Union republics in increase in residents (per 1,000), namely as a result of migration. As a result of interrepublic migration, Russians account for 40 percent of the increase in the republic's residents, Belorussians 19 percent, Ukrainians 14 percent, Lithuanians 10 percent, and Poles nine percent.

The majority of the arrivals have settled in cities, thereby exacerbating the housing problem and increasing the difficulties in forming an infrastructure. The Union ministries' contribution to construction of facilities in the nonproduction sphere is not great. Between 1976 and 1988, the funds of Union-subordinate enterprises accounted for only 14 percent of the state capital investments earmarked for construction in the nonproduction sphere. And about 40 percent of all people employed in the republic's industry work at these enterprises.

Construction of large industrial enterprises had negative consequences for the ecology. Thus, the Mazheykskiy oil refinery accounts for 78 percent of all carbon dioxide being discharged into the atmosphere in Lithuania and 88 percent of the hydrogen sulfide. The Kedaynskiy chemical plant discharges into the atmosphere 72 percent of the fluoro-compounds; the "Azotas" Production Association—93 percent of the chlorine; and the Panevezhis "Ekran" Plant—99 percent of the lead. Between 1976 and 1988, enterprises of the Union ministries allocated R160.8 million, or 36 percent of the state capital investments intended for construction of environmental protection facilities. The percentage of fixed production assets allocated by these enterprises for environmental protection is about 26 percent of the value of fixed production assets being allocated for environmental protection.

The respected Yu.D. Maslyukov is correct in saying that capital investments in Lithuania's economy were R50 billion between 1966 and 1989. However, 19 percent of this amount were funds of kolkhozes [collective farm] and residents of the republic. During this period, R14.8 billion were allocated to the republic's agriculture, or 29 percent of all capital investments: state funds account for only 60 percent of these investments. Some R4.1 billion, or 28 percent, of all investments in agriculture were allocated for acquiring transports, equipment, and other assets. However, whereas the volume of this type of capital investments increased 11.7-fold between 1961 and 1988, the energy-producing capacities of agriculture increased only 7-fold. That means that the state, through a monopolized industry, as a result of price increases for agricultural production assets, took from Lithuania, as well as other Union republics, a considerable portion of the farmers' funds. This again shows that, under conditions of a normal economy, there are no capital investments that do not pay for themselves. Otherwise this would be mismanagement.

We cannot object to the claim that in 1988 Lithuania produced R2,427 of national income per capita and the USSR produced R2,210. The difference in these indicators was 0.5 percent in 1985 and 9.8 percent in 1988. But we have already seen for ourselves that such comparisons merely answer the question: Who is better among the worst? When comparing per capita national income in Lithuania with certain countries in Europe, the following picture is drawn.

Table 4. Comparison of Per Capita National Incomes of Certain European Countries with Lithuania (in percent)

Country	1972	1973	1983	1984	1989
England	...	114	...	53	...
France	...	70	...	49	...
FRG	...	57	...	39	...
Austria	118	...	49	...	51
Finland	104	...	46	...	46
Sweden	66	...	47	...	51

Calculations show that R128.6 billion less national income was produced in Lithuania between 1960 and 1989 than in Finland and 155.8 billion less than in Sweden. Almost the entire volume of produced national income during this period was R154 billion. And this gap continues to increase.

The quantitative (physical) and value indicators of importing products into the republic and exporting from it actually attest to the **volume of reciprocal ties** of organizations and enterprises of various republics, since at existing prices and controversial methods of calculating imports and exports, there cannot be another assessment criterion. The effectiveness and expediency of the methods can be assessed only by comparing the financial balances of the volume of goods and resources. The respected Yu.D. Maslyukov, informing the readers that R16 million of capital investments will be used in this five-year plan for developing the Vilnius "Elfa" Production Association, including 12.3 million from Union centralized funds, left out some significant data: Between 1965 and 1988, the above association transferred R86 million of profit just to the Union budget, and an additional R74 million to the ministry. During these 25 years, R34 million and 3 million foreign-currency rubles in centralized capital investments, i.e., 26 percent of all capital investments, were allocated. This means that during the 25 years, the "Elfa" Production Association, thanks to its profit withholding tax, created centralized sources of funds and exceeded the sum allocated to it from these funds by a factor of 3.3.

The point is that the contributions to these funds are mandatory, but allocation of money from them is interpreted as assistance. This is considered part of normal economics, but it is not taken into account that the workers of "Elfa," like all workers of Lithuania, made a considerable contribution to the USSR's coffers.

We know with what effectiveness the Gosplan and USSR Government used these funds. We also know what negative consequences such a distribution had for the country's economy.

The economic essence of appropriating a portion of domestic and foreign debt to Lithuania and other republics is not at all understandable. After all, these debts are the result of the activities of economic services and the government of the USSR.

To submit claims concerning debts means to demand repeat payments and a repeat and additional contribution to the union coffers, the funds of which were used without the republics' knowledge.

The data presented once again indicates the need for the republic's independence and sovereignty, which would help assess the economic categories and the true mutual relations between republics. In our opinion, the indicators characterizing these and other ties should be their effectiveness and economic expediency, not rate of growth, overall volumes, and other declarative indicators.

Lithuanian Veterans Appeal to Soviet Soldiers

LD2704083490 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0700 GMT 27 Apr 90

[Text] Sajudis Information Agency reports:

An appeal of the Lithuanian union of former servicemen in Afghanistan to the Soviet Army soldiers and officers was received on 26 April. It says: The Lithuanian people who regard Lithuania as their homeland wish and can live independently in peace with all people. But the implementation of this idea is in danger. The veterans of the Afghanistan war appeal to the Soviet Army soldiers asking them not to take part in the (?spectacle) taking place in the republic of Lithuania.

Vilnius Mourning Rally To Be Held for Protestor

LD3004151990 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1300 GMT 30 Apr 90

[Summary] At 1300 GMT today the body of Stanislovas Zemaitis, who burned himself to death in Moscow protesting against Moscow's refusal to recognize Lithuania's independence, will be flown to Vilnius airport.

Following this a mass of mourning will be held in Vilnius Cathedral. A mourning procession will follow from Cathedral Square to Independence Square. Here, outside the building of the Supreme Council, Vilnius city residents will hold a mourning rally. At 1630 GMT the coffin containing the late Stanislovas Zemaitis will be taken to Kaunas where the people of Kaunas will come to the Statue of Liberty to bid farewell to the diceased.

The funeral of S. Zemaitis will take place on Wednesday.

Landsbergis Speaks at Funeral

LD0105005390 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 30 Apr 90

[Speech by Lithuanian Supreme Soviet President Vytautas Landsbergis at cortege for Stanislovas Zemaitis in Vilnius on 30 April—recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] Lithuanian Supreme Council Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis recalled that after 16 February 1918, volunteer Povilas Luksys became the first victim. His name has not been forgotten. Stanislovas Zemaitis became the first victim after 11 March of this year. Neither will his name be forgotten.

[Begin Landsbergis recording] He did not wish to express feelings of anger, hatred, or revenge—feelings which he did not harbor. He only felt [word indistinct] the love for Lithuania. Perhaps he asked himself, as I ask many [words indistinct] in Lithuania: and what can I do? And he [word indistinct] decided he must do this.

His determination, his step, and his response are in answer to the mighty in whose city he finished his earthly journey. [passages indistinct]

A declaration as it were, you (?threaten) [word indistinct] that Lithuania would have many victims. You perhaps, wish that there would be victims in Lithuania. There is no need for victims in Lithuania. Take me at your doorstep. Will this suffice? God willing. When we are [words indistinct] by this honored [word indistinct], for which we started the path with the Sajudis flag, with the flag of Lithuania, we always stated that there is no need for an armed course and there is not need for victims—we will proceed peacefully. Our hands grasp only trust and love and only our own truth is in our hearts.

However, we are subjected to tests. We are told: you are small and incapable of anything. We are being humiliated and insulted and they are waiting for us to break. Thus, one heart could not tolerate it any further. However, let its sacrifice strengthen all other hearts. We think it is possible to have [words indistinct]. We are [word indistinct] to accept the blow, but apparently it could be otherwise. The entire nation may be denied, in order to break it. And Stanislovas Zemaitis tells us not to break; that is what this sacrifice states. It declares there exists nothing one could fail to give up for Lithuania and freedom. Stanislovas Zemaitis will remain very understood, very close, very mourned, and very honored among us.

This was not just his sacrifice, but his farewell. [passage indistinct] similar to a vow of all endurances. Stanislovas, we shall endure...we shall endure. May Lithuania's soil, which you loved so much, and about which you thought in trying to do it some good, weigh lightly upon you. For you have done the most a human being could do. [words indistinct] [end recording]

Vilnius Private Radio Owner Describes Problems

LD3004182190 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 29 Apr 90

[From the "Radio Vilnius Listeners Club", feature presented by Rimantas Pleikys]

[Excerpts] To be honest, I have not had too much time for DXing since I am very busy at the private radio station M-1. I think that my colleague [name indistinct] has on many occasions told you all about (?it). Today I'd like to tell several things you might find interesting.

Two weeks ago, Lithuania's new minister of communications, Mr. Birulis, gave us the permission to rebroadcast the M-1 station on the medium wave frequeny in both Vilnius and Kaunas. So far this broadcast will be available only in FM 73.34 mhz (?area). The frequency allotted for the medium wave program is 1785 khz. The capacity of both transmitters is 1 kw. You might find it interesting to know that we plan to use former radio jammers made in the Soviet Union as transmitters of our broadcasts. We hope to purchase them on the black market for R1,000.

By the way, we also plan to set up a medium wave antenna of our own in the shape of the letter T in Lithuania's second major city Kaunas in between the two towers of the (?former radio channels).

And I must remind you here that the jamming of all foreign radio stations was officially stopped in the Soviet Union and Lithuania on (?30) November, 1989. In a word, we have many bold plans. I will tell you about some of them later on, but I'd like to stress the fact that regrettably not everything depends on our desires. [passage omitted] Now that the supplies of crude oil and natural gas have been stopped we are feeling a great shortage of electricity supplies. A week ago I found out that the Lithuanian state-run TV and radio had decided under these circumstances to reduce its program length and cut down the former rebroadcasting time of Moscow's two TV programs.

Something extremely peculiar is happening with the broadcasts of Radio Vilnius external service. [passage omitted]

We have heard from a number of sources that reception conditions deteriorate considerably as soon as the English and Lithuanian broadcasts of Radio Vilnius external services come on the air. We would very much appreciate if you could report the quality of reception in your part of the world of Radio Vilnius, Vsemirnaya Sluzhba—program in Russian of Radio Moscow, Radio Moscow World Service, and Radio Kiev. You see, these stations use the same transmitters.

Slightly over a month ago Radio Vilnius broadcasts on the short wave frequencies were not transmitted for a few days at all. Asked for an official explanation the Ministry of Communications of the USSR replied that this was the result of a mistake. After this so-called mistake I spoke to Mr. Malukevicius, the head of the Lithuanian state-run radio and suggested that Lithuania's (?own) short wave transmitter should be modernized. It is located in mid-Lithuania not far from Kaunas and has a capacity of 50 kw. You might find it of interest that this transmitter was made in Germany somewhere around 1936 to 1938. Of course it has undergone certain modifications since then. In my opinion, it capacity should be at least doubled to 100 kw. The antenna is directed at an angle of 260 degrees—that means it could be used for broadcasting to North America. If we wanted to do so a second antenna would be necessary. So you see we've got a lot of problems ahead. I sincerely hope that the state-run radio will overcome them. But now back to our private radio station M-1. [passage omitted]

M-1 plans to change its juridical status soon. At present we have been registered under the auspices of the Lithuanian Young Communist League, but we have decided that we want to be totally independent. The previously adopted legislation on the press in Lithuania allows us to do do this.

And now, before I end, there are several piquant details I'd like to mention. I think they will be of interest to everyone since they present a realistic description of the situation in Lithuania.

The private radio station M-1 has its office in the press center, which the pro-Moscow communists are determined to occupy. For the past several weeks volunteers loyal to Lithuania are guarding the building together with units of the Soviet Interior Forces. Men from both sides of the barricades (?pop into our studio) for a friendly chat and just look around. We rarely tell our listeners about this because we are afraid to cause unnecessary anxiety.

Together with my colleagues at M-1 we discussed the possible alternatives if the Soviet troops would decide to take over the TV tower in Vilnius simultaneously switching off the transmitter. One alternative has been worked out. We'd buy a medium wave transmitter of a relatively low capacity on the black market and start broadcasts from the underground. Of course, we'd follow this plan of action only in an extreme case. [passage omitted]

Estonian Ministers Discuss Independence, Lithuania

LD0105113190

[Editorial Report] Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian at 1100 GMT on 26 April in its "Peak Hour" program, carries a 45-minute discussion of the Lithuanian economic blockade and Estonian independence. The program is presented by Jiri Hansen and Raul Malk. Studio guests include Jaak Leiman, minister of the economy, and Endel Lippmaa, minister without portfolio, who is responsible for talks with Moscow.

Discussing the situation in Lithuania and the flexibility of Estonian economy, Jaak Leimann says, "We have been busy looking at things from a different angle these past few days. We have been acting out and thinking out and calculating figures on what we should be doing if something like this should also, well, hit us, for example; not according to the same scenario but for the reason that simply in some USSR regions, for example, in the coming summer, some kind of disturbances may occur or...or some kind of new catastrophes or new passions and what is one to do then? We have acted out this situation in respect of gas and petroleum and agricultural produce as well as many other areas, as to what would happen then. Well, the picture is anything but pleasing. That is, our stocks are indeed modest. The possibilities to increase our stocks are also modest because warehouses and containers have not been built for years, and so on. Yet, the situation is not at all hopeless. I would say this has indeed been considered and we would exist somehow for quite some time should such chain reactions of crisis take place."

Radio listeners phone in to the program with various practical suggestions for helping Lithuania, with washing detergent, sugar, oil-shale, etc. It is suggested that Estonia could relax its postal restrictions—in favor of Lithuania—which do not currently allow sending certain goods by mail.

Endel Lippmaa defends Kazimiera Prunskiene's Scandinavian visit but says that hard work is still needed to win support in the West, and that there is no reason to believe it should come easily.

Talking about Estonian affairs, Hansen refers to the all-Union resolution in respect of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and asks if now a resolution should not follow on the events of 1940. Lippmaa says, "Well, naturally one must adopt clear-cut resolutions here; that is quite clear. I must say the views are not all that uniform [in Moscow]. For example, Shevardnadze and perhaps Yakovlev to some degree—although this may become more clear tomorrow—accept indeed fully that the 1940 events stink rather and that corresponding commissions should investigate the matter to clarify what it was exactly that happened and so on and so forth. People who outright, well, would not listen at all in respect of this matter are relatively few indeed even if they do of course exist still. We have to work thorougly on this issue. Until now the USSR Government has not wished to set up any commission of this kind. What is more, the issue of, well, discussing the independence of Lithuania and Estonia has meanwhile been removed from the [USSR] Supreme Soviet's agenda, secretly, without an announcement to the effect that it had been removed. Now one has only to reinstate it. Indeed, we will have to work on this. At the moment this action is in hand according to Shevardnadze's proposal to set up a commission at the USSR Supreme Soviet for a detailed research into the 1940 events and to adopt a stance. I emphasize that to achieve that this commission is set up is a big job. It will not happen just like that because obviously the USSR Government does not wish to learn the truth about the matter."

When questioned about his meeting with Yakovlev scheduled for the next day, Lippmaa says he cannot see any agreements reached tomorrow as such. He continues, "it is essential to determine [his] viewpoints because he is indeed a member of the Presidential Council and it is very important what individual members of the Presidential Council think. In this respect this contact is of course undoubtedly extremely necessary."

On the subject of economic sanctions on Lithuania Lippmaa says, "I will emphasize once again: he [Gorbachev] as the USSR president is at the moment undoubtedly breaking the law because the USSR Congress of People's Deputies adopted an unambiguous law against any blockade: no one and nothing must be set under a blockade under any circumstances. Comrade Gorbachev as USSR president has been put on his post by the selfsame body, the Congress of People's Deputies. Consequently, he is subordinate to it. He has no legal basis for breaching resolutions of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies."

A listener asks about the Estonian Supreme Soviet proposing that an extraordinary USSR Congress of People's Deputies should be convened on the issue of Lithuania. Lippmaa says that with Estonia in the transition period the issue presents juridical complications. "Well, no, according to President Gorbachev's interpretation the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] has suspended both Estonian SSR and USSR Constitutions. Consequently, the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet cannot indeed any longer convene it." It could be done by the Estonian USSR people's deputies.

Juri Hansen says, "You have referred to the law. At present it is altogether an interesting situation: Moscow is living by its laws, Estonia is living by its laws, and Lithuania by its laws. How could this finally be resolved? What will this lead up to?" Lippmaa says, "I think, to a mutual understanding. At some moment or another it will be understood that things change, circumstances change and well, one needs to clarify mutual relationships." Leimann adds, "would that not be natural: different states live indeed by different laws."

Latvian Citizens Congress Opens 30 Apr

LD2904084990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0600 GMT 29 Apr 90

[Text] The Congress of Citizens of the Latvian Republic opens on 30 April. Two hundred and thirty delegates have been elected to attend. The draft main principles of the policy document of the Congress of Citizens say that the congress is assuming the obligations of representing the Latvian republic until the restoration of the republic's constitutional institutions. This refers to the institutions of 1918. The congress demands recognition of its authority both on the international stage and from the Soviet Union's bodies of state power.

Independence Issue on Agenda

LD3004111990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1038 GMT 30 Apr 90

[By TASS Correspondent Galina Kuchina]

[Text] Riga, 30 Apr (TASS)—Demands for the immediate restoration of Latvia's state independence will be heard at the citizens congress which opens today in the capital of this Baltic republic. This concerns the return to the status and Constitution of the republic which was proclaimed 70 years ago.

The congress participants represent the opinion of slightly more than 700,000 of its electorate. Only citizens of the Latvian republic up to 17 June 1940, or their direct descendants, could vote for delegates with the right of a deciding vote. Those who came to the republic during the Soviet period and who worked alongside for its well-being were allowed to register only if they desire to take up citizenship under the changed status of the republic. The candidates for future citizenship, and there were around 30,000 of them, also elected their representatives to the congress, but they have only a consultative voice.

On the eve of the congress of Latvian procurator, Valentin Daukshis, received many letters of protest against the division of inhabitants into categories and the aspirations of one group of people to dictate their will to all, without taking into account today's realities. Commenting on the protests, the procurator said: "The activities of the civil committees opposing Soviet authority and having convened a congress are increasing the schism in society and destabilizing the situation even more and are in conflict with the existing Constitution and the existing system. The watershed between the representatives of the native population and non-Latvians who have arrived here since 1940 has been practically prolonged."

A few days ago the bureau of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee appealed to all inhabitants of the republic to react soberly to the ill-considered intentions and appeals of the civil committees. Their position, the appeal says, causes lack of conidence in the future. It is not a path to a worthy life and general agreement, but a road to the unknown with alarm and disillusionment.

Program, Goals of 'Citizens Congress' Viewed

PM3004141990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Apr 90 First Edition p 3

[Own correspondent Lieutenant Colonel M. Ziyeminsh report: "What Is the 'Citizens Congress'?"]

[Text] Riga—A number of the republic's mass media organs have recently been covering the highly popular topic of the so-called "Latvian Republic Citizens Congress," due to open 30 April. The natural question is: Just what is the "Citizens Congress"?

It all started with an unofficial action by informals from the movement for Latvian national independence, who approximately two years ago set about instilling order in "the registration of the republic's citizens." The basis for this was the criterion that only those people who were living in Latvia before 1940 (that is, before the establishment of Soviet power) could be considered full citizens.

Almost simultaneously with the registration process, citizens committees—something akin to alternative structures to the soviets—began to be set up. Understandably, they were not covered by any legislative acts. The republic Supreme Soviet Presidium 13 July 1989 resolution "On the Activity To Set Up Citizens Committees," which, in particular, recognized that the organization of citizens committees contravenes the main provisions of the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Constitution as well as existing legislation, was the logical result of this activity. But at the time the stipulation was made that the activities undertaken at this stage by the citizens committees did not threaten the state and were not therefore classifiable as criminal. It is now clear that this stipulation played a decisive role in the future activities of these committees.

Today the "Citizens Congress," to which 230 deputies have been elected, is a fait accompli. Just what kind of structure is it and how does it intend to operate? The draft "Basic Principles" state the following on this point: "The Latvian Republic Citizens Committee assumes the duties of representing the Latvian republic until such time as the constitutional institutions of the Latvian republic (referring to the institutions of 1918—M.Z.) are restored, and demands recognition of its powers both in the international arena and on the part of the organs of USSR state power." Essentially it is a question of a new organ attempting to present itself as the sole legitimate representative of authority in the republic, an organ whose powers—as was stated at a news conference—will be extended "until such time as legitimate authority is restored in Latvia." This refers to the activities of the Seimas elected in accordance with the 1922 Constitution, the real legal force of which—as is stated in congress documents—should be restored along with the restoration of state independence.

A special draft resolution has been prepared on the activity of the "Soviet forces of occupation on the territory of the Latvian republic." In what sense is this new in comparison with the distasteful allegations about the "occupation" and "aggression" of 17 June 1940? It is being proposed that the USSR president and the USSR Supreme Soviet "begin talks immediately on the procedure for the Soviet forces of occupation to leave the territory of the Latvian republic." Ministry of Internal Affairs and KGB troops are equated with Soviet Army units and subunits. Young people's refusal to serve in the Soviet Armed Forces is deemed legal. The congress goes even further than certain informal formations in respect of national-territorial military formations. Such formations are entirely impermissible within the structure of the Soviet Armed Forces, the draft resolution states.

The following question is increasingly being asked of late: How will the new structure, which can in no way be called peace-loving, coexist with the republic's new parliament?

Riga Radio Carries Latvian Citizens' Congress

Independence Discussed

LD3004124890

[Editorial Report] Riga Domestic Service in Latvian at 0700 GMT on 30 April begins broadcasting a live relay of the Latvian Citizens' Congress at the Philharmonia Concert Hall in Riga.

The congress is declared open and "God Bless Latvia," the Latvian national anthem is sung. Archbishop Karlis Gailitis reads a scripture then speaks on the future of Latvia and their distrust of the CPSU. He mentions briefly the example of Lithuania, and God's guidance, and concludes with the Lord's Prayer.

At 0706 GMT a song on encouraging people's diligence, which has become the anthem of the People's Front, is sung.

At 0709 GMT Aigars Jurgens, chairman of the Citizens' Committee speaks about the work of the Citizens' Committee. He proposes a commission of vote counters. It is proposed that the time allowed for speeches in the debates not exceed three minutes. This proposal is adopted. A presidium of six members, a secretariat, and a mandate commission are elected.

At 0720 GMT an account of the agenda for both days is read and adopted.

At 0728 GMT Jirgens delivers a report on the citizens movement. He begins with the evils of the Soviet occupation, giving a historical account. He calls the Soviet call for a citizenship cynical. Offering citizenship under the present state of occupation, and confronting the Supreme Soviet with its new image, our citizens, he claims.

At 0747 GMT Viktors Kulbergs emphasizes the need for all three Baltic peoples to stick together. He mentions how Gorbachev called on the Latvians first, then the Estonians.

At 0751 GMT Olgerts Eglitis considers the basic principles of the Citizens' Congress.

At 0803 GMT Guntis Berzins, from England, greets the congress on behalf of Gunars Meierovics, who has not been given a visa, and talks about the decisions of the World Association of Free Latvians concerning the future of Latvia.

At 0809 GMT there is a report on behalf of the mandate commission on the delegates elected.

At 0836 GMT Jiris Dobelis invites Aleksandr Barkanov, from Liepaja, to speak. He speaks in Russian about one native land and suporting citizenship, and receives prolonged applause.

At 0844 GMT greetings in Estonian, translated into Latvian, from the Estonian citizens' movement are read. They stress the unity of the Baltic states, mentioning a Baltic spring. The torn down Berlin Wall has been re-erected in Lithuania, as if Europe could not live without a wall. The Latvian congress accepts responsibility not only for Latvia, but also for Lithuania and Estonia. Respect is expressed on behalf of the Estonian Congress, and wishes for the liberation of Latvia. Long live Latvia, Estonia, and Lietuva is said in the respective languages, to loud applause.

At 0853 GMT a proposal for a monument to Karlins Ulmanis is approved by applause.

At 0855 GMT a brief proposal is read on behalf of the editorial commission, for achanging the wording of an item in the basic principles—that the Saeima, not the

Citizens' Congress, which was a precursor to the Saeima, should represent the republic.

Elections Viewed

LD3004133190

[Editorial Report] Riga Domestic Service in Latvian at 0900 GMT on 30 April continues its live relay of the Citizens' Congress at Riga's Philharmonia Concert Hall.

At 0902 GMT the congress adjourns for a brief break and resumes again at 0922 GMT. A report is presented on the poor election results yesterday; only four People's Front candidates were elected, although the People's Front has a majority in the Supreme Soviet. The number of Interfront deputies has increased considerably.

At 0925 GMT a speaker asks for the Constitution of the republic of Latvia to be respected.

At 0935 GMT Leiskalns delivers a report on the restoration of legal state power to the republic of Latvia, and details various provisions. He says the congress could only have temporary power until the Saeima is elected.

At 0938 GMT Grigulis expresses surprise at the idea that elections to the Saeima could take place in the presence of the occupation army.

At 0942 GMT Lacis notes that several agreements with the Soviet Union have been broken in the past, and stresses that elections should take in the presence of international observers.

At 0947 GMT Grinblats reads a draft proposal on how to restore Latvian independence. This includes international talks with those who recognize the Republic of Latvia de jure, talks with the Soviet Union, and other proposals. He is doubtful that enough support can be mustered to accomplish this, but also acknowledges that there are some true allies.

At 0954 GMT the next speaker talks about the number of people who have registered as citizens; they are quite a force, But many are still afraid.

At 0958 GMT Raimonds Stepins talks about the need to restore the Aizsargi organization, which could perform good service especially during times of confusion. The majority of militiamen are not citizens of the republic. The organization could also guard the border.

At 1004 GMT a proposal is read on behalf of Miezitis, who wants to return his Soviet passport and replace it with a passport of the Republic of Latvia in its place.

At 1023 GMT Baiba Petersone delivers a report on the election regulations to the committee of Latvia.

At 1030 GMT Juris Dobelis talks about the illegality of army participation in elections and about the ideas of a federation.

At 1037 GMT Einers Repse doubts the wisdom of resolutions which, if implemented, would stop legislative activities. He also says that there is still fear of following Lithuania's example.

At 1100 GMT a draft proposal of an appeal by the Citizens' Congress to the Latvian Soviet Socialist Repubic Supreme Soviet deputies requests the cancellation of the 13 July 1989 Supreme Soviet Presidium decision on the activity of forming citizens' committees and the 1 March Supreme Soviet decision which put the people of Latvia to shame.

At 1114 GMT a lunch break is announced until 1300 GMT.

World Appeal Debated

LD3004164190

[Editorial Report] Riga Domestic Service in Latvian at 1302 GMT on 30 April continues its live relay of the Latvian Citizens' Congress at Riga's Philharmonia Concert Hall following the break for lunch after an initial failure to reestablish the link with the Philharmonia Hall. At 1302 remarks are heard in progress concerning the editorial commission.

At 1305 GMT Romans (Kusars) appeals to the countries of the world on behalf of the congress for freedom for the Baltic states. He points out Latvia's honesty in international relations in the past, and says mankind should support not only the independence of, say, Namibia, but also of the Baltic states. Latvia must again return to the family of free European countries, he says and goes on to read the text of the proposed message to the peoples and governments of the world. Among other things the message calls for UN observers and talks with the USSR.

At 1317 GMT are series of brief remarks by various speakers in support of the message.

At 1329 GMT another speaker talks about the closeness of the Baltic states to one another, and suggest a possible federation of the Baltic states.

At 1331 GMT the congress is informed that Egils Levits, a lawyer from the FRG, who has helped Latvia's cause a great deal, has been detained at Riga airport and is not being allowed to participate. Then follows a discussion concerning election to the committee.

At 1338 GMT there is a five-minute break in the link with the Philharmonia Hall until 1343 GMT when a male speaker is heard speaking about undemocratic elections, conceding however that the Supreme Soviet could be made use of in supporting the aims of the congress. At 1347 GMT Eriks Vebers speaks about cooperation with the Supreme Soviet, followed by Janis Straume supporting cooperation with the USSR, but noting that the Citizens' Congress should not become an appendage of the occupying power.

At 1352 GMT another speaker suggests that the words "The Army" should be deleted from any drafts. He is followed by (Cilinskis) who thinks that the democratic forces have gained a majority in the Supreme Soviet although it still does not have enough power.

At 1356 GMT Einars Repse suggests that the Supreme Soviet should not be continued to be called the self-administration of the occupying power.

Candidates Nominated

LD3004172190

[Editorial Report] Riga Domestic Service in Latvian at 1400 GMT on 30 April continues its live relay of the Latvian Citizens' Congress at Riga's Philharmonia Hall. Valdis (Bekovics) thinks that Gorbunov's declaration on improvements within the federation only means "an improved slavery". Half a century's mistake should not be repeated, he says. What was interrupted in 1940 should be restored. Another speaker suggests changing the tone of the declaration, considering the aspects concerning the Supreme Soviet.

At 1406 GMT Juris Freibergs talks about the extraordinarily eventful week with the Citizens' Congress and the Supreme Soviet. Nobody would think of calling the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet an occupied country's self-administration, he says, and adds that the words about exploiting the Supreme Soviet should be altered.

At 1409 GMT (Anta Bergmane) talks about the solemn oath of a member of the Committee of Latvia and calls for a vote.

At 1412 GMT Vizma Belsevica is called to speak but there is a two-minute connection break. At 1414 Belsevica is heard to speak about not betraying the Lithuanians and against a president who would support the CPSU line. This is met with prolonged applause.

At 1416 GMT (Sergejevs) proposes a clause concerning the indivisibility of the territory of Latvia.

At 1418 GMT all the articles of the proposed document, including corrections about the provisional power of the Citizens' Congress and making use of the Supreme Soviet, and elections to the Saeima are approved separately, and the document as a whole is adopted.

At 1426 GMT, to save time, the chairman reads a list of proposed candidates to the Citizens' Committee of Latvia. Those present indicate their acceptance or otherwise.

At 1434 GMT Gita (Gemute) greets the young people in America in the name of Latvia.

At 1436 GMT Guntis Berzins talks about the policy of the great powers, especially the de facto recognition of the Republic of Lithuania. He says this is encouraging. Although there have been disappointments because of self-interest and not moral considerations by the Western countries, a great deal of attention has been aroused beginning with the Baltic Road. The Baltics have made front page news, he says, citing the London TIMES and other world newspapers, and other media including the BBC. Bush, Thatcher, and also Gorbachev understood that the independence efforts of the Baltic states could not be stopped. His remarks are met with applause. This is followed by announcements and greetings read by the chairman.

At 1449 GMT Agnis Balodis from Sweden talks about the situation as seen from abroad and the qualifications for citizenship of Latvia.

At 1455 GMT Martins Skujins talks about Latvians in Moscow and conveys wishes for success from the society there. The chairman then reads further greetings.

At 1459 GMT a report on behalf of the editorial commission on some corrections concerning the competence of the Supreme Soviet and the Citizens' Congress is read.

At 1504 GMT candidates to the committee are proposed.

At 1507 GMT one of the 17 deputies to the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet talks about the unfairness of being called representatives of establishments of an occupying power. But, guided by the People's Front, they have accepted these accusations and slanders with the goal of Latvia's freedom and independence in mind.

At 1510 GMT a break of 15 minutes is announced.

Oath Debated

LD3004175890

[Editorial Report] Riga Domestic Service in Latvian at 1535 GMT on 30 April continues its live relay of the Latvian Citizens' Congress at Riga's Philharmonia Hall. Listeners who want to hear a relay of the congress tomorrow are invited to telephone the radio station for details.

At 1536 GMT the detailed corrections to the text of the appeal to the world are discussed until 1542 GMT, when the appeal is adopted by a vote.

At 1544 GMT the names of candidates' to the committee are read and they are asked to indicate their acceptance or refusal if they have not previously done so.

At 1555 GMT Guntis Berzins says that they had wanted to nominate Egils Levits, but as he is in exile it has been difficult to coordinate among the possible candidates. Another speaker suggests there should be candidates from every country, and another suggests to elect 48 people, that Levits could be included among them, and the remaining three to be coopted later, from among exile representatives. This proposal is adopted. The chairman then conducts procedural matters concerning the election, which will be by secret ballot. A vote counting commission is proposed and approved.

At 1610 GMT the chairman reads further greetings and messages.

At 1613 GMT the chairman says one more document should be adopted, but the editorial commission is not in the hall, and so a vote is taken on whether there should be a break or "filling in time". The reporter explains that the delegates are discussing among themselves the resolution of the congress concerning the Supreme Soviet. At 1620 GMT specific objections are asked for and the relevant corrected passage is read. After a call for it not to be adopted at all, the resolution is adopted.

At 1625 GMT further greetings are read and the chairman says that the day's program is completed. But there is further discussion concerning the proposed oath. Some delegates complain that it smacks of the Young Pioneers' oath, and Gailitis gives a religious approach to oath. The reporter then says there was no point in telephoning the radio about tomorrow's possible relay, as there is nobody at the radio station now who could authorize a change to tomorrow's program schedule. The live relay ends at 1631 GMT.

Riga Radio on Pro-Moscow Latvian May Day Rally

LD0105093890

[Editorial Report] Riga Domestic Service in Russian at 0657 GMT on 1 May begins to carry a live relay from Riga of the May Day rally organized by the pro-Moscow Latvian Communist Party.

The reporter says that people from many parts of Riga are attending, and that he can see very many Army caps—officers and paratroopers. The main theme of the rally, he forecasts, will be maintaining the unity of the Soviet Union. Military music is heard in the background. The report says that the atmosphere is less like that of a May Day rally, than a military parade. He then says a few sentences in Latvian. He announces that the organizers of the rally, Alfred Rubiks and Klaucens, are walking on to the platform. Scattered applause is heard. The reporter says that he cannot see any of his friends or acquaintances present.

At 0705 GMT an unidentified man opens proceedings in Latvian, followed by an opening announcement in Russian, stressing the importance of May Day as a workers' festival. He speaks of the problems currently facing the country, then declares the rally open. This is followed by applause.

At 0708 GMT Alfreds Rubiks, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Latvian Communist Party began speaking. He speaks for one minute in Latvian followed by eight minutes in Russian. He discusses his concerns over the anti-socialist activities of the secessionists, and attacks the Citizens' Committees, which he accuses of attempting to deprive people of citizenship. He insists that Latvia must remain in the USSR and claims grownig support for his party's policies, as evidenced by the recent election results. In conclusion, he appeals for support for the Latvian Communist Party and wishes his audience good luck and happiness.

At 0717 GMT a series of speakers talk about their fears over secessionist adventures and gloat over the Lithuanian Communist Party's election successes. They speak mainly in Russian.

At 0758 GMT Lopatin, head of the pro-Russian Interfront organization, starts speaking. At this point, the studio announces that coverage of the rally is over.

Latvia Cancels Support Rally for Baltics

LD0105070890 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 0430 GMT 1 May 90

[Text] Latvia is on the eve of great historical events. Having seen groups of paratroopers walking in the streets of Riga, and listened to warnings about possible provocations during the envisaged 1 May meeting of the People's Front of Latvia, the leadership of the people's front of Latvia will not organize today the meeting of support for Lithuania and Estonia.

Moreover, the greatest assistance expected from us by the peoples of Lithuania and Estonia is the decisions of the first session of the new Supreme Soviet on the restoration of state independence. In the name of that, let us avoid any mass undertaking which, during these days, could provide cause to the opponents of the Baltic Road for hampering the peaceful course of preparations for the session. So then, let us not gather at 1130 today at the Daugavmala. The meeting will not take place.

Poll Shows Native/Non-native Split in Latvia

PM3004153190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 May 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Irina Litvinova report from Riga under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Sociologists' Predictions"]

[Text] On the eve of the first session of the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet (it opens 3 May) the Sociologists' Association has acquainted the republic inhabitants with the findings of its research within the framework of the "Public Consensus" program.

Some 24,600 questionnaires were received. Among those polled, 92 percent of representatives of the indigenous population and 45 percent of the nonindigenous population expressed themselves in favor of an "independent Latvia." Five percent of Latvians and 52 percent of non-Latvians expressed themselves in favor of a "federation." The sociologists asked: What course of action should the Supreme Soviet take: Should it adopt a decision on independence at its first session, or should it first secure the economic base and obtain consent from Moscow? The first option was favored by 62 percent of Latvians, and the second option by 71 percent of non-Latvians.

Judging by the results of the poll, Latvians view potential changes in the republic's life following a proclamation of independence relatively optimistically—"those who work better will be able to earn more," "democratic freedoms will be expanded," "industry will get closer to the level prevailing in developed countries."

Among a substantial section of representatives of other nationalities the idea of Latvia's independence provokes above all "doubts, alarm, and uncertainty." They are convinced that "there will be unemployment," "there will be discrimination against the non-Latvian population," "there will be a deterioration in the supply of essential goods," and "the number of people with incomes below the official level will increase."

Virtually all the Latvians who were polled replied that, if Latvia became independent, they would remain where they were and adopt Latvian citizenship. Many non-Latvians take a different view: Some 68 percent would remain in Latvia, but only just over half of them would adopt Latvian citizenship, 13 percent would move to the USSR, and two percent would go to other countries.

RSFSR

PRAVDA Reports on Gorbachev Urals Visit

PM2704154190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Apr 90 Second Edition pp 1-2

["Mutual Understanding Is the Buttress of Perestroyka. M.S. Gorbachev's Meetings at Urals Labor Collectives."—PRAVDA headline]

[Excerpts] Sverdlovsk, 26 Apr—What needs to be done to live better, to radically change the socioeconomic situation in the country? This question arose repeatedly during the meetings of M.S. Gorbachev, USSR president, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in labor collectives in the Urals. Today is the second day of Mikhail Sergeyevich's stay in Sverdlovsk.

Yesterday evening at the works management of Uralmash he had a meeting, lasting hours, with workers, engineering and technical staff, representatives of the labor collective council, and with the party aktiv of the association. Since the auditorium could not accommodate everyone who wanted to take part in the frank, controversial conversation, its progress was relayed to the works square where many hundreds of Uralmash people had gathered.

I have a tremendous desire to have a talk with you in a calm, businesslike atmosphere, M.S. Gorbachev said, opening the meeting. What is worrying us? The fact that the Urals, which has done, is doing and will do so much for the country—this mighty region is now experiencing great distortions and strains in its development. Not only production and economic ones but also social ones. And this is already spilling out into certain moods. The situation is worrying us.

These last few hours of contacts and conversations with the Uralmash people shows that the correct information is reaching us. People are confirming what was already known to us, which gives rise to a certain disquiet. In any case, one can evidently speak of certain deformations having taken place in the development of the Urals' production forces. On the one hand, a mighty cadre and scientific potential has been created, still capable of performing further great tasks, and on the other hand there are problems of ecology and social tension.

M.S. Gorbachev asked the Uralmash people to express their ideas on this point.

Our meeting and my arrival in your oblast, he continued, precisely coincides with a very important stage in the development of the economic reform.

What we have gone through is like a preparatory stage of that reform, and we have come to understand the country in which we live. Perhaps in the main we have understood its illnesses which, along with achievements, undoubtedly exist. We have tried many approaches in the economic sphere, new methods of management. Some have succeeded, others not, and here and there we have simply miscalculated.

But at all events this was the period which, especially when we are talking about one of the greatest changes in the country's history, we have passed through, and now we have the foundations of a legal order, and economic experience. We have acquired experience; we have started thinking differently and we have started talking to each other differently. An environment has come about in which one can solidly and radically begin economic reform.

Therefore talk is important, from these angles too. What is more, I see anxiety. It has appeared both in the press and here. How are we going to live? And in general it touches precisely upon what we are going to do in order to live better, so that the situation should change for the better. Evidently people's patience is already at its limit. So from that point of view the trip is very important for me.

We have conducted two USSR Presidential Councils, joint sessions of the USSR Council of the Federation and the Presidential Council. We will return to that again, and then, as they say, we will go to the people in order to weigh everything up thoroughly. Such a change needs to be made by everybody, together, if we understand each other. Sharp turns are calculated in what is envisaged to be proposed to the working people, to the country. But we need to do things in such a way that we travel this road with the least losses.

I.I. Stroganov, general director of the Uralmash association who spoke next gave a short description of the enterprise and told of the tasks and problems facing the collective. [passage omitted]

Under the existing state of affairs and with the very low rents the association sustains losses each year amounting to 7 million rubles on housing alone. Children's preschool establishments and a number of other facilities are loss-making, too. We have 45,000 apartments on our books, but today there are 12,000 people in the housing line, because we build housing but are also obliged to give it to other people who do not work at "Uralmash."

(Gorbachev) Wherein lies the sickness, and not just that of "Uralmash," but of the other works in the Urals economic region too?

(I.I. Stroganov) We made a major mistake when we created additional jobs; for a time we forgot about the person, about the social base. The regional sickness seems to lie in precisely this. And second. All of us together, we made a real mess of agriculture. It's the time not to give help, but for everyone to restructure themselves fundamentally in this way...

(Gorbachev) I noticed that labor productivity is nevertheless quite decent at your enterprise. Is this linked with modernization of production, price formation or with the intensification of labor?

(Stroganov) Unfortunately with intensification...

(Gorbachev) When you say that according to your calculations the changeover to the new economic relations could ruin machine-building, which calculations do you have in mind?

(Stroganov) These calculations have been done on the basis of the deductions that are being planned: 30 percent to the union budget, 27 percent to the republican budget, plus new types of payment for land, electricity and labor resources. If you add all of this together, then we are left with less than 30 percent. That is to say that nothing remains for forming capital funds. And this is a key question for us.

(Gorbachev) Do you compare your products with similar competitive models? What is the difference between them?

(Stroganov) By way of example I'll say that our quarry excavator is absolutely competitive with foreign machines of the same class. We supply this equipment to Soviet customers for R90,000: There has never been an instance when we have sold each excavator abroad for less than 600,000. [passage omitted]

A.S. Osintsev, deputy general director of the Association for Economics, touched on the question of how one should asess the monopoly of "Uralmash" in the production of unique machine building parts. I think, he said, that we do not need to be afraid of monopolists such as "Uralmash." We are a long way away from becoming a monopoly, for the level of our output depends not so much upon ourselves as it does in many cases upon a mass of component manufactures and actions by suppliers. It is here, at the supplier level, that we must initiate demonopolization or, rather, organize broad competition among suppliers to enable us to really choose the best.

M.S. Gorbachev asked the deputy director to answer the question: What, in his view, causes society's concern when the question arises of the radicalization of reforms and of us having to take consistent and major steps toward a market economy? What has frightened people and caused alarm?

It seems to me, the economist replied, that apprehensions arise as a result of the losses without which there can be no shift to a market economy.

It cannot avoid falls in the volumes of production and unemployment. I believe that these two factors are the chief ones. They, most of all, are making people worried.

(M.S. Gorbachev) But if it is a case of having to take this path, and I have understood from the speeches here and from numerous conversations during the visit to the enterprise, that everyone realizes that this is the path we have to take, then it is necessary for everything to be thought through and weighed up beforehand, for everything to be discussed. The essence of matters should be known not only at the center, it should be understood not only by economic personnel. Ordinary people and work collectives should understand precisely what it is all about.

We do not wish to rush headlong into the market, and such an approach is unacceptable to us. The transfer should be carried out on the basis of a considered policy. We must, particularly in the initial stage, have a grip on this process and regulate it by means of a price mechanism.

Social protection measures must also be provided for. Finally, it is necessary to think of the fact that a process of regrouping, and possibly a laying off, of the working force will take place in manufacturing. But our cooperatives are only just coming into being, the service sector is not developed, just as everything connected to trade is not developed. For example we have enormous loads on our retail trade capacity, whereas the world has already gone through all that. Nearly always they have a ratio where the number of people employed outside of manufacturing is greater than the number working in material manufacturing. In other words, everything here is stil the other way around.

Basically everything—is in material production. So, we still have much work, we can employ people. But a system of re-training is needed, a plan of action is needed. This must be understood by everyone! I am convinced that in our country today unemployment occurs where we do not think things out, do not work things out. We shall keep our promise. When we are ready to talk with people, when we have thought everything through, we shall present well-thought out measures, we shall submit them to society's judgement. They will have to be worked out in each region, in each labor collective.

From the hall the request was heard for an opinion on the latest publications in the press about the so-called economics of shock therapy Polish-fashion.

(M.S. Gorbachev) So the press has frightened people? From this hall, from Sverdlovsk, the whole press must be told, and the journlists who are here present must learn and tell others: In these matters particularly well-considered judgements are needed, publications must not carry only the element of alarm.

The speech by A.R. Sagalovich, head of mechanical workshop No. 15, touched on an important aspect of radicalization of the reform. In my opinion, he said, enterprises are entering the market economy by various paths. This means it is necessary to take into account the state of the basic assets of each specific plant. Some have more worn assets and other newer ones.

Today there is a leasehold law. But often, when the division of money in the collective begins according to the coefficient of the share of work, the system does not work. Where people are good the system really works. Where the collective has not taken shape, it does not operate.

In order to advance further, the question needs to be asked regarding the role of the manager, the organizer of production and the specialists, and regarding the responsibility for the course of economic reform and his role in the course of that reform.

(M.S. Gorbachev) And don't you feel remote tremors in connection with reform and a change in the situation: That it is already necessary to prove one's right and entitlement by competence, conscientiousness, and the capability to work better? For soon everybody will have to prove this. Does not such a way of putting things have an effect on discipline, on responsibility, and on conscientiousness?

(A.R. Sagalovich) It does not. Well, maybe to a certain degree. My opinion is that at the level of the top manager of a structural subsection, a factory, for example, it is possible to manage somehow in the old fashion. But further work must be carried out in accordance with some other system.

Yu.F. Chebotarev, head of the social-cultural-service directorate of "Uralmash," devoted his speech to the difficult problems of his work. In part he raised the question of this area's unprofitability. As an exmaple the cost of a square meter of new housing was brought up. It increases with each passing year, but the payment per square meter is fixed as previously. They have tried to touch on this question but have received a decisive rebuff from the public.

(M.S. Gorbachev) How much housing do you have and what is the subsidy for maintaining it?

(Yu.E Chebotarev) The subsidy from the works is almost R7 million...

(M.S. Gorbachev) Obviously many people would agree to take apartments as their own property?

(Yu.F. Chebotarev) There is such an initiative, however the right of such a transferral has not yet been given to the local soviets.

(M.S. Gorbachev) But this concerns your housing—departmental.

(Yu.F. Chebotarev) Departmental—yes it's departmental, however there are many complicated issues here.

(M.S. Gorbachev) But this is a matter of handing them over for free. The apartments are received, people live according to the norm. We are not talking about those who are waiting. Their situation, of course, must be improved. But those whose housing corresponds to the norms should have it given to them as their own property, for free. And let them maintain their apartments themselves and pay for this themselves. For comrades, when we say that rents here are low—this is an artificial approach. They reduced wages—and at the expense of this they made housing cheap.

Naturally, this does not concern people in need, poor people. The state is bound to take care of them. But as regards the basic mass it is possible to act in this way. But then, when someone realizes that it is his own apartment, then he will maintain it in a different way. And the housing stock will be in a completely different condition. Especially our entrances.

Look at what the West does. There wages decide everything. Public stock is very small. On the whole people live on their wages. They get, say, 2,000 dollars and immediately 30 percent go on housing and 11 percent on taxes. Forty odd percent of their earnings has already gone.

We are used to: This is free, that's free—and people do not see their wages anyway. Now if they were to receive them in full and pay for everything themselves, then it would be a completely different matter.

Apart from this, what does receiving housing as property mean? It means: People have received property. One person, two, many. That is, market relations appear in society.

So far this does not exist here. But the question must probably be considered properly.

A.A. Tokminov, leader of a mixed-skill [kompleksnyy] team, recounted that at "Uralmash" the workers' initiative, labor effort and fervor had dropped sharply recently. At present the workers who work well, quite honestly, do not understand who benefits by the creation of artificial obstacles to prevent them from working even better and to higher standards, and receiving worthy remuneration for this.

(M.S. Gorbachev) I want to support your concern. The concept of producing more and better in conditions of economic reform by a smaller number is a key one. We have been throttled by egalitarianism [uravnilovka]. If we don't properly value the labor of the worker, collective farm worker, teacher, doctor and engineer, but keep on assessing it according to the scale and the rate, we will not move forward. I have been told of cases where surgeons, for instance, cannot carry out an important operation without high-grade nurses. But a surgeon does not possess any rights to encourage a specialist who, in his opinion, is worthy of a professor's wage.

And what happens: Such a nurse leaves the team and the whole cycle of complex operations falls apart. There is a similar picture everywhere.

In science also remuneration is according to ranks and degrees—seniors, juniors and scientific assistants. But the contribution to the common cause over a year, over the last five years, which a man has contributed to, hardly bothers anyone. But if his work was noticed because, according to the contract, some amount was received thanks to this, then in any case it was divided equally.

Let us agree: It is necessary to initiate a resolute struggle against egalitarianism [uravnilovkoy], beginning with every workplace and every working operation. Otherwise we will deprive ourselves of the opportunity of constantly deriving benefit for society from the energy of talented people. Having thanked the USSR president in the name of the collective for visiting "Uralmash," P.N. Tobolov, chief of a workshop, drew M.S. Gorbachev's attention to the labor conditions of association's metalworkers. In the last year alone the shop has lost 150 high-class specialists. Some have left because of the poor working conditions, others because of the low pay.

A very great number of women are already working at our enterprise, V.F. Boyankin, a smith from section number 37, noted. They are working on a sliding rotation, meaning that it includes night shifts. What does a woman who works on a sliding rotation feel? You can already imagine, the worker added, for you have seen our furnaces.

(M.S. Gorbachev) In general, the situation of women, above all, is an indicator of the fact that our society needs changes. Let us acknowledge this honestly. Take just the USSR Presidential Council—there are no women there. Take the other leading bodies—it's the same dismal picture. But on the other hand, they are working in places where there shouldn't be any women at all, in hot workshops, on a three-shift system. [passage omitted]

Summing up the results of the meeting M.S. Gorbachev said: Here in the Urals huge masses of people are concentrated, who are dealing with tasks in the economic, scientific and defense spheres that are of importance for the country. And that role which Sverdlovsk and its labor collectives are playing, and your anxieties and concern, all this has made us come here. I think I as the president and the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and other members of the Soviet leadership ought to pay more attention to the Urals.

This conference and the conversations with the workers of "Uralmash" are of great importance for me. We have reached a stage in perestroyka when one has to take decisions that are of very great importance for the destiny of the country. And what people are thinking, the way they are assessing the situation and the thigns they consider necessary to be done, all this is very important now.

You obviously realize that I have a position of my own and my own convictions. And nevertheless through all the years of my life and work I have believed in the following method: Any decision ought to be checked agianst the opinion of the working people, no matter how one assesses it oneself. This is a most important condition for a policy to be right and for fewer losses and mistakes to be made.

When we began perestroyka we saw our society in one light. Having gone more deeply into it, we began to understand that minor repairs alone, repainting, a change in wallpaper, will not do. Changes were necessary everywhere and very serious ones—in the economy, in the federation, in the party, in the soviets, in culture and in the whole spiritual sphere, with the aim of ennobling society and creating normal living conditions for people.

We have now approached the stage of adopting major decisions. It was for this reason that I decided to come to you, knowing the potential of the Urals—human, intellectual, scientific and cultural. I see this meeting as support and interpret your opinions in relation to our policies and to the actions of the center as a desire to attrac the leadership's attentions, so that it does not overlook anything serious.

It is true that people have not been able to do without demagogy either, in several conversations. But demagogues also make use of democracy and even more so than we do. It should, however be the other way around: That all sensible people and responsible people in our society should make use of glasnost and democracy and genuinely take power into their own hands.

In this sense I would like to answer the question raised in the discussions and the notes—how does the country's leadership and how do I personally view the working class' role at the current very important stage of society's development.

The party will not be able to achieve the implementation of its policy and to march in the vanguard of change unless it bases itself upon the working class. I am greatly alarmed by the fact that 12 workers resigned from the party today. I would not say: It's the nature of the present time; some come others leave. I would ask both the works party committee and ordinary party and works comrades to meet with them and try to understand what the matter is. The country's leadership is pinning its hopes on an active contribution by workers into all our affairs. And not merely at the machine, although I agree with the comrades who say that it's time we finished with meetings and discussions and started active and productive work. The discussions will probably continue, but the center of gravity ought to be shifted to implementing policy in all spheres. And we are counting on the support of the working class everywhere.

It is a pity that at the elections of USSR and Russian Federation people's deputies, and even at those to local soviets, many workers have been squeezed out. To put it frankly: the soviets will only lose from it. Perhaps they should think of setting up consultative bodies which the most front-ranking and active workers, faithful to the cause of the renewal, would join. Secondly: Give an account to labor collectives of all they do. Without such a link, neither the soviets will work as they should, not will the workers be satisfied.

We must introduce this kind of a 'correction coefficient,' and also think about why many workers withdrew their candidacies and refused to participate in the pre-election struggle, and ask ourselves whether it was because it was taking place in such a form that this was discouraging from them. One must learn from this. One mustn't allow the soviets, which to some extent, I would say, no longer fully represent the working class and peasantry, to find themselves cut off from life and from people's real concerns.

My main point in my answer on the role of the working class in the current crucial time is this: If the working class remains apart from the political processes, or at least does not take up a very active role, perestroyka will lose, we will be marking time. I want us to understand this. More opportunities for the working class to take a more active role have come into being today. Both the trade unions, the labor collectives councils and other social and economic mechanisms need to be used so that the working class may influence everything which now occurs.

Further, M.S. Gorbachev answered questions from Uralmash workers. Answering a question about individual housing construction, he stressed the necessity to meet people's initiatives halfway in all ways possible and to give them the maximum help including the use of enterprises' resources. A real opportunity now exists to accelerate housing construction and I have several proposals on this count. I would ask local bodies to concern themselves with the allocation of land for individual housing construction. It is also necessary to give land for gardens and vegetable gardens so that those who wish to, may grow all that they need for themselves. This has both a social and educative significance, and a significance in relation to foodstuffs. A man on the earth, communing with the earth, is a quite different man.

M.S. Gorbachev read out the following question: "In my view, the open letter of the CPSU Central Committee on consolidation based on principle, contradicts the principle expounded in your Lenin speech. This principle is closer to me as an ordinary party member. I know your style fairly well thanks to the mass media and it seemed to me that you personally did not participate in the composition of the open letter. Is this so?"

I will speak bluntly—I did participate, was the answer. I think, comrades, we should take into account the concern, to which Communists' letters to the Central Committee serve as testimony. There are messages from your works among them as well. Gatherings and conferences express anxiety about the party's fate and about preparing properly for the congress so that it can cope with the tasks being placed before it, both from the point of view of the aims of perestroyka and from the point of view of strengthening and enhancing the vanguard role of the CPSU.

We have taken this in and have tried, as far as possible to express it in the platform and the draft rules. Perhaps a little more work was needed but the documents were published so that communists could discuss them, express critical remarks and go to the congress with good ideas and proposals which would strengthen the party and give it a new, attractive look. And as well, so that communists might feel themselves to be really in charge in the party.

It may be that as yet not everything is working out, but the direction, the line we have taken is the correct one. We have invited Communists to come forward with alternative platforms. We are for freedom of thought, for the juxtaposition of points of view. We have published the "Democratic Platform," then the "Platform For a Marxist Party"—go ahead, comrade Communists, and discuss them!

But why were we obliged to write that letter, against what? Communists were worried by the fact that, instead of consolidation, to all intents and purposes work had begun to split the party. This was no longer the struggle of opinions, the juxtaposition of points of view, the search for the real truth, no longer consolidation but rather an attempt on the eve of the congress—or perhaps at the Congress itself—to split the party. At this responsible and crucial stage in the development of the country, the state and society, we cannot allow the force which is the CPSU to be put in jeopardy. So the letter is directed against splitters, not against those who criticize the platform. Incidentally, this document was distributed to all Central Committee members and to first secretaries of kray and oblast committees. They contributed their remarks, and then the question arose: If someone criticizes the platform and the draft rules, what then? Should this comrade be removed from the party? If that were the case we would have had to start with the first secretary of the CPSU Moscow City Committee Yu.A. Prokofyev, given that he voiced some serious critical remarks as far back as the Politburo meeting on the draft of the platform. Of course not!

We are talking about people who are heading toward a split. At the present responsible stage the party cannot fulfil its vanguard role if it is dragged into a struggle among factions. We are for the consolidation of all forces—those on the "Democratic Platform" and those who have proposed the "Marxist Platform." In juxtaposing all points of view things must be done in such a way that the congress is able to fulfill its task.

Replying to a question about possible versions of the development of events in Lithuania, M.S. Gorbachev said: We hope to arrive at a political resolution of the problem. But I must say to you and to the country that we are up against a leadership which is displaying adventurism and is speculating on democracy. For, even for the simplest matters proposals are prepared which are subjected to preliminary examination in the soviets and are then put forward for people to discuss and it is only after this that decisions are made. Here, however, in deciding a basic question of the fate of the republic and of the people living in it, a question affecting the whole population of our multinational state—the deputies assembled at night, raised their hands and made the decision. This does not come within any framework of democracy.

I think that the Third USSR Congres of Peoples Deputies acted correctly, and we—the president and the government—have only the mandate of the Congress: The constitutional structure should be restored. It is necessary to return to the position which existed in the republic on 10 March, and examine the question after this. Otherwise, what will happen? What will happen to the people who wish to return to their own republics (non-Lithuanians—there are about 700,000)? What will be the fate of the Belorussian lands? Further for 500 years Klaipeda was in German hands and as a result of the war was transferred to the USSR and, insofar as Lithuania was a part of the USSR it was united with that republic. Today the people of Kaliningrad are putting forward the proposal to unite Klaipeda with their oblast.

Finally, how is the oil, raw material, etc. to be paid for? In foriegn currency? We shall discuss that, too. For the "divorce process" what will be needed is first of all a referendum. It is necessary to find out what people will say, and the Lithuanians are a very sensible people, a cultured and educated people. Let them give some thought as to which path to follow. In my opinion there is an increasing number of sober voices there now. People's thirst for an independent [samostoyatelnyy] Lithuanian state can also be satisfied within the framework of the relations of the federation. The important thing is to tackle all of these questions in a normal and constitutional form.

Thus, we shall not retreat from the mandate of the Third USSR Congress of Peoples Deputies.

A question has come in about the islands of the Kuriles ridge. We have no superfluous land. We shall adhere to the helsinki positions—the recognition of postwar realities, including the inviolability of borders.

There was the following question, too: Does the government study such phenomena as unidentified flying objects. The president replied that as far as he was aware there exist scientific collectives engaged in studying such phenomena.

This question came in: "Why, in your opinion, does Comrade Yeltsin enjoy great authority in the Urals and at Uralmash, but not with the government?"

M.S. Gorbachev replied: I have already been asked in the streets what my attitude is to B.N. Yeltsin. There was the time when I invited the first secretary of the Sverdlovsk oblast party committee and Central Committee member to transfer to work in the Central Committee. We needed somebody in charge of the construction department, and Comrade Yeltsin, besides his party experience, had experience of construction, for he is a builder by education. He agreed and got actively involved in that work. Then, when the need to tackle the question of the first secretary of the Moscow committee came up, the choice was for Boris Nikolayevich. I presented him and recommended him on behalf of the Politburo and tried to support him. He set about the job ardently at first, but events developed in such a way that the situation in the city party organization grew tense. In the summer, when I was on holiday, he raised sharply the question of his resignation from that post. I said: I'll come back and we'll have a chat. My aim was simple: to cool passions, so that Comrade Yeltsin could continue working. But Boris Nikolayevich did not heed this advise and insisted on being relieved, since he did not want to work in such an atmosphere. I do not think he had sufficient arguments. It was some kind of whim, strictly speaking, and that is just how the Central Committee saw it. But you have read all this—we published the story of this matter in full.

I was convinced that he had to be kept and I tried to keep this process within the framework of party democracy and comradely discussion. I attempted to ask once more how he viewed the observations of comrades. No, he said firmly, I ask you to relieve me. Well, let it be. Subsequently I insisted that his experience should be used in a ministerial post and that he should continue his activity in the Central Committee.

There are all manner of turn-arounds in life. We took account of some of B.N. Yeltsin's qualities which had already been revealed when he was here—you know his style better than I do—but we thought that the Moscow party organization and the responsibility would "grind all that down" and the excesses would go. That did not happen. Then, in my opinion, he chose the course which was not the best and set off on the course of confrontation.

What are we getting from him? Nothing except a full dose of criticism. Well, that is the right of every member of the Central Committee, and deputy, his right. But it seems to me now that his potential as a political figure nonetheless is not great. His program and his speeches are known to me. If they are taken in succession, it is like an old played-out record, a collection of theses: The leadership is living out its term, it has exhausted itself, torn itself away from the people and so on and so forth. If one takes the criticism by itself, it is of some use, all the same. However, I cannot agree with his indiscriminate accusations directed toward the leadership of the country, toward the party and the Central Committee.

What he touches upon requires serious political analysis. While remaining principled, critical, demanding, one must behave responsibly oneself. Boris Nikoalyevich is speculating upon the difficulties, upon the socioeconomic tension. All that does exist, but one can and must act in order to draw lessons, to turn the matter round, and not speculate upon the difficulties from demagogic positions. I think that here, Boris Nikolayevich has got carried away and is not at all able to get off this destructive track.

Of course, you understand; That it is only because I am in Sverdlovsk and you are asking me about it that I have given such a detailed reply. On the whole, I have never delved deep into these discussions, I do not like them. Today, we need to get things done, not engage in slogans and promises. I think probably something should be said about privileges. We ought to get to the point where there are no illegal privileges. There should be just one privilege: That labor, talent, position and merit should all be valued, but on the basis of law. In this connection we have already resolved a great deal. I know that both in your region and throughout the country these problems—concerning private residences and all manner of "special benefits"—are being resolved.

In Moscow, as far back as the time of the Civil War, Lenin and the country's top leadership were provided with state dachas. In the thirties the system was given legal status through appropriate decisions. This was done to fix the leadership's salaries at a certain level, so that they would not differ sharply from those of workers, officials or the intelligentsia. Salaries for Politburo members and for secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee were R800, but in conjunction with this it was possible to order provisions up to a value of R400. And there were a number of other concessions. Now we have handed over all the dachas: In one case to veterans, in another for children, in a third case for medical purposes, in a fourth for holiday homes.

From now on all this will be decided at the Supreme Soviet, as is the case in all states. As far as the top two or three people are concerned, the Supreme Soviet will have to pass an official decision on what level of salary to set and what conditions are attached, and then publish this information for everyone to know. The main criterion is that everything should be assessed in terms of salary, and from there on one lives as the rest of the country lives.

Now we have got as far as personal pensions and personal transport. This all needs to be thought through. I shall tell you frankly: We are of a mind to impose strict order.

What should be the state's first concern? Particularly deserving people—veterans, regardless of whether they are party members or not—and families with many children. Much has already been done in these six months. This work has proved to be not simple. The fact is that the system of privileges is to be found practically everywhere. For example, all the creative unions build holiday homes. And what is the situation in manufacturing industry? Industrial workers themselves have earned the money to build their own social facilities. At Uralmash, let's say, who makes use of the holiday homes, the convalescent homes or the hunting lodges or whatever—is it all the workers or only the bosses? In other words, are there privileges here too or not? People argue over this. And I think: Let them argue.

The main criterion is the same: Everything should be evaluated according to the labor contribution of each person—worker, peasant, member of the intelligentsia, scientist, cultural worker and state official.

Now, if you will permit me I shall say a few words about the allegations that Gorbachev has an account in a Swiss bank and pays his royalties into it. I must disappoint those who love rumors: All of my royalties go into the party funds. This includes the royalties for the book "Restructuring and the New Thinking For Our Country and For the Whole World," which has been published in many countries. I put a million rubles into the party funds and did not take one kopeck for myself. I sent R350,000 to Irkutsk Children's Hospital, handed 100,000 dollars to the Russian Children's Clinical Hospital for very sick children. Raisa Maksimovna acts as patron of that hospital and helps it to develop in such a way that children from all over the country can receive highly qualified help here. R50,000 has been paid to the Culture Fund, R200,000 for the Terkin monument, R150,000 to Armenia for the victims of the earthquake, R50,000 to refugees from Azerbaijan. Royalties for that book are still coming in. What I do with them you can see from this "account" that I have given.

And, of course, there are no bank accounts in existence anywhere. It is demeaning and simply shameful even to reply to these fabrications. It pains me as a person that at times people stoop to such a vulgar level of, literally, narrow-mindedness, using such clumsy fabrications for political ends.

Many serious issues in urgent need of resolution have accumulated in our country. And it is necessary to approach all of them in a responsible manner.

But the main thing is to show, from the example of our vast country, that socialism is capable of carrying out deep transformations within the framework of democracy and legality. It is necessary to do everything to avoid confrontation in society and even more so to avoid civil war, violence, illegality and arbitrary actions. The rule of law must prevail. No more organizing of witch-hunts or sowing of hatred in the quest for an enemy must be permitted.

Can the fate of Russia lie in this? Can one arrive at a democratic and humane socialism via new lawlessness? No! I am convinced that in our country we must do everything in a good way. What is needed is patience and restraint. Some people make this appeal to me: Mikhail Sergeyevich, bang your fist! Others say: Give the order to strike at the headquarters! Dear comrades, we are developing the democratic process and the construction of a law- based state so that the people, themselves, should decide all the very important questions via the institutions of democracy and democratic processes in the party. But to strike with one's fist means failing to escape from the vicious circle.

We must become a civilized country. That is what our peoples, who have suffered so much and have done so much for history and for the entire world, are worthy of. After all, without our socialist contribution the world would be different today.

And now, if perestroyka is victorious, there will be an entirely different world. If we lose—even though I think that we won't lose, simply our path may turn out to be more or less painful—the world will change for the worse. I know for a fact that you will no longer return our people to the old life and you won't shut them up. The oxygen which our society has received as a result of democratization and openness is what our people and each person needs.

That path of changes on such a scale is difficult, not everything succeeds as planned. And we make errors, and we endure them, we endure them in a human way. But there is no return to the past, our people have already gone through too much for them to be muzzled again. Indeed they themselves will not permit this. That is the main thing which I would like to say in conclusion. I hope dear Uralmash workers, that you maintain your reputation at a high level and maintain your character. Without you the country cannot live, just as you cannot live without the country. And in this spirit of mutual understanding let's part. I wish you great success, we will help one another also in future! (Applause)

Perestroyka is, first and foremost, the individual and concern for his vital needs. It is not by chance that the attention of M.S. Gorbachev, who on Thursday continued his visit to Sverdlovsk, was drawn to the blocks of the country's first youth housing complex. [passage omitted] The problem of foodstuffs in the country, including the Urals, is as acute. How can it be solved most quickly in the interests of Soviet people? This was the subject of a conversation between the USSR president and shoppers and sales people in one of the city's supermarkets.

M.S. Gorbachev was interested to know which foodstuffs and goods it was possible to buy, and what presented particular difficulties. The people complained in particular about the lack of fruit. Here the line is as follows, M.S. Gorbachev said: The city should have enough storehouses and conclude agreements about deliveries from southern republics. There will be no other means. It's not good that there is no reliable center for storing fruit and vegetables in Sverdlovsk. It is not good for such a city to live on handouts on what's being supplied to it. I know storehouses are being built here, but evidently things are progressing slowly.

On Sverdlovsk's main square—named after the 1905 revolution—the USSR president and CPSU Central Committee general secretary laid flowers at the V.I. Lenin statue. A conversation with war and labor veterans on the glorious traditions of the Urals and on the valor and loyalty to their homeland of its sons and daughters.

I cordially greet you, dear veterans, Mikhail Sergeyevich addressed them, especially on the eve of the 45th anniversary of the great victory. The whole country is preparing to give the generation which did everything to defend our life, freedom and ideals, its due.

N.I. Mikhailova-Gagarina, a veteran of the airborne assault troops, entered the conversation. We are proud of what we have lived through, she said, noticeably nervous. We thank the state for its care of us. Mikhail Sergeyevich answered: The optimism, confidence and calmness of the veterans always attracts me. [passage omitted]

We need, M.S. Gorbachev said, to renew society and more fully open up the possibilities of the socialist system and increase the party's authority by deeds. And we will certainly preserve our ideals and spiritual values, we will carry the banner of our cause high.

For how do some people act: They, it seems, are in favor of the renewal process but are ready to throw out the baby, as they say, with the bath water, and are prepared to reject socialism. We ourselves, of course, must investigate our party base. If someone has decided to act differently today, let him act as his conscience allows. But we must go to the congress consolidated.

M.S. Gorbachev approached another group of citizens who wanted to know the president's point of view on the problems of forming a market economy in the country and his opinion on the draft laws being prepared and the means for improving the economy. There was a detailed and frank conversation on these themes.

One of the questions, outside of the general framework, went like this: Why are talks not being conducted with Lithuania?

—We conduct talks with other states—Mikhail Sergeyevich answered—but we consider Lithuania a Soviet republic. If you remember the question was put precisely in this way at the Third USSR Congress of People's Deputies. And you and I, in the face of the Congress decisions, are in an identical situation.

The Urals has from time immemorial forged weapons for the defense of the homeland. A powerful defense potential has ben created here. The new political thinking born of perestroyka has allowed the country to reorient a considerable proportion of the capacities of the defense complex to production of purely peaceful output.

An exhibition of consumer goods set out at one of the enterprises which is undergoing conversion, the Urals Electro-Mechanical Works, shows how this difficult process is proceeding. M.S. Gorbachev looked around the exhibition.

He assessed the creative work of the engineers, designers, and workers by whose efforts high-quality competitive civilian products are being produced.

As the saying goes, there are goods and goods. It is very important, the president of the USSR noted, to use the great intellectual and technical potential of the defense sector to obtain output of the hightest category. The exhibition displays the most modern models of medical apparatus, household electronics, and video equipment. It was emphasized in the conversation that it was important for these items to be put into mass production more quickly and that they should become not just exhibition display items but goods which everyone can buy.

A detailed dialogue about the problems being tackled by Soviet scientists and about the development of the scientific potential and of the Urals took place at the Institute of Metals Physics of the Urals Scientific Center.

Leading representatives of virtually all branches of science had assembled here for the meeting with the USSR president.

Opening the meeting, G.A. Mesyats, chairman of the Presidium of the Urals Scientific Center and vice-president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, dwelt in detail on the main activities of the Urals branch of the Academy, which now unites 38 scientific institutions, special design bureau for scientific instrument making, and a number of engineering centers.

The majority of those who took part in the exchange of views drew attention to problems of the development of fundamental science, having noted the need to raise its prestige, renew the material base, and strengthen higher educational establishments. In particular, it was pointed out that the interests of the development of fundamental science and the results of the introduction of market principles in the economy are now entering into a contradiction. A firm legislative base, which removes this tendency, is necessary, the speakers believe.

It was said also that the scientists' limited opportunities for developing international contacts is one of the factors restraining progress in science and research.

Addressing the meeting, M.S. Gorbachev said in particular: I profess the following point of view. In politics there would be fewer mistakes, policy well-grounded, real, and effective, if it rested on scientific knowledge. A scientific prediction of our advance is especially topical in the Urals, in a region which plays an immense role in the development of the productive forces of the entire country. The Urals have taken on too many of the country's worries during the years that were difficult for it, for us to continue exploiting it today without thinking of anything apart from increasing capacities and labor resources.

In this hall I have heard much that is useful and interesting, M.S. Gorbachev stressed. Now, according to him, is precisely the moment for everyone together to think soundly about things, including the question of how it came to pass that such a oblast, has found itself with such old capital stock.

Responding to the addresses by the scientists, M.S. Gorbachev noted that he shares their concern over the state and fate of fundamental science in the Soviet Union.

The president replied to questions by participants in the meeting concerning both problems of scientific and technical progress and the realities of today's sociopolitical situation in the country.

In the evening a meeting between representatives of the working people of Sverdlovsk oblast, party, war and labor veterans and M.S. Gorbachev took place in the Youth Palace.

The participants in the meeting were addressed by M.S. Gorbachev. The address will be published in the press.

TASS on Gorbachev TV Interview in Urals

LD2704164690 Moscow TASS in English 1936 GMT 27 Apr 90

[Text] Nizhni Tagil April 27 TASS—"Meetings and conversation in the land of the Urals showed that Soviet people support perestroyka policies and are determined to back more decisive steps towards the implementation of the economic reform," Mikhail Gorbachev said in an interview to Soviet Television today. The Soviet president has concluded a three-day tour of the Sverdlovsk region.

Speaking yesterday before people of Nizhni Tagil, Gorbachev said that he returns to Moscow, being enriched with impressions. He said his chief impression is that despite the toughness and fairness of the demands made by people in the Urals, he has not felt panic and confusion, but only the wish for decisive changes so as to open opportunities for creative, constructive and effective work.

"We have only one road," Gorbachev went on. "Perestroyka, glasnost help us to overcome errors and miscalculations. But no one could offer and, I am sure, will not be able to offer a serious comprehensive programme, an alternative to our policy of perestroyka based on values of the October, on socialist ideals, aimed at expanding the potential of society in which we live, at making it more humane and democratic. This policy has been prompted by life itself." Soviet people can make a breakthrough, the president said. He said the country is about to start the advance to a market which would expand the possibilities of the economy and people. Gorbachev said that the purpose of this policy is to formulate a competitive man-oriented economy.

With the 45th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War drawing nearer, the Soviet president greeted war veterans present in the hall. He said it is necesary not just to thank the older generation, but to bow low to them in gratitude for the fact that the Soviet people can live and work and make plans now.

Gorbachev returned to Moscow this evening.

More on Gorbachev Visit to Nizhni Tagil

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[Unattributed report: "'Great Consultation' With the Working Class"]

[Text] Nizhni Tagil (Sverdlovsk Oblast), 27 Apr—The city of metal workers and machine builders today greeted M.S. Gorbachev, president of the USSR and general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, who came here from Sverdlovsk. The final day of the president's visit to the central Urals was saturated with numerous meetings and frank dialogues with representatives of the working class on pressing problems of socioeconomic life and the radicalization of economic reform.

The president's "great consultation" with Nizhni Tagil's labor collectives is of particular importance. Founded approximately 270 years ago as a city of prospectors and metal workers, Nizhni Tagil has not changed its "profession," having become a mighty industrial complex these days and a leader in the Ural economic region.

That is the "professional background" of this worker city of almost 500,000 people. M.S. Gorbachev began his acquaintance with it by visiting the F.E. Dzerzhinskiy "Uralvagonzavod" Production Association. This is the country's largest complex producing heavy-duty mainline open freightcars.

Mikhail Sergeyevich's first meeting with machine builders on the enterprise's main square clearly determined the substance of his numerous later meetings in production bays, namely the economy and the environment.

"I came to visit you as soon as I became president," Mikhail Sergeyevich smiled.

However, the discussion immediately became businesslike. The USSR president asked the machine builders how things are going with them, since the country's railroads have an acute need of modernized rolling stock and modern equipment.

Complementing one another, the machine builders said that the association is experiencing hard times. Conversion is compressing defense production—and that is a good thing. However, the capacities that are being released must be converted and adapted for mass production of the output that the national economy is awaiting in order to obtain full return from them.

Many of M.S. Gorbachev's interlocutors—workers, engineers, workshop leaders—told him today that this process is by no means going smoothly and is sometimes just painful. Wages are falling and production is losing intelligent, skilled workers. The lack of clear planning guidelines and the reduction in discipline, including delivery discipline, is also making an impact.

"We must certainly make intelligent use of conversion," M.S. Gorbachev said. "We regard conversion as an essential reserve for restructuring and transferring the economy to a market footing. The defense complex, in which the country has invested so much effort, intellect, and money, can and must, after all, afford tangible assistance in saturating the market with goods. The state conversion program has been developed to organize this work efficiently."

At one assembly shop bay a group of young people asked M.S. Gorbachev to describe in more detail how the country's leadership sees the transition to a market system of economic activity and what specifically this model will do for the working class.

"Above all," M.S. Gorbachev said, "it unties labor collectives' hands and will enable each one of you to be real masters of your trade and, of course, its results."

"But we don't need anything else," one interlocutor said. "We are not asking the state for any favors because we sense that we can work better and get better wages. If only we could cast off the fetters and everything that is impeding us..."

"This is what we are moving toward," M.S. Gorbachev said. What is the point of complaining to each other. There must be more work throughout the entire country. As for the details of the radicalization of economic reform, we will—as I have already pointed out in Sverdlovsk—consult the people without fail on this subject. This is, incidentally, what I am doing now."

At one section a group of women workers complained to M.S. Gorbachev about the wild rampage of speculation which is literally emptying working people's pockets. As is always the case in such situations, there was no shortage of advice and suggestions—"put up barriers," "take very strict action," "don't let them off."

"I understand what you are saying," was M.S. Gorbachev's response. "We must combat speculators, self-seekers, and dishonest people and we are already mounting such a struggle, as you are probably aware. But, obviously you cannot achieve success here by prohibitive measures alone. Let's try to launch an offensive on these adverse phenomena from the other side, from the viewpoint of the notorious shortages. It must be overcome as soon as possible. Then there will be no rationing or lines and there will be no room in our economy for all these mafiosi, racketeers, and the black market. We are now using economic methods to form the kind of market that is geared toward people and is capable of meeting their reasonable requirements and providing every worker with a fitting lifestyle."

The program for radicalizing economic reform is now attracting many people, and the number of its supporters is growing rapidly. However, the road to the planned goals should not be seen as a one-shot effort, a single leap forward. What is needed is well-considered, well thought-out, persistent work. That alone can produce impressive, positive results.

M.S. Gorbachev was shown a flatcar manufactured from light-duty metalwork. This is superior technology, and a considerable amount of raw materials is saved in its construction.

"It is quite competitive on the world market," one specialist said of the freightcar. "It could be sold for dollars and the association would not be out of pocket in terms of hard currency."

"We must concern ourselves with our own country above all," M.S. Gorbachev pointed out. "You cannot expect anything good to come of the easy profit of economic egoism. Take this specific example: The association acquires the raw materials for this kind of output in return for rubles and gets its profit in dollars—does that mean for itself? No, comrades, we all have one option—we must produce more better output, and then the foreign market is forbidden to no one. We will only welcome this kind of economic initiative."

The final conversation took place near one of the plant buildings. The sunny spring day was delightful, with its blue sky and the first greenness of spring. This is, regrettably, a rare delight for the people of Nizhni Tagil. The sky above the city is most frequently obscured with motley clouds of smoke from the chemical, metallurgical, and other production units. Today's blueness on the horizon is not nature smiling but a kind of environmental window-dressing with which some people have tried to embellish the urban landscape for the president's visit. A few days before this visit—M.S. Gorbachev was told by many of his interlocutors—a number of most environmentally hazardous production facilities were switched to a "friendlier regime."

"It is often hard even for me, a healthy man, to breathe," 35-year old lathe operator Yevgeniy Lenda said. "What is it like for my two children and all the children in Nizhni Tagil?"

It is no accident, he went on, that environmental neglect is constantly discussed at rallies. Yet it is wasteful to spend time on interminable debates now.

"When I looked at your boiler house from the aircraft, I immediately realized how neglected the environment is here," Mikhail Sergeyevich said. "There is a program to save the environment in the Urals. The government's recent resolution on improving Nizhni Tagil's social sphere and economy also took this into account. Your people's deputy, V.A. Yarin, member of the Presidential Council, was one of the people who initiated it. He will report all the details here today."

In route from the airport to the city, the president's vehicle stopped at a military cantonment. Naturally, the main topic of conversation here was the Army, its present concerns, and the future.

"The Army represents a serious problem for us," M.S. Gorbachev said; "thorough, deep reflection is needed here. The main line is clear—we must disarm and move onto a peaceful track. We have, after all, been spending almost 18-20 percent of our national revenue on military purposes. This does not happen in any other state: We're talking about billions!"

"The Army must be reformed. It must be competent, educated, and armed with state-of-the-art equipment that guarantees the country's security. Drafts for this reform are coming not only from the ministry but also from deputies and officers. We are comparing various opinions and preparing a program. The Defense Ministry is to submit proposals to the government on improving officers' housing and living conditions."

One and all turned out to greet the president in the village of Pokrovskoye, which also lay en route. Here, on the outskirts, the conversation turned to power at the local level. Many of the people to whom M.S. Gorbachev spoke voiced concern at the position with regard to the soviets: They have been given complete power, yet where is this power, really? The soviets' lack of money and humiliating dependence on their rich "uncles"—the departments—is taking its toll. In Pokrovskoye itself, for instance, the inhabitants who clustered round the president said that there are not enough funds to construct an outpatient clinic, there is nowhere to site a post office, and even the rural soviet building itself has long been begging for repairs...

Mikhail Sergeyevich asked whether there were any problems with water. No one present was able to name a single clean reservoir in the area, and it turned out that there are none: There have only been promises that antipollution installations will be constructed.

"The soviets and their real powers are the supreme question, the heart of the political reform," M.S. Gorbachev said. "We are doing everything at central level to ensure that soviets at local level do what they should—convey the wishes of their voters and the people. There can be no democracy without this. But, esteemed comrades, you must not sit idle. You must help the local soviets get on their feet and the soviets, for their part, will become a reliable instrument of perestroyka for you."

People were waiting for the president at the Nizhni Tagil V.I. Lenin Metallurgical Combine. The progeny of the first five-year plans, this enterprise will soon celebrate its 50th anniversary. But this by no means implies that people here are in an "anniversary mood."

It is not traditional for the people of the Urals to brag of their achievements. Rather the reverse: They are more inclined to ponder and talk about things that have not as yet proved completely possible. This constructive position which is truly characteristic of perestroyka was revealed from the very outset of M.S. Gorbachev's conversation with the metal workers.

The first steel works greeted him with a rumble of noise and fiery heat. Donning a protective helmet and waterproofs, M.S. Gorbachev went up to first one work area then another in an attempt to involve as many people as possible in the discussion and get a deeeper idea of the essence of the problems worrying people.

Introducing himself to the president, A.A Rozhin, a young fitter and repair worker at the "1500" rolling mill furnace, said the following: I have something important to say to you, Mikhail Sergeyevich. The crux of the matter is that indifference on the part of the sector and enterprise leadership to metal workers' feelings threatens losses: Rated specialists are leaving production, they are going to places where life is easier, where the air is cleaner, and where they pay more...

Mikhail Sergeyevich asked what steps the workshop leadership had taken to keep people. The steps are all the same, dating back the times of stagnation—just promises, the worker said.

During the conversation it then turned out that a year or two ago metal workers had raised the question of supplying kindergartens with fruit and vegetables, replacing totally outmoded equipment, and constructing specialized pediatric outpatients clinics. But things had not gotten moving at all. M.S. Gorbachev drew the attention of the sector and association leaders who were involved in the conversation to these critical statements made by the worker.

A difficult raft of problems has to be unraveled. The problems causing the people of Nizhni Tagil headaches today have, after all, taken years or decades to build up. On the eve of its 50th anniversary the Nizhni Tagil Metallurgical Combine is in acute need of comprehensive reconstruction.

V.A. Yarin, who acquainted the president with his home combine, passed the following comment on the situation: Perestroyka will falter here until these production units' profits are defended from departmental diktat.

It has been calculated that the radical modernization of the combine would "cost" R2 billion. Where are we to get these billions? Metal workers are well aware that the country has no spare funds now. There are vehement struggles in parliament for literally every hundred thousand rubles—this is not a whim on the part of people's deputies. Every sphere in the life of our society is in acute need of improvement. The people of the Urals, who are by nature averse to freeloading, clearly realize this.

Metal workers could not understand their "own" ministry's inefficiency and passivity either. After all, the first continuous steel casting installation developed at "Uralmash" came into operation at Nizhni Tagil Metallurgical Combine in the mid-1970's.

The housing issue was one of the most acute subjects voiced that day in Nizhni Tagil's hot workshops. There is a line of 9,000 people at the Nizhni Tagil Metallurgical Combine waiting to obtain apartments—almost one-fourth of all Nizhni Tagil residents in need of improved housing conditions. The city is in acute need of another large housing construction combine. But this also requires considerable funds. They can only be earned provided that skillful use is made of all the opportunities which economic reform provides.

That is why the people of the Urals are following so attentively the USSR Presidential Council's efforts to radicalize reform.

While striving to achieve this, we must not only rely on impetus "from above." After all, the smoke over the city comes for the most part from the Nizhni Tagil Metallurgical Combine's chimneys. This is the result of the use of outmoded technology and of indifference to scientific and technical progress. The metal workers' desire to ponder what can be done to rectify the situation with M.S. Gorbachev is natural.

"The enterprise's metallurgical stock is certainly very old," Mikhail Sergeyevich noted. "Science-intensive systems must be introduced more rapidly at the enterprise, and we will do our utmost to assist this. It was save metal, after all."

"But people are not made of iron, Mikhail Sergeyevich," one interlocutor remarked.

"I agree, but you are not the only ones in a difficult position now. Things are hard throughout the country. People expect a great deal from perestroyka—hence the disappointment. Renewal is proceeding with difficulty but most people believe in perestroyka, its aims, and course. What about you?" Mikhail Sergeyevich addressed a worker.

"I personally am among them," fitter and repair worker V.I. Vetluzhskikh said, "and most of my comrades too."

A meeting in the evening between representatives of Nizhni Tagil's working people and the USSR president at the metallurgical combine's culture center continued the dialogue begun at the workplaces and on the city streets.

The meeting was opened by S.F. Barkov, first secretary of the CPSU gorkom [city party committee]. The following shared their opinions, reflections, and questions concerning the difficult paths of perestroyka, the contribution to perestroyka made by the people of Nizhni Tagil, and problems of direct concern to them: V.A. Cherdyntsev, chairman of the city soviet of people's deputies; V.V. Yakushev, steel founder at the "Uralvagonzavod" Production Association; Yu.S. Komratov, general director of Nizhniy Tagil Metallurgical Combine; I.N. Fasakhov, head of the city's public health department; A.N. Demina, director of the No. 1 Pedagogical School; war veteran L.I. Kolbin; and Vladimir Maltsev, a young worker at Nizhni Tagil Metallurgical Combine.

M.S. Gorbachev addressed the meeting.

Preparations for Russian Congress Reported

LD2704143290 Moscow TASS in English 1414 GMT 27 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent Dmitriy Voronov]

[Text] Moscow April 27 TASS—Preparations for the first Congress of People's Deputies are in full swing in the Russian Federation, the largest Soviet republic. It is due to open on May 16 in Moscow's Grand Kremlin Palace.

The people's deputies, who were elected this spring, are united by their desire for radical changes. However, they differ about the ways out of the grave economic, social and ecological crisis in the Russian Federation, Deputy Chairwoman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Tatiana Ivanova told a news conference devoted to the preparations for the first congress here today.

The Congress Preparation Commission is now working on the agenda and procedure. Commission members have considered the experience gained during preparations for the USSR Congresses of People's Deputies, but a consensus has not yet been reached, Ivanova said.

A conciliation Commission has been set up to look for compromise solutions. In addition, a 213-strong Council of Representatives of Regions and the various groups and blocs that are now taking shape within the deputy corps will begin work during the last stage of preparations, starting on May 10.

Only one bloc has already taken shape—Democratic Russia—supported, according to the initiative group, by about one-third of the Russian Federation people's deputies. The total number of delegates to the congress is 1068. Vocational interest groups are also being formed—agrarians and physicians have already made clear their intentions in this respect.

Ivanova said there will be several candidates for the post of president of Russia. Democratic Russia, for instance, already nominated several candidates, including USSR People's Deputy Boris Yeltsin, for the post in the middle of April.

Preliminary estimates show that the forum will last ten to twelve days, including a brief recession for the first session of the parliament elected at the congress, Ivanova said.

Russian Social Democrats To Hold Congress

90UN1585A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian No 16, 21 Apr 90 p 2

[Article by P. Yevdokimov: "And Who Are They?"]

[Text] **A regular session of the organizational committee to convoke the Constituent Congress of the Social-Democratic Party of the Russian Federation took place last week in Moscow. The congress is to be conducted 4-6 May of this year in Moscow. People's Deputies A. Obolenskiy and K. Yankov were elected cochairmen of the organizational committee.**

Who are they, the current Social Democrats of the era of perestroyka? Descendants of the Mensheviks bearing the pedigree of G.B. Plekhanov, or politicians of a new formation who have taken final leave of the values of scientific socialism? As they emphasized at the session of the organizational committee, Social Democracy is not a new entity on the stage of history. Its rebirth on the principles of political, economic, and social democracy is inevitable. Social Democrats aspire to a market economy with protections for society and each person. Oriented toward the cooperation of differing social strata, they explained that they speak out against social demagogy which, in their opinion, splits society according to group and class characteristics. The Social Democrats believe that only dialogue and mutual respect can provide the impetus for the country's return to civilization.

As we have reported, the organization of Social Democrats functions today in more than 70 cities of the country, and dozens of Social Democrats have been elected to soviets at various levels.

"I attach great hope to the party," said A. Obolenskiy. "Personally I am for independence, but I am also for cooperation with all democratic forces. We must consolidate all active forces and unite on the road to the achievement of the common goal, but at the same time we must also make the most of our own goals." The congress is ahead...

Foreign Minister Cited on Foreign Contacts

LD2704193590 Moscow TASS in English 1901 GMT 27 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 27 TASS—The Russian Federation is ready for cooperation with foreign partners, including relations with individual states, Russian Federation Foreign Minister Vladimir Vinogradov told a news conference here today.

Speaking at the Foreign Ministry press centre, he said that the republic has full freedom to develop its foreign relations which are not limited by anything apart from the agreed foreign policy within the Soviet Union.

The Russian Federation, the biggest Union republic, has the greatest potential to expand its foreign contacts in the interests of strengthening relations of peace, friendship and cooperation between world nations, the minister said.

He noted that the decentralisation of administration in the USSR helped the Russian Federation in using its rights.

Speaking of contacts with administrative and territorial entities in other states, he said that Russia concluded over ten inter-governmental agreements, including Yugoslav republics—Serbia and Montenegro, West German lands—North Rhine-Westphalia, Baden-Wuerttemberg and Lower Saxony, Canadian provinces—Quebec and Alberta, two Chinese provinces and the American state of Illinios.

Talks will soon be completed with the Italian province of Veneto and the American state of Maryland. Foreign partners are very interested in economic matters, he said.

The volume of the Russian Federation's foreign economic operations is constantly growing. About 7,500 organisations and enterprises were granted the right to conduct these activities.

Last year Russia's independent foreign economic deals topped two billion roubles. The number of joint ventures with foreign partners is on the rise in the Russian Federation: the figure has already topped 800.

The federation's government expanded regular contacts with governors of provinces in Japan, the United States, Turkey, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, the minister noted.

The related cities' movement has stepped up its activities: over 170 cities in the Russian Federation have twin relations with 270 foreign cities.

"This is a very active form of people's diplomacy which enables nations to learn one another better and to gain mutual benefit," Vinogradov said.

He noted that a large delegation of the Russian Federation's cities would participate in the first meeting of twin cities of Western and Eastern Europe, which will be held in Rotterdam this May.

Prokofyev Holds Moscow News Conference

LD2704185490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 27 Apr 90

[Text] The meeting with Soviet and foreign correspondents in the press center of the Moscow City Party Committee has become a tradition. Today at one of these regular meetings Prokofyev, first secretary of the Moscow City Committee, told the journalists about the election of delegates from the capital's party organization to the 28th congress. Among the candidates named are, in part, Comrades Gorbachev, Ryzhkov, Shevardnadze, and Yakovlev.

He reported further that this year 1 May will be celebrated in a new way. The procession and meeting, organized by the trade unions, will be fundamentally different from previous festivities. There will be a demonstration of Muscovites on Red Square, organized by the capital's new soviet.

Comrade Prokofyev shared his impressions with the journalists on the progress of the first session of the new city soviet.

New Tyumen Oblast Secretary; Ligachev Interviewed

LD2704171390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 27 Apr 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer Aleksandr Krutov] Several candidates put their names forward for the post of first secretary of Tyumen Obkom [oblast party committee]. Their platforms were first discussed by primary party organizations and labor collectives. Comrade Chertishchev was elected first secretary of Tyumen Obkom.

[Correspondent] At this stage of the conference it was very important for the delegates to choose new leadership bodies and to elect the obkom first secretary. Originally 13 people put their names forward for this post. Subsequently many withdrew their names. Only five of the candidates put forward their policies. As a result of the voting the delegates named Vladimir Sergeyevich Chertishchev as the oblast's new party leader. He has worked for many years in Tyumen Oblast, in various senior posts, although most recently he was working in the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic. Yegor Kuzmich Ligachev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, secretary of the Central Committee, took part in the work of the conference.

[Ligachev] The Tyumen area has already provided over 5,000 million tonnes of oil and over 4 trillion cubic meters of gas. I think this says a lot. At the same time, however, one must say bluntly that very many imbalances have also been allowed to come about in the process, in the development of this area. Therefore, the development of the social sector was the main topic on the agenda. Basically, man and his needs and requirements dominated discussions at the party conference. One must say frankly that the serious shortcomings in tackling questions connected with people's living conditions have already begun to affect the production and development of the oil and gas industry.

At the conference we agreed it is only through efforts undertaken by the center and by local organizations that these problems, which are of indisputable importance to the entire country, can be resolved. In this regard I would like to make one point. In our society there is a very lively debate going on at the moment about the strengthening of the republics' sovereignty, and our Supreme Soviet legislators have already done quite a bit of work in this direction. This is right. This is the correct path. But I do not think the republics' sovereignty is affected in any way by the fact that from time to time, when the interests of the state and society require it, the endevors of all republics and the entire country have to be concentrated on the solution of problems which concern the whole state, the whole union, problems which are common to all the nationalities, I would say. These include the development of the fuel and energy industry in Tyumen, which accounts for 60 percent of all the oil and gas in our country. This is one of the priority problems on which all the union republics must concentrate their attention. That is why the government has again confirmed that in the 13th Five-Year Plan also, the union republics and the large cities of our country will continue to take part in the building up of the Tyumen area and Western Siberia as a whole. This applies particularly to housing and the whole range of social and cultural amenities. That is the first thing I would like to say.

Second, the delegates stressed we must carry out the renewal of our society on the basis of socialism, that our people have suffered to achieve the socialist ideal itself and that our people have understanding of all the problems. They are very well aware this is the only path by which we can improve both the material and spiritual life of people and involve them in a realistic way in the management of production.

[Correspondent] The Tyumen Oblast part conference will continue its work at the end of May, when it will study no less important questions involving the preparations for the 28th party congress, complete the formation of the obkom establishment, and determine its functions.

Ligachev on Perestroyka in Tyumen Oblast

LD2704142390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1307 GMT 27 Apr 90

[Text] Tyumen, 27 April (TASS)—Yegor Ligachev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, was in Tyumen 24-27 April. He took part in the work of the oblast report-back and election party conference and met workers, specialists, people's deputies, and representatives of the intelligentsia.

The main issue which resounded insistently at the conference and during meetings was the reduction in the effectiveness of the oil and gas complex and the absence of prospects for the resolution of the social problems which have accumulated in the oblast. The West-Siberian oil and gas complex today represents two thirds of all-Union oil extraction and more than a half of gas. But, as the people of Tyumen have noticed, these gigantic scales—and the interests of the country and of all the republics are encompassed in them—have during recent years become the business of the Siberian region alone. A difficult situation has taken shape with the provision of matrials and equipment to factories, as a result of which the state order for oil is being disrupted.

Yegor Ligachev was asked complicated questions and conversations were acute. Tyumen Oblast, the secretary of the Central Committee stressed, indisputably occupies a special place in the development of the country's economy. A fuel and power supply complex of world scale has been formed here, and the main hard currency earner of the country is here. Oil and gas workers demands that more concern be shown for Siberians are justififed. The government and many ministries and departments are now working on their resolution. A governmental commission has been set up. However, the greatest result will be achieved when the efforts of the center are reinforced by intensive work in the towns and rural areas of the oblast.

Prior to his departure, answering a TASS correspondent's question about his impressions of the meetings on Siberian soil, Yegor Ligachev said: During these days I felt that the Party organizations and the renewed Soviets of People's Deputies were powerful forces in Tyumen Oblast, capable of much, and that they were the decisive lynchpins of perestroyka. New people have taken on the leadership, with their own positions, natures, thirst for action and the ardent desire to make life better. But they, taking into account the specific nature of the oblast and the scale of the tasks, need to be helped. Then things will happen.

Union of Russia's Agrarian Workers Hold Congress

PM3004100990 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 28 Apr 90 Second Edition p 3

[TASS report under the rubric "Union of Russia's Agrarian Workers": "Increasing the Prestige of Peasant Labor"]

[Text] The First All-Russian Congress of Agrarian Workers ended on 27 April in the Hall of Columns of the House of the Unions in Moscow. The congress adopted statutes and a program. V.A. Starodubtsev was elected chairman of the agrarian workers' union.

The agrarian union, it is stressed in the statutes, is a sociopolitical organization uniting on a voluntary basis the collectives of kolkhozes [collective farm], sovkhozes [state farm], processing and food enterprises, rural construction organizations, and agro-industrial cooperatives, as well as autonomous peasant farms. Scientific and research organizations and figures in science, art, and culture who share the union's objectives and tasks may also join the union.

The union's objective is the priority development of the agrarian sector of the economy in order to increase the production of food products, create social equality between the city and the countryside, and increase the prestige of peasant labor.

The congress participants were addressed by N.I. Ryzhkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. Analyzing the present state of the USSR's economy, he noted, in particular, the existence of negative processes in the national economy and their relationship with the fact that social activeness is in many cases directed primarily not into constructive work, but into changing distribution relations. Society is constantly under pressure from ultimatums. Here at the congress, delegates have said that the peasantry is against such methods. I believe that is correct: Common goals must be found. Until we consolidate our ranks and orient ourselves toward constructive work, we will not create anything. Last year the country lost 7 million person-days through strikes and interethnic conflicts, and it has lost 9 million person-days in the first quarter of this year alone. How can that fail to affect the national economy in general?

Economic and financial recovery in our country, recovery in the general climate, especially on the consumer market, should proceed from agriculture, the USSR Council of Ministers chairman went on to say. Virtually every country that has embarked on a path of reforms began with this sector. The state of affairs here can rapidly influence people's mood and the general sociopolitical climate. I am therefore convinced that the transformations in our economy must be set in motion beginning with the agro-industrial complex. Another reason why this must be done today is that the food program has become particularly acute and purchases of food products from abroad are continuing on a large scale. Therefore when we say that priorities are necessary, we have in mind first and foremost agriculture. Our task is to create a system such that all economic mechanisms promote rapid development of the countryside. And in this respect the formation of such a body as the agrarian union is highly relevant.

The USSR Council of Ministers chairman spoke about the government's position on the question of the switch to a regulated market economy. There is currently a great deal of talk about how the government is formulating some kind of shattering proposals and planning to use "shock therapy" to resolve economic problems. People say that the program submitted by the government last December at the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies has "given up the ghost" and something else is being proposed to replace it.

I can state authoritatively, N.I. Ryzhkov said, that there is no question of any new program today, but only of the logical development of the program supported by the Congress of People's Deputies. The time has come when we should endow our intentions with concrete content and move on from appeals and declarations to actions. In view of this year's experience, when we can see that the consumer market is out of balance and, instead of trade, what is in effect commodity exchange has begun, we can conclude that prompt decisions must be taken. What paths should we follow? This is what we are working on now, and we should finish preparing the corresponding documents by approximately mid-May. And before doing anything we must convey our views to the whole people. Without the people's consent, without consolidation, and without a common understanding of the need for new paths, we cannot make progress.

The USSR Council of Ministers chairman came out categorically against arguments that we must inevitably pass through some kind of furnace. I believe, he noted, that we have a very clear opportunity to pass through the stage of the transition to a regulated market economy without complications and in an organized manner. Of course, a diversity of opinions exists, especially on such problems as pricing and the material balance of the national economy. One position is, for instance, that free prices (wholesale, purchase, and retail) must be introduced immediately. And the market will supposedly regulate matters and sort everything out. The government believes that we should not plunge into unregulated spontaneity. The country could be thrown into economic and even political chaos. Work is therefore in progress now in order to find the correct combination of state regulation and market relations. This, the head of government said, will be the carefully considered option that we will propose to the people with the hope that they will support us.

In the context of an increase in purchase prices for agricultural output, the problem of the growth in retail prices for basic food products arises. Here a sensible, intelligent approach is needed to ensure that this does not affect the living standard of certain strata of our society. Appropriate compensation must without fail be provided for them, so that no one suffers. And then I am sure the people will understand this matter.

On the question of the material balance of production, again many proposals exist. People think, for instance, that there is no need to balance anything, let everyone find what he needs for himself. But if we abandon everyone now and tell them to find each other, much time will elapse before anything is achieved. Therefore the government's opinion, in principle, is this: It is necessary to keep a certain proportion of output for manufacturing and technical purposes under state control, so as to secure, so to speak, the backbone of the economy.

Expressing his attitude to forms of economic management in the countryside, by way of conclusion, N.I. Ryzhkov expressed support for lessees and indivudal farmers. At the same time he stressed that it is absolutely intolerable to pursue a line of abolishing kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Equal conditions must be created for everyone. There must be a very serious, well considered policy here.

N.I. Ryzhkov answered delegates' questions.

V.I. Vorotnikov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium, and Yu.A. Manayenkov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, took part in the congress.

Ryzhkov Addresses Congress

LD2704202790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 27 Apr 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpt] The founding congress of the Union of Agrarian Workers of Russia [Soyuz Agrarnikov Rossii] ended its work in Moscow today.

[Corespondent V. Golubev] So, at the insistence of the delegates, Comrades Ryzhkov, Vorotnikov, and Manayenkov took part in its work today. Addressing themselves to the head of the government, the speakers stressed the unequal exchange between the town and the countryside, the sharp deterioration in the provision of resources to the countryside, unfair taxes and requisitions and the heavy burden of the state orders. Particular alarm is aroused by the absence of a mechanism for implementing the laws on land, ownership, and leasing which is delaying the development of new economic relations. Speaking about the peasants' social position, one of the speakers said figuratively that in sweeping away the borders between the town and the countryside we are at the same time also sweeping away the countryside.

At the rostrum is the head of the government. Here is an excerpt from his speech:

[Ryzhkov] Wherein lies, well, the question concerning so to speak, your, that is, the agricultural workers' sphere? of course—and we are convinced of this and we have calculations—we must raise the purchase prices in agriculture. The second question that worries you very much is the question of maintaining a balance of materials. Some people think nothing should be distributed, nothing should contributed to stocks, let every person in the country find himself. I sense the reaction is such that you have little hope of finding each other. Evidently, it is necessary to keep a proportion of the equipment and the resources in the hands of the state so that we are able, as we say, to have the framework of the economy.

[Golubev] Comrade Ryzhkov said the concept of the transition to the market would be provided in full by the government to the Supreme Soviet in mid-May. [passage omitted]

CPSU Congress Candidate Delegates Meet

PM2704160790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Apr 90 Second Edition p 3

[A. Petrushov report: "Meeting With Communists"]

[Text] Moscow—A meeting of candidate delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress and the 28th conference of the Moscow city party organization from the Leningradskiy Rayon party organization's No. 4 electoral district was held yesterday at the "Varshava" Movie Theater's concert hall within the framework of the election campaign.

N.I. Ryzhkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, was among the candidate congress delegates.

In his speech Nikolay Ivanovich talked about the complex problems of perestroyka in the party and the country, and dwelt particularly on certain political and economic issues of concern to all Soviet people.

Leningrad Conference Launches Russian Party

LD2704201390 Moscow TASS in English 1939 GMT 27 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondents]

[Text] Leningrad April 27 TASS—"A Russian Communist Party (RCP) shall be recognised as actually existing and requiring organisational formalisation before the 28th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)," says a resolution adopted by the sponsoring congress of the Russian Communist Party within the CPSU. The congress took place in Leningrad.

Speakers at the congress pointed out that Russian communists had always been notable for firm internationalist positions and non-acceptance of any division of communists on an ethnic basis whatsoever. Therefore participants in the congress favoured the formation of the RCP within the CPSU on the same principles as the Ukrainian, Belorussian and other republican organisations exist within the CPSU.

During a debate the majority of delegates favoured keeping unity within the CPSU. The RCP will be finally founded at a conference which will be held in Moscow on June 19.

At the same time the delegates reserved the right to elect a central committee and to complete the founding of the party independently during the congress's second phase which is also to be held in Leningrad.

Delegates devoted much attention to problems of the country's economic recovery. Professor Mikhail Popov, one of the authors of the RCP's economic concept, in a TASS interview, spoke out in favour of an economic programme which presupposes a refinement of the planned economy.

"We firmly reject the 'shock therapy' of a market economy," he said. "we believe that such a 'therapy' would lead to unemployment, price rise, and division of soviety into the superrich and the superpoor and is fraught with a social outburst."

The results of the work of the congress gave rise to various reactions among Leningrad communists. Many of them believe that the programme of the RCP is in many respects consonant with the ideas of the United Front of the Working People, with which the Leningraders associate the period of stagnation.

Such an evaluation was prompted by the fact that Nina Andreyeva, who personifies to many the epoch of Stalinism due to her articles in the Soviet and foreign press, was invited to the forum.

"I think that nothing good can be expected from this congress," said USSR people's deputy Yuriy Boldyrev. "If an organisation adhering to these positions is founded, I will not be able to join such a communist party."

Leningrad Chief on 'Split' Over Party Letter

LD3004081790 Moscow TASS in English 0716 GMT 30 Apr 90

[Text] Leningrad April 30 TASS—"I will do all I can to justify the trust of communists who reelected me first secretary of the Leningrad Regional and City Soviet Communist Party Committee," newly-reelected Party Chief Boris Gidaspov told TASS.

Gidaspov said Leningrad communists were divided over the recent Soviet Communist Party Central Committee letter, "we split into two."

The letter suggested that communists dissociate from those in the party who oppose the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee platform.

Many in Leningrad believe the publication of the letter was either premature or late, Gidaspov said.

Commenting on discussions in the party in the run-up to the 28th Party Congress, Gidaspov said the plurality of opinions was quite natural.

"Only a clash of opinions can produce a position that is not necessarily a guarantee against mistakes, but, in any case, will be much less faulty," he said.

Gidaspov believes Soviet press should be more analytical. However, "we should remember that the press reflects the state of society we live in. Society is characterised by multi-facetedness and a plurality of opinions, and the press reflects all these qualities."

Gidaspov blasted a recent seizure of the Leningrad TV studio by a group of local deputies. "This is unworthy of Leningraders," he said.

Gidaspov said it was necessary to fight for the "minds of the young". The recent party conference decided to set up the post of secretary of the regional party committee who will be in charge of youth problems.

Gidaspov said he will have little time to pursue his scientific work. "The only thing I will continue to concentrate on is the ecological problem. I will do all I can and use my experience from work in Chernobyl and Armenia to help Leningrad solve its ecological problems," he said.

Perm Outlaws Construction of Nuclear Station

LD2804092390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0600 GMT 28 Apr 90

[Text] Will there or will there not be a nuclear electric power station [AES] in Perm Oblast? Animated discussion on this subject continues in the western Urals. The building of the AES was planned for the northern part of the oblast, in the Komi-Permyat Autonomous Okrug.

A decision now has been made at a session of the oblast soviet of people's deputies of the new convocation. It says that planning and survey work in the area of the possible location of the station must be curtailed immediately. A separate paragraph states: The design and construction of the AES on the territory of Perm Oblast is forbidden.

Gorno-Altay Soviet Chairman Becomes Party Chief

PM0105112190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Apr 90 Second Edition p 2

[From roundup of reports by PRAVDA and TASS correspondents under the general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] Gorno-Altaysk, 28 Apr—A conference of the communists of Gorno-Altay Autonomous Oblast has been held here. V.I. Chaptynov, working as chairman of Gorno-Altay Oblast Soviet, was elected first secretary of the oblast CPSU committee in a multiple candidate election.

Western Republics

Moldavian Women's Council Leader Replaced

LD2304230490

[Editorial Report] Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA in Russian on 10 April publishes on page two a report that a plenum of the Moldavian Women's Council granted N.P.Kiriyak's request that she be released from her duties as council chairman in connection with her transfer to other work. L.Ye. Skalnaya was lected to the vacant post.

Future of Chernobyl-Zone City in Doubt

WA2704191490 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 25 Apr 90 p 2

[Article by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA staff correspondent G. Dolzhenko: "A City Without a Future"]

[Text] A bird's eye view of Slavutich is that of a fairy-tale town. Snow-white candles of high-rises, clusters of cottages with peaked roofs, straight boulevards, and cozy lawns suddenly emerge from the green thicket. Mushrooms and berries grow right underfoot, so one can live and be merry. This is how the architects laid out the city. But life makes revisions, and at times harsh revisions, in the plans of the people who quite recently survived the horrors of Chernobyl. Slavutich is no paradise.

Our conversation took place in the office of V. Zhigallo, acting chairman of the city executive committee. The concerns of local executive committee staffers are the same as everywhere else: square meters, provision of amenities, social and cultural facilities.... In the last three years, construction workers have almost fulfilled their minimum program: Some 5,500 apartments have been allocated, there are trade centers, a house of consumer services, and a movie theater. To be sure, there are arrears of about 30,000 square meters of housing, and they are having problems completing medical facilities. The Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Ministry of Construction points to the USSR Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry: Supposedly, they have failed to allocate resources to us, and this is why we have not signed a contract. Meanwhile, R36.6 million in state capital investment have been allocated for this year. A school, a day-care center, the House of Culture, and an athletic center have yet to be built. Next year, another stage of erecting a city designed for 30,000 people will begin, whereas at present there are about 20,000 registered residents. This is serious business: 700 employees of the power station are on the waiting list for housing, or one-third of the entire city list.

In general, everything is as it ought to be. However, a certain amount of reticence is felt in conversations. It is in the air, it clouds one's thinking. Should construction proceed? What is this city for anyway? Could it be that it really appeared as in a fairy tale in order to disappear without a trace later? Slavutich turned out to be "located" in the place with the highest radioactive contamination in the entire area, in its very center.

To this day, nobody has been able to explain coherently how this happened. The area has been surveyed many times. In August 1986, a letter signed by S. Burenkov, the then USSR Minister of Health, and Yu. Izrael, chairman of the State Committee for Hydrometeorology, arrived at the conclusion that no restrictions on residence exist here, including those for children, and that auxiliary farmsteads may be also be developed. A year later, a repeat letter came, this time signed by new USSR Minister of Health Ye. Chazov and, once again, Yu. Izrael confirming that life was possible. Meanwhile, specialists knew from the very beginning about "the dirt"—the ringing [of radiation monitors] has been heard there since the first hours of the accident and to this day.

Strange as it may be, forest rangers rather than nuclear specialists were the first to raise the alarm. They were the ones to encircle the city with gates and warning signs. On their own initiative, the disease control service and employees of the nuclear power station began to take readings on the streets and in the apartments. However, they hissed at the independent dosimeter operators: There are official data, why shouldn't you mind your own business. Why are you agitating the people?

I asked N. Chaban, chief physician of the disease control center, who brought pressure to bear. He laughed and said: I want to go on working, I have already been fired twice. Attempts to report the situation to the top echelons were nipped in the bud: The ministries zealously protected their secrets. A decision on decontaminating Slavutich was made only when the secrets began to leak little by little and the public raised its voice. Last year alone, more than 200,000 cubic meters of soil were removed, and the same amount was shipped in; more than R50 million were spent.

Whichever way you look at it, the radioactive sword of Damocles will forever hang over the city, even if it is polished until it shines. The woods around the city cannot be cut over. According to preliminary calculations, another R50 million will be required to decontaminate them, but even this will hardly be a solution.

In a word, you are damned if you do and damned if you don't. The wind will keep carrying radioactive particles to the city, despite the forest being cordoned off by barbed wire. Meanwhile, apart from the isotopes of cesium and strontium known to exist here, plutonium with a half-life of 24,000 years has also been found in the emissions! Numerous commissions of scientists merely draw up protocols and send recommendations: You can't go here, you can't go there, keep to the footpaths only, vegetables are not to be bought from the populace without a test, special methods are to be used on garden lots, and so on.

One has difficulty calling this normal life. Some theoreticians from the union Academy of Medical Sciences and the Ministry of Health attempted to reassure the public and even developed the uniquely inhumane concept of "safe residence under unsafe conditions" in keeping with which 35 rem in a lifetime and 40 rem per square kilometer is nothing for a human to worry about. To be sure, not one of them has said thus far how small doses of radiation influence the human organism and how the isotopes are to be distributed among babies and schoolchildren.

As was to be expected, the government of the Ukraine, non-opportunistic scientists, and the public questioned this theory. A decision was made to include more than 1,500 localities of five oblasts in the zone of stringent radiation control and to establish additional preferences for a large segment of their population: The right to leave and be placed on waiting lists with a priority in the allocation of housing throughout the entire territory of the republic with the exception of Kiev and resort areas, an allowance of R15 monthly per member of the household for purchasing uncontaminated foodstuffs, reductions of work tenure by five years, and so on.

Incidentally, I did not find extensive radiophobia in Slavutich. Perhaps the inherent disdain of nuclear specialists for continuous risk was a factor. Looking at them, other residents of the city did not give in to panic either, all the more so because finding a dosimeter in this city is easy. To be sure, they began to clean their houses more often and treat their foodstuffs with more care. There is something else that concerns the people. The above resolution of the government applies to all of the surrounding villages—Nedanchichi, Mekshunovka where lots have been allocated for second homes, Redkovka, Chervona Guta, Komarovka, Grabovka—and all of them are getting preferences whereas Slavutich is not.

So what can those who want to move do? The apartments here belong to the ministry. Only those who have worked at the station for 10 years or more may dispose of their apartments as they wish. The rest have no right to swap their apartments even if they could work out an arrangement—strange as it is, there are people who want to live "in the dirt," retire earlier, and be given preferences. It is necessary to finally make an official determination once and for all: Is there even the slightest danger to the residents of Slavutich or not? If there is danger the city ought to be placed in the proper category, with all the bonuses it is entitled to; if it is not so, this needs to be said and justified. At present, nobody can be easily fooled.

The last decision in February of the old composition of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet to close down the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station by 1995 poured oil on the fire. Undoubtedly, this is a commendable though belated decision. However, there are 300 young specialists at the station; thousands of people have been allocated marvelous apartments recently, and all of them have plans for the future.

However, what is to be done if the provider-station is not around anymore? The issue of finding jobs for the families of nuclear power station personnel is acute in this city to begin with. To be sure, the station cannot be shut down just like that, and even after it is closed the units will have to be serviced for a long time. Also, after the accident an assignment was given by N. Ryzhkov to think through building dairy processing facilities and shops for the assembly of metering instruments here. However, when will this come true, and will it at all? Uncertainty makes the people nervous and injects tension into the difficult life of Slavutich.

First Secretary of the City Committee of the party V. Lukyanenko said: "The atmosphere in the city is hot. The populace has formed strata according to its interests, and each group is after its own goal. At the meetings and rallies, it comes close to hysteria."

I was to see for myself very soon how true these words were. Teacher L. Pavlova-Savelyeva, cochairman of the Pripyat Society, told me about many things she has encountered since moving here. When the employees of the station were invited to move from Kiev to Slavutich they were promised literally mountains of gold. Many of them left behind good apartments, but ran into speculation and indifference here. They got nothing of what the country has put together for the victims. To this day, 100 people have not had a medical checkup. They were placed on the general list as far as the supply of foodstuffs is concerned, whereas the health of all of them turned out to be damaged. A survey done on their own initiative showed that only seven percent of the children were healthy. In the first quarter, three out of 16 births were still births, and five babies were found to have serious diseases. Not one of the "station people" got to take part in the advertised trip of child-victims to Israel (incidentally, Ukrainian SSR Minister of Health Yu. Spizhenko referred to it as a tourist trip), despite three children in Slavutich having acute leucosis and 13 children having leukemia; only one child went to Cuba.

This is the situation in the city today. The attitudes of the people reflect everything: the initial lies of officials, lack of confidence in belated admissions, the sluggishness of economic managers, the backwardness and confusion of science, and our overall homegrown negligence. However, the heaviest burden is that of the lack of a future for Slavutich or, more precisely, the unknown: Does the city have a future or not?

So far, no one has come up with a direct and complete answer. Meanwhile, it is badly needed. If we are not in a position to respond ourselves we should swallow our pride and ask for outside scientific and financial assistance. Just several days ago, the Council of Ministers of the republic appealed to the governments and the public of foreign countries and international organizations with a call for cooperation in hopes of receiving support because the Chernobyl disaster is increasingly becoming global in nature, and we cannot cope with its consequences alone.

Ukrainian Official Cited on Local Soviets

LD2004173290 Kiev International Service in Ukrainian 1700 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Throughout the day the situation in Lvov remained tense. The square opposite the oblast soviet building, in which a meeting was in progress, became the epicenter of passions. Demands are being voiced in the city to form the oblast soviet exclusively from representatives of informal organizations. The situation became overheated when Vyacheslav Chornovol, one of the leaders of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, was elected chairman of the oblast soviet.

However, what has happened in Lvov and in some other regions of the Ukraine cannot be regarded as typical for the republic. Vasyl Stadnyk, an official of the Ukraine SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Presidium, was interviewed by our correspondent, Andrey Sylenko:

[Begin recording] [Stadnyk] On the whole, one can say that in the overwhelming majority of local soviets, representatives of party and state organs were elected to the leading posts. In the composition of the newly elected soviets, (?party members) make up 86 percent. However, in several regions of our republic—in Lvov, Ivano-Frankovsk and Ternopol Oblasts—the leading posts are occupied by representatives of Rukh [Ukrainian People's Front for Perestroyka], the Ukrainian Language Society, and the Green World Association.

[Sylenko] I've been told that the representatives of these organizations are beginning to run the soviets in a new way?

[Stadnyk] Regretfully, they have passed a number of decisions which crudely contradict our constitution. This fact, whatever way you look at it, cannot be regarded as normal. If they fail to display common sense, then, no doubt, the Supreme Soviet Presidium, and later the Supreme Soviet itself will rescind these decisions and, assisted by law-and-order organs [orhany upravlinnya], will normalize things in accordance with the law. [end recording]

Lukyanenko Elected Ukrainian Republic Party Head

LD3004213790 Kiev International Service in English 1800 GMT 30 Apr 90

[Text] Next is a report on the constituent congress of the Ukrainian Republican Party which ended its work today in Kiev:

The Ukrainian Republican Party was established in Kiev at a constituent congress convened upon the initiative of the Ukrainian Helsinki Association. The name of the new party was proclaimed yesterday, but only today, when the delegates of the congress confirmed its statute, the Ukrainian Republican Party took on force. The congress also approved the self-disbandment of the Ukrainian Helsinki Association, on the basis of which the new party was formed. And this means that the initial organizations and societies of the Helsinki Association will conduct a reregistration of the Ukrainian Helsinki Association members into members of the newly formed political party, in accordance with the requirements of its program and statute.

The new party, as singled out in its program, will be working for the formation of a Ukrainian independent united state; [words indistinct] economic, industrial revival; consolidation and self-determination of the people of the Ukraine; raising their well being; establishing a democratic system and developing society.

One of the leaders of the new party, people's deputy of the Ukraine Bohdan Horyn, in an interview for Radio Kiev, underlined that the congress has led the Ukraine onto a new stage of multiparty existence, that is, party pluralism. Along with the Ukrainian Farmers' Party and the Communist Party of the Ukraine, the Ukrainian Republican Party will be now one of the many parties existing in the Ukraine, and such a multiparty system will make it possible for the republic to overcome the crisis situation it's found itself in. Party pluralism will now make the Communist Party of the Ukraine also to reconsider its present position. It would be desirable that the parties should not confront one another, but work jointly with the aim of taking the Ukraine out of a heavy [difficult] situation, first of all the economic and ecological one.

The transition of the Ukraine to a multiparty system, to party pluralism, is a historical moment and it will obviously promote the stabilization of our political situation and will lead to changes for the better, which the independent party formations are striving for.

The congress elected the leading bodies of the Ukrainian Republican Party. People's Deputy Levko Lukyanenko has been elected the chairman of the new party.

Then the congress adopted several resolutions.

Taking part in the work of the congress as guests were delegations from Moscow, Leningrad, Latvia, Estonia, the United States, Canada, Belgium, Poland, Great Britain.

Today the congress ended its work.

New Ukrainian Separatist Party Formed

AU3004192890 Paris AFP in English 1906 GMT 30 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, April 30 (AFP)—Nearly 500 Ukrainian human rights activists on Monday formed a new party calling for an independent Ukraine, nationalists said.

According to a statement from the Ukrainian nationalist movement Rukh which reached here Monday, the new Republican Party wants Ukraine, the second-biggest Soviet republic in terms of population, to become "fully democratic and independent."

The new party, led by Levko Lukyanenko, said the 1922 Treaty of the Union which currently governs Moscow's relations with the 15 Soviet republics is "illegal, because it was adopted by illegal governments."

It also called for independent Ukrainian armed forces, a Ukrainian central bank, currency and diplomatic service.

It wants to nationalise Communist Party property in the republic, the introduction of a free-market economy and the disbanding of the KGB state security police in the Ukraine.

Ukraine has a population of 51.7 million, compared to the Russian Republic's 145 million.

Mr. Lukyanenko, a former political prisoner from Chernigov, in western Ukraine, heads the Ukraine Helsinki Watch Group.

The group monitors compliance with the Helsinki human rights accords signed in 1975 by the 35 members of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe—all Europe except Albania plus the United States and Canada.

Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party Founded

LD3004132390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1000 GMT 30 Apr 90

[Text] In Lvov the founding regional conference of the Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party [Krestyanskoy Demokraticheskoy Partii] has taken place. Its participants adopted program documents and elected leading organs of the regional party section. In the near future official registration in the Lvov Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies is expected.

Ukrainian Helsinki Union Holds Kiev Congress

LD3004121590 Kiev International Service in English 2330 GMT 29 Apr 90

[Text] Today a constituent congress of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union started its work in Kiev with the aim of turning it into political party. In attendance are 500 delegates as well as 250 guests, including representatives of Ukrainian communities in the United States, Canada, Australia, and other countries. The discussion today focused on the draft program of the future party.

In an interview for Radio Kiev, Levko Lukyanenko, head of the executive committee of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union Ukraine SSR [Soviet Socialist Repubic] people's deputy, said that the union, which is going to take the name republican party, will further abide by democratic principles and work for turning Ukraine into an independent republic.

Tomorrow the congress will continue its work.

Ukrainian Peasants Party Holds Congress

LD3004133290 Kiev Domestic Service in Ukrainian 0230 GMT 29 Apr 90

[Text] Yesterday, with the participation of kolkhoz [collective farm] workers of West Ukraine and also from Dnepropetrovsk and Kiev Oblasts—in all, over 260 delegates were present—a constituent congress of the Ukrainian Peasants-Democratic Party was held in Lvov. It approved the rules of the party and adopted an appeal to peasants of the Ukraine. The delegates also elected the party's council.

Further on Girenko Trip to Kherson Oblast

PM0105082390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Apr 90 Second Edition p 3

[RATAU-TASS report under the general heading: "Meetings With Working People"]

[Text] Kherson, 29 Apr—CPSU Central Committee Secretary A.N. Girenko was in Kherson Oblast 26-29 April. During meetings and conversations with Kherson people there was a discussion of the course of perestroyka in the oblast, and a wide range of questions connected with the democratization of public life, the renewal of the party, and the reform of the economy was touched on.

The greater part of the trip was a familiarization with the life of the labor collectives and party organization of the most remote rayon, Genicheskiy. There the CPSU Central Committee secretary met with communists working in health, education, and culture institutions and asked about the problems that concern them. The conversations with field and livestock unit workers turned into a detailed, businesslike discussion. The country people talked about the work of lease collectives working in all the rayon's farms and about Communists' initiative in introducing new production relations in the countryside. A great deal was also said about difficulties in providing social amenities for the countryside.

At meetings in labor collectives and at a meeting of the rayon party-economic aktiv attention was focused on preparations for the 28th CPSU Congress, the course of the discussion of the draft CPSU Central Committee platform and draft party statutes, the enhancement of primary organizations' authority, and the international education of working people.